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Freedom, Society, And The Individual In Early Modern Women's Thought
Abstract
This dissertation describes and analyses several different approaches to the relation between individuals and
wider social groupings in the work of Margaret Cavendish, Sophie de Grouchy, Gabrielle Suchon, Mary
Wollstonecraft, and other women of the early modern period in Europe. From these disparate
sources—Cavendish’s vitalist metaphysics, Suchon’s practical ethics, Wollstonecraft’s polemical aesthetics—a
unifying political concern can be drawn: one of how individuals relate to their societies, and how this relation
can be distorted or outright controlled by existing power relations.
Each chapter approaches this subject from a different side: the tension of individual freedom and universal
order in Cavendish’s metaphysics; the problem of autonomy for socially-constituted subjects in Suchon’s
ethics and, by contrast, in the ethics of contemporary relational autonomy theory; the revolutionary solutions
to the gendered traps of aesthetic ideology presented by Mary Wollstonecraft; and the practical, activist route
to the achievement of freedom in the actions of the radical republican women of the French Revolution.
In analysing the political bases of these questions I aim to provide new interpretations of these works of the
early modern era, many of which have been unjustly neglected until very recently. But I also motivate changes
in the methodology of early modern philosophy that are ongoing and that, I hope, can be pushed yet further.
By focusing on the political in early modern women philosopher’s work, and by reading that work politically, I










early modern, feminism, freedom, politics
Subject Categories
Philosophy
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3248
 





Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 





Supervisor of Dissertation  
      
______________      
Karen Detlefsen       
Professor of Philosophy and Education       
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
 
_________________ 
Errol Lord, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Graduate Chair 
 
Dissertation Committee  
 
Lisa Miracchi, Assistant Professor of Philosophy 





 To reflect upon and record the support that I have received and 
collaborations I have made over the last several years is a great pleasure but a 
huge task. I have received a great deal of help from a great many quarters, and I 
am grateful for all of it, even if I cannot list it all here.  
 First, I am grateful to Karen Detlefsen, my dissertation supervisor, who 
brought me several years ago to the unexpected field of early modern women’s 
philosophy, helped me forge my own path through it, and provided invaluable 
support at every step. I am also grateful to my other committee members, Lisa 
Miracchi and Alex Guerrero, for their academic and emotional support 
throughout the process, to my friend and fellow traveller Allauren Forbes, and to 
Jacqueline Broad, Sandrine Bergès, and Alan Coffee, along with all my colleagues 
in the University of Pennsylvania philosophy department, the Philadelphia Early 
Modern Paper Workshop, and in the global early modern women’s philosophy 
community.  
 I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues at Riepe College 
House, and my family, who have supported me throughout. Finally, I would like 
to thank Hayley Rennie, who first taught me philosophy at Longley Park Sixth 













 This dissertation describes and analyses several different approaches to 
the relation between individuals and wider social groupings in the work of 
Margaret Cavendish, Sophie de Grouchy, Gabrielle Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
and other women of the early modern period in Europe. From these disparate 
sources—Cavendish’s vitalist metaphysics, Suchon’s practical ethics, 
Wollstonecraft’s polemical aesthetics—a unifying political concern can be drawn: 
one of how individuals relate to their societies, and how this relation can be 
distorted or outright controlled by existing power relations.    
 Each chapter approaches this subject from a different side: the tension of 
individual freedom and universal order in Cavendish’s metaphysics; the problem 
of autonomy for socially-constituted subjects in Suchon’s ethics and, by contrast, 
in the ethics of contemporary relational autonomy theory; the revolutionary 
solutions to the gendered traps of aesthetic ideology presented by Mary 
Wollstonecraft; and the practical, activist route to the achievement of freedom in 
the actions of the radical republican women of the French Revolution.  
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 In analysing the political bases of these questions I aim to provide new 
interpretations of these works of the early modern era, many of which have been 
unjustly neglected until very recently. But I also motivate changes in the 
methodology of early modern philosophy that are ongoing and that, I hope, can 
be pushed yet further. By focusing on the political in early modern women 
philosopher’s work, and by reading that work politically, I argue, we can effect a 
wider break with older methodologies and open up many new avenues of inquiry.   
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i.1 Early Modern Narratives   
 
The four chapters of this dissertation are all concerned with examining how 
individuals interact with larger social groupings of which they are a part—societies, 
governments, even the universe itself—through the lens of the social and political 
thought of women in England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Each chapter explores this relation from a different direction and in a different context: 
through metaphysics, ethics, revolutionary politics, and aesthetics. And though each 
chapter contains its own strong central thesis, I do not aim to forge from them a single 
grand claim about how individuals and societies relate, or how they ought to relate, or 
how we ought to read the early modern women philosophers in the light of this question. 
Such a claim would, I think, obviate the advantage to be had in using multiple 
perspectives in the first place: their differences are as important as their similarities. 
Rather, through the chapters I seek to illuminate again pathways through this subject-
society relation that were visible at the time of Margaret Cavendish and Gabrielle 
Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft and Sophie de Grouchy, and to think along them again 
with a view to, perhaps, looking newly at contemporary conditions. This search is 
informed by, and in turn has informed, a number of methodological and philosophical 
preoccupations that are present throughout the dissertation.  
These preoccupations follow, and aim to expand upon, an unfolding change that 
has been occurring in the study of the history of philosophy for the last few decades. 
During this period historians of philosophy have sought to alter, challenge, or undo the 
famous “standard narrative” of early modern philosophy: that narrative that sees the era 
beginning with the spontaneous generation of René Descartes; constructs Spinoza and 
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Leibniz as his “rationalist” epigones; traverses the Channel to the “empiricist” Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume; then returns to the continent to crown Kant as the era’s synthesis 
and apogee.  
Like many historical stories, the standard narrative probably does not date from 
the period it purports to describe, but achieved its form later. Knud Haakonssen locates 
the beginning of the “epistemological paradigm” of the history of philosophy in the work 
of, separately, Thomas Reid and Kant at the very end of the eighteenth century; this 
paradigm was then standardised in textbooks, at differing rates in different locales, over 
the course of the nineteenth century.1 Don Garrett claims that it was British Idealist 
followers of Hegel that first developed the standard narrative “toward the end of the 
nineteenth century.”2 Alberto Vanzo, against both Haakonssen and Garrett, argues that 
the narrative was developed by Kantian historians in the first half of the nineteenth 
century but only became “standard” later, noting key differences between “our” standard 
narrative and the Hegelian ones that remained popular competitors into the twentieth 
century.3  
Whatever its provenance, the standard narrative does provide a useful structure 
that makes one kind of sense of the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy as the 
bringing-together of rationalist and empiricist doctrines rather neatly at the tail end of 
the eighteenth century. But when this becomes the only lens through which the thought 
of the early modern period is understood it also becomes a severe limit on the potential 
of contemporary thought and of contemporary historians. Certainly the early modern 
period has more to offer us now than just this tale of the emergence of transcendental 
idealism from the battle between “continental rationalists” and “British empiricists.”  
                                                        
1 Haakonssen 103 
2 Garrett 49 
3 Vanzo 259, 267, 274 
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Clearly, one of the primary problems with the standard narrative is the poverty of 
its representation of early modern thought. It presents us with seven European men as 
the minds and faces of all the philosophy of a period of globalisation and revolution. By 
now, much work has already been done on redressing this imbalance by focusing on the 
work of the many women philosophers of the time: as I will discuss in more detail 
shortly, this dissertation is one contribution to that process. Progress in contemporary 
history of philosophy is also being made in considering the period from outside of the 
small cluster of western European countries in which the seven legendary sages lived, 
and in considering the ways that thought in Europe was influenced by growing 
connections with the wider world—and vice versa.4    
But the narrative is limited even beyond making seven men stand for all the 
thought of the period. In its extreme form, it focuses exclusively on epistemology and 
metaphysics: those questions relating to what is in the world and how we can come to 
know anything of it. The narrative thereby even overlooks large portions of the work of 
those figures it does consecrate, or shapes their ideas to fit itself. A dedicated vivisector 
like Descartes is made to appear opposed to empiricism, and Berkeley is lined up 
alongside Locke against a fellow idealist like Leibniz.5 Questions of politics, ethics, 
beauty, education, sociality, and natural science are marginalised alongside the people 
that sought to answer them. 
Further, the particular focuses and preoccupations of the standard narrative can 
also lead to methodological distortions in its consideration of texts. For example, Jorge 
Secada has noted that even for Descartes’ Meditations, surely the ur-text of the entire 
                                                        
4 Shapiro 366 
5 Vanzo 273. The alternative schema that sees Leibniz and Berkeley as “idealists” and Hume and Locke as 
“realists” is what Vanzo calls the “Hegelian narrative,” and with this he differentiates that narrative from 
the standard one. Of course it is just as much a constructed narrative, and no more representative of the 
full gamut of the period. Hegel’s own comparison of Berkeley and Leibniz can be found in Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, volume 3, 366-7.  
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narrative as it is now presented to us, philosophers’ “focus on argument and doctrine” 
has caused them to overlook much that is of philosophical importance.6 Rather than 
treating them as a philosophical treatise or set of essays, or—what may amount to the 
same—mining them for rational arguments to reconstruct, Secada argues for a close 
attention to the Meditations as meditations, as texts operating in a very particular 
chosen genre and thereby with certain goals that treatises mightn’t share. Work such as 
this moves us away from the strict paradigms of the standard narrative just as 
considering little-known figures or texts does.  
This move away from the standard narrative is now very much in progress, and 
making strides. Lisa Shapiro places the beginnings of a serious challenge to the narrative 
in the work of historians that sought to contextualise its metaphysical concerns within 
the history of science more generally. This contextualism, Shapiro argues, began then to 
shift the narrative’s rigid shape. Considerations of how bodies work and interact are 
moved into view alongside the old question of what they are. This means that Descartes’ 
vivisections were no longer in vain and, more importantly, brings some new figures onto 
the field of the early modern canon: Bacon, Boyle, Hooke, Hobbes, Newton, Cavendish, 
and du Châtelet.7  
As we look deeper into multiple historical contexts and try to undo the 
homogenisation of the canon a great number of alternative narratives become possible—
just as they were possible before the standardisation of the rationalism-empiricism-Kant 
narrative.  Here, my focus on the relation between individuals and larger groups 
traverses metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, but in all cases it leads me back to politics, 
another area that was neglected in the history of early modern philosophy until fairly 
recently. For the most part I do not focus on the crafting of theories or descriptions of 
                                                        
6 Secada 201 
7 Shapiro 371 
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new societies of the kind put forward by Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau during the period. 
Rather, the views on the freedom of individuals within groups that I find here are routed 
more strongly in their immediate contexts: they seek to criticise existing structures and 
systems, analyse those systems’ bases and causes, and consider possible routes out of the 
present. Practical political work such as this is common in the writing of women 
philosophers of the period, who in many cases were better placed than men to 
understand the restrictions and incoherences of existing (and persisting) conditions.  
This focus on politics, and especially a politics that pays attention to the present, 
opens up fruitful ground for a philosophy of the early modern period that exceeds and 
moves away from the standard narrative. There is a vast amount that could be done here. 
Even if we limit ourselves to considering only Europe and the places it subjugated, the 
early modern period was one of extraordinary political change and turmoil. It saw the 
deaths of kings; wars of religion; revolutions; the expansion of slaveholding across the 
Atlantic and its forcible destruction by the enslaved in Haiti; the zenith then decline of 
the Dutch global empire and the earliest rise of the British. Its thought included 
millenarians and religious dissidents and levellers, and—allowing ourselves anachronism 
for a moment—feminists, anarchists, communists, anti-imperialists, and punks.8 Doing 
justice to the narratives that could be drawn out of these ideas and the people that made 
them will, and has, taken many lifetimes.  
At the broadest scope, then, this dissertation is one of many attempts of recent 
years to look at the early modern period of European philosophy afresh. This entails 
looking for new questions and new figures—in my case especially I look toward women 
political philosophers and the questions and concerns that, I believe, interested them. 
But to look anew like this, especially in the face of an institutionalisation that has 
                                                        
8 For the classic statement on just the radical thought of the English Revolution, see Hill, The World Turned 
Upside Down.  
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proceeded along pernicious, oppressive lines—that has excluded people on the basis of 
their being women, rather than for any other reason—also requires that we turn to new 
genres of philosophy and develop new methods for dealing with them. As Shapiro notes,9  
and as we saw in the work of Secada on the Meditations, not all philosophers wrote 
treatises; as I shall come to argue in the course of this dissertation, not all philosophers 
wrote at all. This is less controversial than it seems: think of Socrates. But it does require 
different methods from those traditionally used by historians of philosophy.  
Even reading texts contextually and with an eye to political content requires some 
difference in methods. I have worked with particular political preoccupations in mind, 
and have sought to place the work of the figures I read or consider within that wider 
context. I do not think I have thereby done significant interpretative violence. But we are 
each our own particularities, and one important commitment, I believe, in a contextual 
study of the history of philosophy that admits of many narratives is forthrightness about 
those lenses we look through.  
So here I have tried to read figures that have not frequently been read, for the 
political content that interests both me and them, using methods that have not 
frequently been used. I aim to be one in a number of recent salvos that thereby seek to 
destabilise and decentre the standard narrative. I will turn next to the specific ways I 
have set about this task.  
 
i.2 Freedom and Society 
 
As I stated at the outset, I work to achieve this goal of bringing new figures, new 
genres, and new content into the history of early modern philosophy through 
investigating the general theme of individuals and their societies in the work of Margaret 
                                                        
9 Shapiro 379 
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Cavendish, Gabrielle Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy, and other 
women of the early modern period. This very broad theme has many facets, and in the 
four chapters of the dissertation I work to illuminate the relations of individuals and 
societies through several of these facets. Nevertheless, there are a number of common 
theoretical positions that are articulated and defended throughout: a dynamic and 
constructive approach to the understanding of individual freedom; a similarly dynamic 
approach to charting the complexities of the ontological nature of individuals; and a 
commitment to the primacy of politics in allowing us to understand both these issues 
and the thought of the period more generally, as can be observed in the political readings 
I give of the metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics of the philosophers on whom I focus.  
In this section of the introduction, then, I will add meat to this skeleton, 
illustrating the substance of the above positions through a summary of their treatment in 
each of the dissertation’s chapters. This will serve to introduce the core arguments 
specific to each chapter alongside their contribution to the project’s overall theme. In 
this way, and through the project as a whole, I hope to build up a particular way of 
thinking through the relation of individual to society as the problem is dealt with in 
various forms—metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, straightforwardly political—by some of 
the women philosophers of the early modern period. I propose, that is, a separate, newer 
narrative: one that looks to how societies treat their people, and vice versa, from the 
perspectives of some of those that were mistreated.  
 
i.2.1 Chapter One: Margaret Cavendish’s Sympathetic Metaphysics 
 
Chapter One makes two arguments regarding the role of sympathy in Margaret 
Cavendish’s metaphysics. The first is a historical argument about the place that 
Cavendish occupies in the history of the development of sympathy as a concept, from an 
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animating vital force that permeates the universe to an individual affect experienced only 
by humans. The second argument is that this unusual understanding of sympathy allows 
Cavendish to explain how Nature appears mostly (but not entirely) ordered and 
harmonious without having to contradict her other metaphysical commitment to the 
freedom of all creatures.  
For Cavendish, the capacity of all things to freely move themselves is a central 
tenet of metaphysics. When a billiard ball strikes another, nothing is transferred, nor 
does the first ball somehow force the other to move. Rather, Cavendish argues, the 
motion of the second ball comes from within itself: the second ball, being composed of 
the same rational and sensitive matter as everything else, senses the motion of the first 
and then chooses to respond in kind by moving itself. All motion in the universe, then, is 
free for Cavendish in the sense that the thing moving is always the principal cause of its 
own motion—nothing is ever made or ‘forced’ to move by anything else.   
A problem arises in this picture once we come to consider that the universe 
appears, to us, to be largely orderly and harmonious. Certainly, things hold together 
fairly well and move with some regularity: the infinite plenum in which Cavendish 
believes is not just a chaotic primordial soup, as we might expect when we first hear that 
all matter in the universe, down to its tiniest motes, is able freely to move itself as it 
chooses. Contemporary scholarship is divided on how Cavendish can account for this 
orderliness while not constructing a deified Nature that is able to overrule the free 
choices of all the things that are her parts.  
I argue that this can best be achieved by paying close attention to Cavendish’s 
historically unique account of sympathy. For Cavendish, sympathy is distributed 
universally within Nature, and she uses it to explain otherwise mysterious phenomena in 
much the same way that it was used by earlier philosophers and chymists. However, 
because for Cavendish everything is rational and everything is sensitive, sympathy is not 
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a mysterious force generated by God or a quasi-mystical kind: it is, as we might expect as 
contemporary readers, an emotion felt by individuals for one another. The upshot of this 
is that Cavendish can use the affective and affectionate bonds that hold between the 
separate and free creatures of the universe to explain how orderliness prevails without 
outside interference.  
For Cavendish, then, freedom is a natural fact, an intrinsic quality of matter that 
cannot be overridden, and that needn’t be overridden to explain how order can prevail. 
We can move further than this, however. Chapter One also considers the work of Sophie 
de Grouchy, who more than a century after Cavendish argued that sympathy could be 
used to explain the positive foundations of civil society—justice and rights. De Grouchy 
claimed that these values are the result of the development of a sympathy for others that 
we acquire in early childhood. We arrive at the concepts of justice and right by 
combining our inclination to care for the well-being of others with our ability to think 
rationally. For de Grouchy, ordered societies are like the universe is for Cavendish: they 
have sympathy at their very roots.  
The well-ordered de Grouchean society, then, is one whose institutions of law and 
order can be recognised as directly resulting from the sympathetic bonds its people have 
for one another. (De Grouchy, having lived through the French Revolution, was clear 
that existing societies were not well-ordered, and had institutions that suppressed rather 
than encouraged sympathy). People then are ruled by themselves: the laws do not 
constrain them, but are created by, and help to codify, their emotional and rational 
needs.  
Returning to Cavendish, we can see a more substantial account of freedom 
developing—one that, in keeping with the positions of this dissertation, traverses the line 
between the metaphysical and political. Nature herself, being made of matter, is a 
thinking and feeling creature for Cavendish—an infinite one—and, like all her smaller 
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parts, she is made up of matter that itself thinks and feels. If, as Karen Detlefsen argues, 
her “laws” are for ethical regularities—akin to human laws10—then, if my arguments are 
correct, the laws of Nature are themselves the outgrowth of the sympathetic bonds of her 
parts. Everything is material for Cavendish, including thoughts and communication: 
Nature cannot generate ethical prescriptions from nothing any more than I can generate 
new thoughts without the matter that makes my mind moving in particular ways. Nature 
as a whole, then, could be just like the de Grouchean well-ordered society: an order that 
arises from the sympathetic feelings of individuals for one another, and that thereby 
generates its own ethical prescriptions. For Cavendish, we are not subject to the law of 
Nature: we are participants in it.  
This gives us a more radical and, I think, concrete image of freedom than the one 
of simple lack of determination with which we started. All the creatures of Nature are not 
just free because they may do whatever they want, but because they have the capacity to 
participate in the functioning of the order in which they exist—because the laws above 
them are nothing but their own collective activity. As we shall see, this participatory 
vision of freedom is one that flows through all the chapters of this dissertation.  
Finally, however, we should note that what constitutes an individual—which we 
might, in other circumstances, wish to hold forth as the obvious subject of freedom—is a 
profoundly slippery notion for Cavendish. She believes in an infinitely divisible plenum, 
and in matter that is rational and sensitive down to the infinitesimal scale: it is thereby 
very difficult to say where, for Cavendish, one individual stops and the next begins. At 
times, for instance, it seems not just that all the matter of my body is co-operating to a 
particular end, but also the matter of things around me, like a beer can and a chair. At 
others, not even all the matter of my body works together, as when I am mentally or 
physically ill. How then can I claim to be a separate and distinct individual?  
                                                        
10 Detlefsen 80-1 
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I’m not sure that, in the Cavendishean framework, I can. But this needn’t be a 
limitation—indeed, I believe it is a virtue. For Cavendish, individuals are complicated 
things: forever shrinking, growing, turning to inner turmoil or finding bonds far beyond 
their skins. Sometimes individuals resemble societies and sometimes societies resemble 
individuals. If freedom is to be understood in this collective, participatory way then we 
must look past notions that attempt to limit it to the capacities of the individual mind or 
body. It will be helpful to have this thought in mind as we turn to the next chapter. 
Chapter One, then, introduces and illustrates the interactions of the three 
primary themes of the dissertation. Beginning with a view of freedom as the simple 
unconstrained action of individuals, and noting the problem that this seems to raise for 
Cavendish—that such freedom, if it really existed, would result in permanent chaos—it 
offers a solution based on the expressly political thought of Sophie de Grouchy. In this 
solution, not only freedom, but individuals themselves, are seen to depend on 
sympathetic co-operation. In my view, the parts of Cavendish’s Nature are free not just 
because their activity is unconstrained, but because in their unconstrained activity, 
guided by their sympathetic affections, they create the orderly structures in and through 
which they persist.    
 
i.2.2 Chapter Two: The Limitations of Autonomy in Gabrielle Suchon and 
Contemporary Philosophy 
 
Chapter Two, then, looks closely at the relation between freedom and the 
individual. It compares the analyses of contemporary theorists of relational autonomy 
with that of the seventeenth-century nun Gabrielle Suchon. Both the contemporary 
theorists and Suchon point to the limitations of conceptions of autonomy that constitute, 
or posit, a socially-atomised individual as autonomy’s proper subject. Such conceptions 
improperly ignore the effects, both negative and positive, that social circumstances have 
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upon the capacity of individuals to govern themselves: they falsely and immorally 
assume that individuals can and should act in ways that proceed directly from some 
asocial core of themselves.  
For Suchon, that this is impossible is a fact, resulting from our fallen natures, 
against which we—and especially women, who suffer the greatest of the deprecations of 
heteronomy-generating ideologies—can struggle more or less successfully. For the 
contemporary theorists, the impetus is to create a new conception of autonomy, for two 
reasons. First, the possibility of political progress toward a better society—one not so 
detrimental to the autonomy of its members—requires, it is asserted, that it is possible 
for people to act in some way contrary to their social programming. If people are wholly 
heteronomous, then the prospect of change, especially the destruction of patriarchy, 
looks dim. Second, a conception of autonomy is necessary to make normative assessment 
of individuals—judgements of their morality—possible, or at least possible without being 
outright tyrannical.  
Before I turn to my own intervention in this discussion, a brief but necessary note 
on terminology. So far I have largely used the term “freedom” to denote my subject; in 
Chapter Two, and my summary of it here, I use “autonomy.” This is largely because I 
follow the lead of the relational autonomy theorists that use the term, rather than for any 
more substantive reason. Nevertheless the two terms have different connotations. In my 
usage, “autonomy,” following its etymological origins denoting self-government for 
polities, largely emphasises the internal, psychological condition necessary for an 
individual to shape their life and/or endorse their choices as speaking, in some way, of 
who they are. It is hence less concerned with the external, concrete limitations or aids 
that are also encompassed by the broader “freedom.” As we shall see, I think this entire 
schema is severely limited. But it is helpful for the internal logic of the chapter to speak 
of “autonomy,” and this is what I mean by it.  
13 
 
Chapter Two, then, contrasts Suchon with later theorists in feminist philosophy, 
such as Catriona Mackenzie, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Paul Benson, and Natalie Stoljar, 
who argue in various ways for the thesis of “relational autonomy.” These theses all 
attempt to find a space for autonomy within the social, thereby opposing the overly-
atomised patriarchal image of autonomy and taking into account the operations of 
ideology and social pressure on individual psyches.  
I argue that all these attempts fail to sufficiently account for the conceptual 
incompatibility between autonomy and sociality. Following Mackenzie’s split of the 
conceptual terrain, I consider first Meyers’ authenticity and competence-based account 
that sees choices as proceeding from an authentic, true self when they are made using a 
particular set of critical skills; Stoljar’s substantive, norm-based account that 
understands autonomy as arising only when one acts according to norms that are not 
false; and Benson’s account of autonomy as “normative competence,” the ability of 
individuals to understand and endorse the norms by which they are judged in their 
communities.  
All these theories, I argue, describe qualities or experiences that are important to 
have, and that far too few do have. But they also all seek to carve out a space for 
autonomy within prevailing social conditions that are understood to be bad and harmful; 
and to this extent, I show, they fail. If we understand ourselves as thoroughly and 
perniciously structured by these conditions, then we cannot take for granted that our 
self-authorisation and self-governance strategies even lead us in the direction of 
autonomy: they could just as well lead us away, or in circles. Ultimately this is because 
even the relational autonomy theories cleave too closely to the individual as the proper 
subject of freedom: to be free, on these grounds, is to be an individual possessed of some 
collection of qualities, strategies, and/or beliefs—and lacking external and internal 
impediments—with which one can hack one’s way into autonomy. These qualities might 
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be impossible to attain as a totally atomised being, on the theories’ readings, and instead 
be the result of social structures. To be autonomous might yet involve having 
relationships with other beings. But autonomy remains an individualised property.  
In Suchon’s account, social mores and ideologies are also understood to be 
harmful to autonomy—what Suchon calls freedom—and to that of women in particular. 
For Suchon this is because bad customs and attitudes structure our desires and influence 
our emotions such that our God-given reason, by which we ought rightly be guided, is 
clouded or suppressed. Suchon talks in some detail about how ideology operates in this 
way: by forcing women into vocations to which they are unsuited (Suchon herself only 
escaped the convent after many years), social structures not only directly impinge upon 
their autonomy, but also constrain their reason and inflame their emotions such that 
new autonomy-damaging mental states are generated. Material and psychic oppression 
are hence utterly intertwined for Suchon, and once in this state she does not see any 
conceptual or mental strategy by which women could escape. Rather, she advocates 
education as the best route to improvement in the position of women in general, and 
argues that society ought institute and allow a “celibate” or “neutral” life for women, 
beyond marriage or the convent.  
She thus advocates a more directly practical response to the contradiction than 
do the relational autonomy theorists. At the same time, however, Suchon’s 
acknowledgement of the contradiction is less fatal to her overall ethical project than for 
the later theorists. This is the final move of the chapter: ultimately, Suchon can allow 
that we are flawed creatures buffeted by the winds of society because her ethical system 
does not require that our actions speak directly of our truest selves for the purposes of 
moral judgement. God is the ultimate judge of goodness and badness; it would be 
surprising and impious if we could easily make such judgements. Later ethical systems, 
by contrast, require that a person’s actions reveal important truths about them, such that 
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it might be proper to make judgements about that person as a result. This is the stated 
goal of at least some of the relational autonomy theorists: to take into account that 
society structures our choices in various ways while still preserving the idea that 
individuals can and should be subject to normative assessment. 
Chapter Two is therefore an argument against the idea of the autonomous 
individual that is to be understood as both irreducibly structured by the social and the 
proper object of ethical judgement. This is so even in the context of the theories of 
relational autonomy that are far superior to the older theories that they set out to 
replace. The chapter makes this argument by questioning those theories that attempt to 
preserve the individual as an autonomous subject while widening their engagement with 
the social. It aims to describe an incoherence, and does not present a positive framework 
for understanding freedom. But in the context of the wider dissertation I think it can 
more clearly be seen that freedom is better understood as a collective, participatory, and 
political project.  
A comparison with Chapter One will be instructive in showing how Chapter Two 
contributes to the themes of the dissertation as a whole. In Cavendish’s Nature, I argue, 
individual parts are free not just because they are individually unconstrained but because 
they are participants in the communal project of the ordered universe. A similar view of 
freedom in human affairs can, I think, lead us away from the incoherences of the 
relational autonomy theories. As the relational autonomy theories note, to have one’s 
choices structured by bad social forces is to be unfree. The solution, however, is not to try 
to carve a space within the self that is isolated from those forces. It is to make those 
forces themselves the product of one’s own activity as a participant in society, just as the 
regularity of Nature is the product of all creatures’ sympathy in my reading of Cavendish. 
Our societies now are unfree because almost everyone is locked out from such 
participation in the direction of the forces that shape their lives. To change this will 
16 
 
require the political emancipation of collectives, not the conceptual emancipation of 
individuals.  
 
i.2.3 Chapter Three: Patriarchy, Beauty, and Revolution in the Work of Mary 
Wollstonecraft 
 
Chapter Three similarly looks to chart the effects of social ideologies and their 
impacts on the lives of women, but it does so through telling a historical story about the 
development of the relation between women and beauty in eighteenth century Britain. It 
argues that the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, right at the end of the eighteenth century, 
can be read as rejecting the feminised view of beauty that had by then developed: not, I 
argue, because of any misogyny on Wollstonecraft’s part, but because she sees this 
ideology as an outgrowth of bad social trends that must be overturned at their bases. For 
her, aesthetic ideologies and practices—self-adornment, charm, artistic appreciation, et 
cetera—have radically deleterious effects on those that allow them to take precedence 
over their “natural” rational capacities. Like Suchon more than a century earlier, 
Wollstonecraft believes the position of women forces them to contort themselves into the 
shapes demanded by aesthetic ideology; and like Suchon, she understands how 
thoroughly this undermines the capacity of women to pursue independent, meaningful 
lives.    
With this understanding of Wollstonecraft in hand, earlier aesthetic theories can 
be seen as part of this story of the association of beauty and femininity against which 
Wollstonecraft argues. The second section of the chapter, then, concerns Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and the artist Frances Reynolds, both of whose 
aesthetics made use of gender to structure their accounts.  
Shaftesbury closely links aesthetic taste with virtue, claiming that true virtue is a 
love and appreciation of order, harmony, and proportion; especially as these are 
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expressed in a well-functioning society. Shaftesbury’s aesthetics is centred on the 
importance of taste in ensuring that people act selflessly and for the public good; greed 
and private self-interest are to him unpardonable deviations, and it is with these 
tendencies that he associates women. On the one hand, for Shaftesbury, an overly 
private, overly sensuous appreciation—one that looks past harmony and proportion to 
baser sentiments—is itself an “effeminate” form of taste. On the other, women 
themselves might, with their enervating and distracting beauty, drive men to just such an 
improper appreciation. To have taste is to be virtuous for Shaftesbury; and the right kind 
of taste is one that is explicitly constructed in contrast to a kind that is associated with 
women.  
Reynolds also closely associates women with private, sensuous beauty, but she 
changes its moral valence: it is no longer a threat to a more austere, manly virtue but the 
highest expression of a different kind of virtue. She argues that the apprehension of 
beauty is the apprehension of an inner virtue, and as, she says, women are the “sweetest, 
most interesting image of beauty,” it is clear that women are the objects par excellence of 
that inner virtue. Indeed, she argues that all our aesthetic sentiments derive from our 
understanding of the essential virtues proper to each gender: when we judge non-human 
objects to be beautiful, for Reynolds, we are anthropomorphising. The virtue of women, 
grasped via their beauty, is hence the axis around which her entire aesthetic system 
revolves. Reynolds also reserves an important role for women in the construction of 
taste, since, as the proper arbiters of the domestic realm, it is they who must cultivate 
good taste in the following generations.  
It is in this milieu that we can situate Wollstonecraft’s two Vindications. Of 
course, Reynolds’ positive association of women with beauty is better than Shaftesbury’s 
negative one. But Wollstonecraft argues that these associations, far from being essential 
aspects of nature, are themselves the products of society: in this case, the products of a 
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society gripped by an oppressive malaise that praises weakness, indolence, extravagance, 
and stupidity as beauty and taste. She sees these tendencies operating, in very different 
ways, on both the aristocracy and the middle class women of her time. The aristocracy, 
she argues, use what is charming and easily pleasurable to the eyes of their subjects as a 
cover for their illegitimate and ill-gotten power: with opulence and luxury they add lustre 
to their rule. At the same time, that very power, and the ease of acquiring pleasure that 
comes with it, cramps their minds and virtues such that soon the aristocracy are no 
longer capable of doing anything but appealing to the baser sentiments of the masses. 
And hence a cycle turns that sees an increasing focus on beauty and taste to the 
detriment, Wollstonecraft claims, of reason and virtue.  
A similar cycle afflicts women, according to Wollstonecraft: not as a result of 
power, as it is for the aristocracy, but of a lack of it. Without access to other avenues to 
assert themselves and live their life-plans, women increasingly rely on becoming 
beautiful objects and witty subjects of taste for the small amount of power this grants 
them—over men, Wollstonecraft says, but also over other women. As with the aristocracy 
these methods lead to an increasing focus on appearances and taste and a neglect of 
reason and virtue; and as with the aristocracy this neglect forecloses any possible 
avenues toward power other than beauty and taste. Beauty, then, for Wollstonecraft, is 
one ideological method by which patriarchy perpetuates itself; and it is even able to 
accomodate moves like that of Reynolds, which aim to change the moral connotation of 
the link between women and beauty while keeping it alive. While this association 
remains, Wollstonecraft argues, women will be harmed by it. 
We can see here another facet of a collective account of freedom. Wollstonecraft 
acknowledges that for certain women, for a short time, adherence to the oppressive 
structures of aesthetic ideology might indeed grant them power, and with it a kind of 
freedom: those women that have the resources and skills to play the game of manners 
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and beauty well will be able to achieve much of what they set out to do. But for 
Wollstonecraft this cannot ever be a path toward liberation. To begin with, this method 
of pursuing one’s life-plans can only ever work temporarily, as aesthetic ideologies (then 
as now) skewed radically toward appreciation of youth and denigration of age. But more 
importantly, the kind of life-plan that one is capable of realising in this way is one that 
leads away from freedom, not towards it. Playing the game well requires a single-minded 
attention on oneself only insofar as one is a beautiful object and a witty subject, and this 
narrowness of focus leads to a narrowness of the horizons of the player’s potential. 
Beauty and sentiment become ends for themselves in the minds of the players, and this 
causes their rational capacities to fester through disuse. For Wollstonecraft, these 
unreasoned creatures remain inevitably unfree. And of course, in playing the game well, 
they are contributing to its persistence, and hence to the unfreedom of all around them: 
other women, who are not as skilled as they, will suffer in their failure to compare; and 
even men, whose overly sentimental desires are the clear cause of the situation, find 
those desires encouraged and inflamed rather than questioned.  
We do not need to agree with Wollstonecraft’s commitment to Enlightenment 
rationality to learn important political lessons here. Freedom cannot be a matter of 
individual advancement through otherwise oppressive structures. To make oneself more 
free in such situations is both illusory and harmful: it requires the contortion of oneself 
into a shape favoured by those structures. Nor, as we learn from the comparison with 
Reynolds, can freedom be a matter of ideological finesse. Shifting the connotations of 
oppressive structures might feel better, and this is valuable. Reynolds is surely better 
than Shaftesbury, just as the relational autonomy theories are better than the patriarchal 
ones they replace. But true liberation for Wollstonecraft lies in the practical expression of 
political power: her famous “revolution in female manners.” Changing bad ideologies 
like beauty, the chapter argues, following Wollstonecraft, requires changing the power 
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structures on which those ideologies grow. In the final chapter, I turn to look directly at a 
case study of practical action, its relation with freedom for the oppressed, and the 
political and methodological lessons that we can learn from it.  
 
i.2.4 Chapter Four: Women’s Militancy and Women’s Republicanism During 
the French Revolution 
 
In Chapter Four, freedom appears most explicitly as an object and goal of 
collective action. The chapter aims to show how the philosophical ideas of liberty and 
right have been shaped by political practice; and, in particular, by the direct political 
action of the masses in the form of riots, insurrections, and rebellions. It also takes 
suspicion of the ontology of the individual as a jumping off point for methodological 
considerations regarding the relations between collectives and ideas, and begins to 
sketch a framework for doing philosophy around or within mass movements.  
The chapter is hence divided broadly between methodological and political 
concerns, but both these sides take the actions of the militant women of Paris during the 
French Revolution as model and inspiration. The goal of the first, methodological, 
section is to begin to open up movements and beliefs that may have been under-studied 
in philosophy because of their lack of central texts or other verbal expressions. The 
militant Parisian women are a good example of this. Though they did write and make 
speeches, their political efficacy and their later philosophical and historical impact was 
dependent on their ability and willingness to assert themselves through collective 
physical confrontation and insurrection. The chapter hence seeks to understand both 
how political action and texts can interact in the development of political or 
philosophical ideas and, perhaps more controversially, how even actions that take place 
entirely without texts can be fruitfully investigated in philosophy. With this latter goal in 
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mind, I consider the women’s march on Versailles of October 1789 in the light of the 
work on the “moral economy” of crowds done by E.P. Thompson. If, as Thompson 
argues, food riots can and often did result from a set of beliefs held by the working-class 
regarding the duties of the state toward them, insurrections such as the march on 
Versailles, I argue, can usefully be understood as important philosophical events. They 
have antecedents, causes, and consequences in the world of abstract ideas as well as in 
the political one.   
In this sense, though they used force as the primary means to achieve their goals, 
insurrections such as the march on Versailles cannot be dismissed as entirely arational 
or outside the realm of ideas. During such events freedom is immediately visible as 
inhering in the people as a mass, regardless of the pretensions of rulers that might codify 
it—to this extent, that the event takes place beyond text is a large part of its point. It 
serves to show that physical confrontation is a last resort of people for whom 
institutional channels have been closed, while at the same time demonstrating that any 
attempt to limit political expression to those institutional channels is provisional on the 
sufferance of the people. If the insurrections were legal, then, they would not be the 
same. On the other hand, however, the presence and success of the insurrection is itself 
evidence for its legitimacy and for the truth of its central claim: that that the poor women 
of Paris are one of the groups that has the right to use force when they feel that their 
needs are unmet and the responsibilities of their nominal rulers have been shirked. The 
first section of the chapter, then, works with these considerations, and with potential 
problems, to begin to produce a methodology that can adequately capture the philosophy 
of insurrection.  
With these methodological considerations in hand, I then try to construct a 
comparison of the militant republicanism of the women of the Revolution with 
contemporary forms of neo-republicanism, along the three contemporary axes of 
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freedom as non-domination, participatory politics, and civic virtue.  I argue that in their 
actions the militant women express and contest their own versions of all these features of 
republicanism. They demanded that they be free in the undominated sense not only 
when they rioted against dominative governments, even driving them to write a 
constitution (that of 1793) that explicitly acknowledged their right to insurrection, but 
also when they demanded that the national government institute and rigorously enforce 
the Terror against the speculators and aristocrats that they saw as their enemies. They 
demanded their right to participate in politics again through their insurrections, through 
their petitions, through their direct participation in local assemblies, and through their 
demand that they be allowed to bear arms, form militias, and defend the new republic. In 
all these things they articulated their civic virtue; they also engaged directly in the 
policing of civic virtue, prowling through marketplaces on the lookout for those less 
patriotic or republican than themselves.  
Not all these things are very nice, of course, but, as I argue in the chapter, they 
represent a republicanism that was worked out by the practical and political action of 
working-class women in the midst of a period of extraordinary political foment. It also 
shows freedom in the light that I wish to consider it—the view of freedom that has been 
an undercurrent of all the previous chapters and that I have brought forward here. As in 
the sympathetic universe of Cavendish, freedom in the milieu of the Revolution’s radicals 
was both the aim and basis of collective action. Freedom for them was the capacity to 
engage directly in the shaping of the society that would itself shape them, and it could 
not result from having the right laws or ideologies or even psychologies in place. For my 
purposes, then, the radical women of the Revolution are a useful model for the image of 
freedom toward which I have been working in the previous chapters.  
Indeed, critics of the radicals—the chapter quotes Mary Wollstonecraft, who, 
though she supported the Revolution, was sharply critical of the turn that popular justice 
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took—were often quick to claim that the insurrectionary masses were frenzied or 
manipulated: in the terms of contemporary autonomy theory, the claim was frequently 
made that their desires and choices were inauthentic and thereby unfree. Chapter Four 
provides some reasons for doubting that this is true. But on a wider scale, I argue, 
whether it’s true is beside the point. As I have tried to show throughout the dissertation, 
freedom does not proceed organically from an individual in possession of the right style 
or shape of soul, the right suite of capacities, or the correctly equanimous mind. Rather, 
freedom is a matter of the relation of individuals to the structures that shape them, and 
this relation can be the object of political activity. During the French Revolution, if only 
briefly, the working-class women of Paris saw that those structures could be moulded—
indeed, were moulded—by their action, not as individuals but as collectives with shared 
interests. And it was by this method that they sought to make themselves free.  
 
i.3 Some Assumptions 
 
Though it shadows much of the preceding discussion, I have not yet much 
engaged with the third of the major themes of the dissertation that I identified at the 
outset: the primacy of the political in allowing us to understand new, non-standard 
narratives—or even ideas beyond narrative—of the early modern period. Nevertheless it 
is a concern that I have brought with me to all of my discussions, and it is visible in the 
progression of each chapter’s individual narrative: metaphysical questions are brought 
into the realm of the political in Chapter One; an ethical question in Chapter Two; the 
entire practice and ideology of aesthetics in Chapter Three; and in Chapter Four, textual 
political philosophy is juxtaposed with direct political action. In all these cases I 
understand “the  realm of the political” to mean that realm that is preoccupied primarily 
with understanding or influencing the organisation of the social life of individuals and 
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larger groups and with the distribution of power across those individuals and groups. In 
Chapter One, then, the metaphysical question of universal order is understood in the 
political terms of social order; in Chapter Two, responses to the ethical problem of 
autonomy are critiqued on the grounds that they fail adequately to account for how 
social organisation affects individual psyches; in Chapter Three, practices and beliefs 
regarding beauty are discussed in the light of their function in the distribution of power; 
and in Chapter Four a link between philosophy and violent attempts to shift that 
distribution is explored. In each case, this movement toward the political is motivated by 
the concerns of the chapter and of the figures whose thoughts, beliefs, and actions I 
discuss: this concern to prioritise understanding philosophical issues politically is, I 
think, present in different ways in the work of all of the figures of the dissertation, and so 
it is not merely a methodological quirk on my part.  
Nevertheless, looking through a political lens is also a significant concern of my 
own, and so here I wish briefly to flag and justify this assumption and other corollary 
assumptions that have informed my discussions. Reading politically means situating 
texts both in their historical contexts and in the contexts, sometimes wildly different, in 
which they have come to be understood since; searching for the effects of texts beyond 
their intent, and the effect of political events on texts; excavating the power structures 
that texts assume and attack, again beyond the singular intentions of the author; and, 
not least, testing out how the text structures narratives, of its period and otherwise, and 
how it can be used to form new ones. I have tried to use all of these methods in writing 
the chapters of this dissertation. Doubtless there are many more approaches too that 
would fall within the remit of a politicised methodology.  
In some cases these approaches and techniques lie outside of traditional or 
established methods in the history of philosophy. Historians of philosophy, for example, 
are often concerned with finding out what a particular figure actually meant when they 
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wrote a particular text, and will look to letters, drafts, and notes to achieve this greater 
intimacy with an author’s mind. This can often lead to quite different interpretations 
than if we try to find out what a text meant in the world beyond the author, or what it 
means now, or what it has come to mean in the context of a particular historical 
narrative. All of these approaches are valuable and all have produced and will produce 
important scholarship.  
I believe that what I have called a politicised methodology can be robustly 
defended in philosophical terms as a way of getting the history of philosophy “right.” 
Doing so, however, would probably take an entire dissertation. Here, then, I just wish to 
present a couple of reasons for granting these assumptions for the time being. 
Of primary importance to me is that the contemporary attempt to destabilise the 
standard narrative is a political project, and hence certain political viewpoints will 
naturally inflect the work that is done for this project. The standard narrative is limited 
in many ways, but one of the main reasons that challenges to it have proliferated recently 
is that it ignores and marginalises the contributions to philosophy of anyone that is not a 
white European man. Bringing in more viewpoints from women, people of colour, and 
people beyond Europe exposes us to new ideas and allows us to more accurately 
construct an image of the thought of the time, but the project is also important—and 
accuracy and novelty are important—because of the impact that such work can have on 
the contemporary world or on contemporary philosophy. By changing how we look to 
our field’s past, we hope to make the field’s future more just and equal in both the people 
and ideas that it includes.  
This is, then, an avowedly political project, and as such it is open to the charge 
that political motivations are incompatible with the search for uncorrupted truth. There 
are many reasons to doubt such an opposition, but at the very least provisionally it helps 
us if we acknowledge that we have these motivations in the background of our work. One 
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reason for granting a politicised methodology, then, is itself political: reading for the 
political symptoms of the contemporary world and their etiologies in our views of the 
past helps orient us toward, hopefully, a better world.  
The second reason to provisionally grant these methods is that I believe that their 
worth is best demonstrated in practice; what’s more, the methodology I use has only 
been developed in practice, in a conjunction between the political necessities above and 
the interpretive restrictions brought by the texts (or riots, or insurrections) themselves. 
Figuring out how to read politically is therefore not a matter of constructing a framework 
that can thereafter be imposed, and presenting such a strict framework now would be 
counterproductive. In this I follow methodologically one of the main philosophical 
themes of the dissertation: that conceptual or philosophical questions can best be 
thought through and addressed through practical work. Finding a new methodology, 
then, is a matter of responding pragmatically to existing conditions while retaining 
previous political commitments. In this, it mirrors in miniature the approaches of the 
philosophers of the forthcoming chapters in their work on, and towards, freedom.  
 
i.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
With all preliminary pieces now on the table, I am able to finish by restating the 
dissertation’s themes, and in particular its understanding of freedom, more concretely. 
In this I am helped by the revolutionary republican women of the final chapter, whose 
militant attempt to forge a freedom that worked for them has informed the 
considerations of all the previous chapters: we can follow the logic of their insurrections 
by beginning quite simply with freedom taken as non-domination and moving 
pragmatically from there to a more positive conception. As the Parisian women saw, to 
be undominated means more than having a written promise from authorities—in the 
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form of a constitution or set of laws—that they will exercise their power wisely or gently. 
It means ultimately that no such authorities exist, or at the very least that they are 
understood by all to exist only as long as the people as a collective allows them to.  
In this sense, real freedom resides in the capacity of individuals to form together 
as a community and to exercise this sovereign power as they see fit—to shape the social 
forces that, in unfree situations such as our own, might dominate them. It is important 
then that we understand these communities not merely as made up of individuals but 
also as shaping them to be the kind of individuals they are. It is inevitable that we are 
made from the social structures and ideologies in which we live and grow: we cannot 
strategise or critically reason our way out of this. Rather, we must be empowered to 
shape ourselves by being full and equal participants in those social structures.  
The women philosophers that I discuss in this dissertation are better placed to 
understand this than many male philosophers of the time were. As repressed individuals 
locked out of power, the social forces that beset them—that, according to Wollstonecraft 
and Suchon, coerce their psyches into harmful shapes—are more alien to women than 
they might be to men. And they understood, like the radical women of the French 
Revolution, that to forge a collective freedom it would not do merely to replace kings 
with parliaments or promulgate bills of rights. Those ideologies, practices, and material 
structures that locked out particular people—women, people of colour, poor people, the 
enslaved—from full participatory freedom had too to be destroyed. As the Society of 
Revolutionary Republican Women noted, once kings were disposed of, speculators and 
merchants sought to dominate them. Undoing all such domination was the basis of 
collective political action. Or, as Wollstonecraft said, what was needed was a revolution 
in manners—not just in governmental structures. 
 Opposed to this encompassing and pragmatic view of freedom are views that 
focus on the internal qualities or possessions of the individual. As I noted in my 
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discussion of Chapter Three above, it is doubtless possible for individuals to gain much 
for themselves by personal advancement through the restrictive ideologies or structures 
of an unfree society: Wollstonecraft noted that some women could gain an illicit form of 
power by playing well the game of prettiness and wit that she saw enmeshing all women 
as a class. Such power would make the successful player more free in a limited sense: she 
would have more opportunity to fulfil her life-plans, she would be able to gain more of 
her desires. But as Wollstonecraft shows us, such “freedom” is illusory and harmful. It is 
contingent upon the vicissitudes of current aesthetic trends, and thus can never be said 
to be freedom from domination, nor the capacity to shape oneself through society. 
Worse, in playing the game well, the player reinforces those dominative ideologies all the 
more, by giving them the sheen of validity or the players the illusion of autonomy: in this 
she makes herself less free, as she retrenches those forces on whose largesse her 
supposed freedom depends.  
The same can be said of the procedural accounts of autonomy that I discuss in 
Chapter Two, which seek to locate autonomy in the ability of individuals to organise their 
thoughts in a particular way. Such strategies might provide solace or guide individuals to 
make helpful choices, and these are not valueless. But they do not provide a route toward 
freedom, as they leave those ideologies that dominate people in place. Destroying those 
ideologies is not merely a species of negative freedom—a “freedom from” domination or 
bad ideology. It entails people exercising collectively their “freedom to” shape themselves 
via the world and the society around them.  
With all these themes in mind, the more abstract and metaphysical Chapter One 
might appear a puzzling inclusion. But the particular reading I give of Cavendish’s 
sympathetic metaphysics is guided by these political considerations, as can be seen 
explicitly in the engagement with Sophie de Grouchy. De Grouchy’s account of sympathy 
allows her to develop a kind of image of collective freedom: for her, the laws and 
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practices of a just society are ones that arise naturally and rationally from out of the 
affections of its citizens for one another, and so in a truly just society everyone is ruled 
not by alien forces but by the feelings that inhere in their own hearts—exactly the kind of 
collective freedom I spend the next three chapters working out.  From this I can develop 
a reading of Cavendish, whose metaphysics is irreducibly sociopolitical, that understands 
the entire universe as a similarly just society of individuals ruled only by themselves as a 
collective. By beginning with this image of freedom in its most abstract, metaphysical, 
and—perhaps—utopian sense I hope to provide a fruitful grounding for the 
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 For Margaret Cavendish, Nature is a living thing, and all her parts are living 
things too: down to the smallest possible levels of description, sensitivity, animation, and 
rationality will be found. This multiplicity of life and movement and consciousness could 
have chaotic results, and indeed Cavendish devotes a lot of space in her philosophical 
writings to consideration of what seem like disorders within Nature, such as disease, 
madness, and the breakdown of the state. These appear like moments in which the living 
parts of nature work against each other and move in contrary ways that produce 
irregularity. For Cavendish, however, it is clear that this irregularity is deviation from a 
more-or-less regular order; though Nature contains disease and war, it more often holds 
together remarkably well. In this chapter, I argue that of particular significance in 
explaining this holding-together is Cavendish’s account of sympathy: a unity, love, or 
fellow-feeling amongst Nature’s creatures that can be found down into its microscopic 
depths.  
Cavendishean sympathy hence plays a historically unusual dual role in both its 
character and function. It figures in her philosophy both as a causal explanation for 
physical phenomena—in a way that is reminiscent of the sympathetic cures of Jan 
Baptist Van Helmont and Sir Kenelm Digby—and, as already mentioned, a moral or 
emotional accord between sensitive and rational beings.  
Cavendish thus stands at an ill-explored, but significant, crossroads in the history 
of the concept of “sympathy.” This is not an unusual position for Cavendish. Karen 
Detlefsen convincingly identifies another historical crossroads at which Cavendish faces 
in both directions: the slow change in the philosophy of science from “law” referring 
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merely to human political constructs to the propagation of “natural laws,” out in the 
regular inhuman universe.1 That sympathy is able to fill this dual role marks another way 
in which Cavendish’s philosophy stands apart from the channels that history has taken. 
In the second part of this chapter, then, I will provide the historical context for 
Cavendish’s view of sympathy: the two roads at whose intersection I take her account to 
be standing. The first of these is that of sympathy as a causal-explanatory phenomenon: 
a force, divine or otherwise, perhaps permeating the entire universe, and holding 
between similar beings, by which otherwise mysterious actions-at-a-distance such as 
magnetism or the famous “sympathetic cure” can be explained. In her own account of 
sympathy, Cavendish makes use of it to explain similar—and in places, the exact same—
phenomena.  
The second relevant historical account of sympathy comes later, in the eighteenth 
century. In the work of Sophie de Grouchy and Adam Smith, as well as other moralists of 
the time, sympathy is no longer a spiritual or quasi-spiritual ordering force, but an 
emotion held by human individuals for one another. I will look in particular at the work 
of De Grouchy, who argues that though it is a personal emotion, not a spiritual 
emanation, sympathy underlies much of the structure of the Enlightenment polity, 
including—importantly—its orderliness. Cavendish’s account, I argue, has much to do 
with this view, too; for though she sees sympathy as able to explain the actions of non-
human beings, she still grounds it in individual emotion.  
From there, Cavendish’s own view of sympathy can be elucidated in more detail. 
And with this view in hand, a new account of the order of Cavendish’s Nature, over which 
there is much debate in contemporary scholarship, can be given. This new account takes 
the order of Nature to be the result of the affective responses—the sympathetic 
motivations—of her autonomous individual parts.  
                                                        
1 Detlefsen “Laws and Order” 80-1 
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The debate regarding the order of Nature for Cavendish has two strands. First, 
there is the question of whether the irregularities that we observe in Nature are ‘real’ 
disorders, or illusory artefacts of our own limited understanding. David Cunning and 
Lisa Walters argue that any observation of disorder that we make is a result of our 
ignorance as mere parts of Nature, necessarily incomplete, and if we were to describe 
Nature from her own point of view then we would see that she is, in fact, perfectly 
ordered. On this view, the lower-level disorders of Nature’s parts—disease, war, et 
cetera—contribute to a perfectly-ordered whole.  
Karen Detlefsen argues that disease, war, and other forms of breakdown or 
corruption are real disorders for Cavendish, and that they therefore detract from the 
orderliness of Nature as a whole. The infinite parts that make up Nature all have their 
own consciousnesses and their own motions and their own epistemic limitations; in 
these circumstances it is inevitable that without some external guiding hand the parts 
will act at cross-purposes with each other and do things that result in real disorder.  
This difference continues into the second strand of the debate, which regards the 
method by which Nature is ordered—whether this resolves itself into a perfect order or 
one with possible deviations. Walters, here, suggests that Nature acts to balance the 
actions—orderly and disorderly, antipathetic and sympathetic—of her parts such that 
everything works out perfectly ordered at the highest scale. Detlefsen has convincingly 
argued that the suggestion that Nature guides all her parts to produce order is in conflict 
with Cavendish’s basic metaphysical tenet that everything is the principal cause of its 
own motion - that is, that everything is self-moving.2 If Nature guides all motion so as to 
produce order then Cavendish’s commitment to this principle of occasional causation is 
undermined. Instead of this direct intervention, then, Detlefsen argues that Nature’s law 
of order manifests itself to her parts as a rational suggestion or prescription: an 
                                                        
2 Detlefsen, “Reason and Freedom” 170 
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instruction to act in an orderly fashion, that can be more-or-less successfully followed 
according to the stupidity, sympathy, or antipathy of individual creatures.  
There is an ambiguity here of which we ought be aware. When we say that 
“Nature acts,” what is the character of the agency that we are ascribing to her? Does she 
intend to produce order, or is this a mere effect of her action? There is a risk here of 
incorrectly anthropomorphising or deifying a being that—for Cavendish—was patently, 
and importantly, neither human nor divine. I believe that a description of Nature that 
understands her agency and wisdom as arising from the ordered, sympathetic action of 
her constituent parts avoids either of these risky paths. It allows us to explain the order 
of Nature without making her a divine tinkerer or an abstracted, law-giving empress. 
Order, I shall argue, necessitates neither a law imposed from above nor the quasi-
spiritual guidance of every moment of motion. In fact, Nature’s being and her wisdom 
depend, it seems to me, on an already-existing order among her parts.  
In this chapter I will argue that even while holding fast to this principle, 
Cavendish’s sociopolitical view of the universe gives her the resources to explain why 
Nature is ordered, though not necessarily so: why, that is, the guiding hand of Nature is 
an invisible one. In particular, I argue that Cavendish’s unique usage of sympathy as 
both a moral-political and causal power allows her to explain how an infinite community 
of willful and ignorant parts can come together to form an ordered (but not perfectly 
ordered) whole. In this sense Cavendish presages Smith and De Grouchy in explaining 
higher-level social phenomena by the bubbling-up of individual actions and attitudes 
within a community; though that, for Cavendish, the relevant community is not the 
Enlightenment polity but the infinite universe separates her significantly from these 
thinkers too. This allows us to explain the order of Cavendish’s universe using neither of 
the positions found in the second strand of the debate: neither direct intervention nor 
rational suggestion. Rather, like the political communities of De Grouchy, the 
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community of Nature is self-ordering. From each creature’s freedom to move itself, 
which has sympathy amongst its effects, an entire universal community is made, 
regulated not from above but by the creatures themselves.  
 
1.2 Sympathy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
 
1.2.1 Sympathy as a Causal Explanation 
 
I begin, then, with an excursus on the two historical tendencies that can be found 
within the concept ‘sympathy.’ The first of these accounts is the older, and in a sense 
more alien, idea of sympathy as being—or resulting from—a metaphysical force or spirit 
that, in one way or another, permeates all reality and contributes to the ordering, 
harmony, or mutual functioning of its creatures. In her account of this “universal 
sympathy” of the seventeenth century, Christia Mercer describes the development of 
sympathy from an “‘occult power’ treated mostly by thinkers on the periphery of 
philosophy” to a “central component of mainstream philosophical systems” such as those 
of Conway and Leibniz.3 Alongside this development, and intimately related with it, was 
an effort made by philosophers such as Kenelm Digby and Jan Baptist Van Helmont to 
describe the effects of sympathy as though it were an observable and explainable part of 
nature, rather than a hidden, occult power essentially closed to investigation.4 This 
occult power, however, played a major role in causal explanations of apparently 
mysterious phenomena for many centuries: Pliny the Elder makes quite frequent use of 
antipathy and sympathy— “the hatreds and friendships of things deaf and dumb, and 
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even without feeling”—in the explanations and observations of his Natural History, 
where he attributes this affective ordering of nature to “the Greeks.”5   
Of particular interest to physicians and natural philosophers at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century was the “weapon-salve,” which could, it was said, be applied to a 
bloody weapon or bandage to cure a wound, though the weapon or bandage was at a 
distance from the wound itself. This cure was the cause of significant controversy in both 
England and continental Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.6 In a 1637 
translation, into English, of Daniel Sennert’s attack on the salve, we read that “most men 
attribute [...] to Paracelsus” an “Unguent” of skull moss, mummy (i.e., preserved human 
flesh), man’s fat, man’s blood, linseed oil, rose oil, and bole Armoniack (Armenian bole, a 
kind of iron-heavy clay). This ointment, applied to a stick dipped into blood from a 
wound, would cure the wound.7  
“Moreover,” writes Sennert, 
 
The Patrons of this Oyntment doubt not, but naturall causes may be given 
of this action; and Crollius [Oswald Croll, another partisan of the salve], 
calls them ignorant fooles that doubt of its efficacie, or referre the cure to 
Sorcery. And to make it appeare that the cure may be done by a naturall 
way, they prove at large, that first there are actions which no corporall 
touch interceding, are done by an hidden Sympathy or Magnetisme as 
they call it. And so the Loadstone draweth Iron, although it touch it not 
with its body, and maketh it move toward the Pole; the Starres also worke 
upon inferiour things, which they touch not bodily [ …] There be some 
that cannot endure to be where a Cat is, though she bee lock’d up in a 
Chest that they see her not; and unlesse the Cat be removed, or they goe 
out of the place they fall into a swoone. Dogs know the foot-steps of their 
Masters, and of wilde Beasts too, and follow them by their track. The 
shade of the Ewe-tree is hurtfull to many … 8 
 
                                                        
5 Pliny the Elder 3 
6 Debus 392-3; see also Waddell. 
7 Sennert 2 
8 Ibid 10-11 
37 
 
Examples of this kind—from, it seems, astrology to cat allergies—were, in 
Sennert’s words, “heape[d] up” by the patrons of the salve as examples of “hidden 
actions” taking place at a distance. If cats could make people uncomfortable from within 
a box, or the shade of a yew cause an ache, there was no in-principle reason why an 
ointment applied to a bloodied stick could not cure the wound whence the blood came. 
Such things were attributable to the essential unity and interconnectedness of the 
universe—a sympathetic relation that exists between all things. As Sennert puts it:  
 
Another thing they presuppose is, that there is a spirit of the world, 
diffused over the whole Universe, which is the conveyor or conveyance of 
all occult vertues and actions; and conjoyneth all the parts of the World, 
and effecteth a wonderfull harmonie between them. 9 
 
This “spirit of the world, diffused over the whole Universe” was indeed taken by 
believers to account for sympathetic or “magnetic” relations between distant objects such 
as the cure of the salve. One such patron of the weapon-salve was the English Paracelsian 
physician and astrologer Robert Fludd, who in his 1638 Mosaicall Philosophy defines 
sympathy to be a “consent, union, or concord, between two spirits, shining forth, or 
having their radical emanation from the selfsame or the like divine property.”10 Fludd 
explains the functioning of the weapon-salve by means of these emanations, or “beamy 
spirits,” and a complex web of immaterial and “magneticall” interactions between the 
ointment, the blood on the weapon, and the wound.11 As Allen Debus writes in his 1964 
paper on Fludd and the weapon-salve controversy, for Fludd “the world is pictured as a 
unified living whole and the magnetic cure of wounds becomes only a special instance 
                                                        
9 Ibid.  
10 Fludd 170. For a detailed account of Fludd’s arcane views on the weapon-salve, and on the controversy 
in England, see Debus.  
11 Ibid 262 
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and consequence of this vitalist universe where all things have correspondences based on 
sympathetic or antipathetic action.”12 
On this picture, sympathy is a hidden, occult, and immaterial connection, or 
tendency toward union, between created beings: “that concording and vivifying love, 
which ariseth from the benigne emanation of the Creator, which desireth to be joined 
with his like, and seeketh to preserve his like by union,” as Fludd puts it, taking a 
Neoplatonist tack against the prevailing Aristotelian opinion that forbade action-at-
distance. This sympathy is opposed by antipathy, “that discording, privative, and hatefull 
affection” which springs, also in created beings, from “darknesse and deformity.”13 
Effects like that of the weapon-salve or the lodestone were explicable as arising from 
these spiritual forces.  
A large part of the controversy surrounding the weapon-salve was about the 
nature of these forces. Action-at-a-distance of the kind apparently seen in the weapon-
salve was more easily seen as magic, or the work of the devil, than as something natural 
and benign. Fludd’s earlier writings on the weapon-salve were vociferously attacked on 
these grounds by one Parson William Foster in 1631, in the splendidly titled treatise 
Hoplocrisma-Spongus: or, a Sponge to wipe away the Weapon-Salve, which bore the 
only slightly less splendid subtitle “A Treatise, wherein is proved, that the Cure late taken 
up amongst us, by applying the Salve to the Weapon, is Magicall and unlawfull.”14  
Some time earlier, on the continent, Van Helmont had sought to explain “that the 
Magnetick Cure of wounds, is the single, and ordinary effect of Nature.”15 He attempted 
to clarify the position of Rodolphus Goclenius the Younger, seemingly the progenitor of 
the new controversy surrounding the salve, who had explained the action-at-a-distance 
                                                        
12 Debus 416 
13 Fludd 143 
14 Foster, title page. See also Debus 396-7 and Waddell 185.  
15 Van Helmont 5. I work from Walter Charleton’s 1650 translation of De magnetica vulnerum curatione.  
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at work in the cure by way of universal sympathetic and antipathetic forces that were 
supernatural and “magical.” Goclenius became embroiled in a long debate with the 
Jesuit Johannes Roberti for his troubles.16 In fact Van Helmont, too, ended up in trouble 
with the Jesuits; he was investigated by the Spanish Inquisition and imprisoned under 
house arrest, most likely for suggesting that the magnetic cure was analogous to the 
curative effects of saints’ relics.17  
Van Helmont sought to defend the weapon-salve from Goclenius’s own 
inopportune, and plausibly heretical, defence. In so doing he invoked his own 
understanding of sympathetic action: it was caused by “the universal spirit, the Common 
Mercury, inhabiting the middle of the universe, [...] the faithful executor and adjutor of 
all natural actions.”18 There was, hence, no reason to “tremble [...] at the name of 
Magick”; the same magic that explained the weapon-salve explained all natural activity. 
Sympathy was spiritual, but that did not make it unnatural or diabolical. Elsewhere, Van 
Helmont describes the universal spirit (“the grand and sole causant of all sympathy”) 
thus: 
 
… in real verity, it is a more and vital breath of Heaven, a Spirit which 
comprehends and cherishes within it self the Sun, and all the herd of 
lesser Stars, a minde or intelligence which diffused through all the limbs 
or parts of this great Animal, the World, doth inform and regulate the 
whole; and so by a certain commerce, communion, and conspiracy of 
otherwise-discordant parts, and an harmonious marriage of the distinct 
virtues of single essences, doth order and govern the vast engine of the 
Universe, according to the unanimous consent of all, who have read and 
commented on the true History of Nature. To example, the Solissequous 
flowers sensibly observe the travel of the Sun: and the Sea conforms to 
either Lunestice, and swells her obsequious tides high in the full, but 
shrinks them low again in the Wane of the Moon. In sum; all Creatures by 
their life, (let us, the master-piece, and abridgment of all, do homage to 
                                                        
16 Camenietzki 7-8; Mercer 111. 
17 Waddell 187 
18 Van Helmont 80 
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the Majesty of that King, to whom all things live) essence, existence and 
sensation visibly attest the majesty, liberality, and presence of the great 
Creator.19 
 
Sympathetic action, then, the visible concord of the activity of creatures even over 
a distance, is explicable because all creatures are participants in, and infused by, the 
universal spirit of God. As Mercer notes, this explanation of sympathy as arising from the 
vital activity of God in every creature resembles the Stoic notion of pneuma. It also 
entails that for Van Helmont, all creatures “stand in sympathetic attraction and concord 
with everything else and so [are] active.”20 The harmoniousness of the universe is 
therefore explicable by this universal perception, activity, and sympathy. This sympathy, 
as Mercer notes, varies depending on the similitude of creatures with one another; but it 
holds to some degree universally, as all creatures recognise their similarity as beings 
imbued with the divine spirit.21  
Cavendish, as I have already mentioned and as I will expand upon in far greater 
detail later, expounds a view that is in many ways similar. But in her doggedly materialist 
hands the position of universal (or near-universal) harmony amongst sensitive creatures 
takes on a very different complexion. 
To cap off the strange story of the weapon-salve, while it still runs along the same 
tracks as the story of sympathy, we return briefly across the Channel to the English 
natural philosopher (and sometime privateer) Sir Kenelm Digby. In his Late discourse of 
1658, Digby describes his own success at curing the wound of one James Howell. He did 
this, he claims, by bathing a bloodied garter that Howell had used to bind his wound in a 
basin of water, in which he had dissolved his “powder of sympathy”—a powder of a single 
                                                        
19 Ibid 44. All emphases original.  
20 Mercer 117 
21 Ibid 121 
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ingredient (green vitriol, or anhydrous iron (II) sulphate22), rather than the gruesome 
bits-and-pieces of human corpses called for by the previous Paracelsian recipes. Digby 
describes what happened once the garter touched his solution:  
 
… [Howell] started suddenly, as if he had found some strange alteration in 
himself; I asked him what he ailed? I know not what ailes me, but I find 
that I feel no more pain, me thinks that a pleasing kind of freshnesse, as it 
were a wet cold napkin did spread over my hand, which hath taken away 
the inflammation that tormented me before; I replyed since then that you 
feel already so good an effect of my medicament, I advise you to cast away 
all your playsters, onely keep the wound clean, and in a moderate temper, 
twixt heat and cold.23 
 
Digby distinguishes himself from the other true believers of the weapon-salve 
because he attempts to give a mechanistic and atomist account of the functioning of his 
powder: “there is no need,” he says, “to admit of an action distant from the Patient.” 
Rather, there is a “real Communication twixt the one and the other [i.e., the patient and 
the bloody garter], viz. of a Balsamical substance [the powder], which corporally 
mingleth with the wound.”24 Digby describes how atoms (or “spirits”) of the blood on the 
garter, now with the much lighter atoms of the powder adhering to them, are thrown into 
the air by heat; at the same time, the wound itself (being inflamed) constantly emanates 
spirits which agitate the air around it, causing a constant circulation of new air across 
itself. By these mechanisms the vitriol-enhanced blood atoms in the air eventually find 
                                                        
22 Dobbs 8 
23 Digby, Late discourse 9-10. We can speculate that this final piece of advice—to keep the wound clean, 
and not contaminate it with plasters—was likely the true cause of the powder’s curative effects. This is 
similarly true for the other weapon-salves; Paracelsus’ original recipe, if Sennert is to believed, called for 
the wounded limb to be bound in a bandage soaked in the patient’s hot urine. Even this would constitute 
relatively little troubling interference with the healing process, by the standards of the time.  
24 Digby 151 
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themselves back at the wound, where they settle back into “their naturall beds, and 
primitive receptacles,” healing it.25 
There is a kind of sympathy at work here: these atoms, for Digby, are attracted to 
others that they resemble—“if it happens that within the air there be found some 
dispersed atoms of the same nature, with the body which draws them, the attraction of 
such atoms is made more powerfully, then if they were bodies of a different nature.” But 
again there is nothing spiritual about this operation. Rather, Digby explains that this 
“same nature” consists of physical properties; in the Late discourse he explains that 
bodies of the same weight, the same rarity or density, and the same figure or shape are 
drawn together and stay together, giving mechanical explanations for how this occurs.26 
“It is a poor kind of pusillanimity,” he concludes, “and faintnesse of heart, or rather a 
grosse ignorance of the Understanding, to pretend any effects of charm or magick 
herein”; “we need not have a recourse to a Demon or Angel” here.27  
So in Digby’s hands sympathy and antipathy cease to be real explanatory causes. 
In his earlier text Of bodies and of man’s soul he says that “with the bare sounds of 
which words most men pay themselvs, without examining what they mean”—these terms 
cannot provide explanations, but are themselves in need of explaining by “downright 
material qualities.”28 And so when, with all the flourish of an inveterate self-promoter,29 
he speaks of the powder of sympathy or the sympathetic cure, he is speaking of a kind or 
character of mechanical action—one in which like unifies with like, by means of their 
physical similarities—not a mysterious, universal affinity that can only be explained in 
spiritual or immaterial terms.  
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28 Digby Of bodies 421 
29 See Petersson 265-274 for an appropriately swashbuckling account of Digby’s presentation of the cure 
in Montpelier, from which the text of his Late discourse is derived. See also Hedrick for a dismantling of 




We have dwelt in some detail on the story of the weapon-salve because, for 
Cavendish too, sympathy plays an important role in physics, biology, and medicine—in 
fact, in everything. At times, with their emphases on universal feeling, Cavendish’s 
explanations resemble the Stoic-influenced vitalism of Van Helmont; at others, with 
their zealous and pedantic materialism, they resemble the kind of explanation given by 
Digby. But for Cavendish sympathy is not the product of an immaterial force, an 
emanation from the Creator; nor is it just a way of characterising the apparently-
affinitive movements of unliving atoms. Instead, on my reading, it is a feeling of living 
matter, born out of itself.  
 
1.2.2 Sympathy as Individual Affection 
  
Before we can turn more fully to Cavendish, however, there is another side to 
sympathy that bears investigation: its ethical side. Of course for the likes of Van Helmont 
and Fludd a divine emanation from God above could not help but be, all things 
considered, a good thing. But for other philosophers sympathy played an important role 
in producing ethical goodness. In the seventeenth century, for Gottfried Leibniz and 
Anne Conway, sympathy contributed to the ethical ordering of the entire universe—its 
presence and action made the universe better than it would otherwise be.30 For our 
purposes, however, the more significant development in the concept of sympathy into an 
ethical principle was in the eighteenth century. Then, political thinkers tore sympathy 
from the heavens and installed it in the human heart, whence it was used as an 
explanation for the ethical ordering of human polities. It is to these thinkers, and 
particularly Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy, that I will now turn.  
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In the eighteenth century, as Ryan Patrick Hanley argues, the shift in the context 
of sympathy from the physical to the ethical realm that we noted above is “cemented.” 
Sympathy transitioned, Hanley says, from being “a principle primarily dedicated to 
explaining connections between substances to a principle dedicated to explaining 
connections between human individuals.”31 These connections are perhaps more familiar 
to us now under the much-later term empathy: the feelings we associate with imagining 
ourselves in another’s place, feeling their pains and joys as our own.  
Hanley argues that this change in the usage of sympathy occurred due to the 
creation in industrialised nations—the sorts of nations that were producing the sorts of 
philosophers we read in those same sorts of nations now—of new social forms that 
required in turn new ways for fellow-feeling to exist between people who were part of 
larger, and hence less intimate, social units than had previously existed. Sympathy on 
Hanley’s thesis is a new force in maintaining the social order, able to replace Christian 
love, which—Hanley says—had become less viable following “the secularizing and 
skeptical tendencies” of the eighteenth century.32 Sympathy is also, in many cases, less of 
a strident ethical requirement than full-fledged love, and thus more suited to the 
urbanising and estranging societies of the Enlightenment. 
Indeed, sympathy, already a phenomenon with ethical import and power for 
Conway and Leibniz, is a preoccupation for many of the big names of eighteenth century 
moral theory: Francis Hutcheson, in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy of 1742, 
harkens to sympathy’s roots in medicine by likening it to a “contagion or infection” by 
which our pleasures and joys demand to be shared33; in the Treatise Hume puts 
sympathy at the base of our moral sentiments, analogising the similarity of human 
minds to “strings all equally wound up,” by which motion—or emotion—can be 
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32 Ibid 176 
33 Hutcheson 12 / I.I.IX. I work from the 1787 translation into English.  
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communicated from one to all others.34 Sympathy, it seems, is now to be understood as 
the propagation of feeling from one human being to another, and it can be leveraged to 
explain our moral sentiments and to provide force to political calls for more open, co-
operative societies.  
In this section, I will look in some depth at two more of the eighteenth century 
theorists of sympathy: Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. De Grouchy’s Letters on 
Sympathy, published in 1798 as a commentary to her French translation of Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, constitute a century-capping defence of the ethical primacy 
and political importance of sympathy, both in explaining our current societies and in 
helping determine our thought about better ones. At times this can seem to resolve itself 
into a starry-eyed, though heartening, faith in the moral virtue inherent within 
humanity:  
 
What do we not owe to sympathy, even in its faintest glimmerings, since 
from that moment sympathy is the first cause of the feeling of humanity, 
the effects of which are so precious. It compensates for a portion of the 
evils issuing from personal interests in large societies, and it struggles 
against the coercive force that we encounter everywhere we go and that 
centuries of Enlightenment alone can destroy by attacking the vices that 
produced it! Amid the shock of so many passions that oppress the weak or 
marginalize the unfortunate, from the bottom of its heart humanity 
secretly pleads the cause of sympathy and avenges it from the injustice of 
fate by arousing the sentiment of natural equality.35  
 
To see how she reaches these conclusions, and to fully excavate the bases and 
workings of sympathy in de Grouchy’s political thought, a comparison with her 
interlocutor will be instructive.  
  Smith describes how sympathy operates at the very beginning of his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. For him, it would seem, in contrast to Hutcheson and Hume—and, as 
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we shall see shortly, in partial contrast with de Grouchy—sympathy is an operation of 
our imaginations. While Hutcheson and Hume see sympathy as a kind of contagion or 
harmony, more-or-less naturally propagating between receptive human hearts, for Smith 
the mechanism of sympathy is more intellectual.36 “Though our brother is upon the 
rack,” he writes, “as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers.” They are a separate person from us; for Smith their pain does not, 
without mediation, leap from them to ourselves. Nevertheless, “that we often derive 
sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances 
to prove it.”37 
Instead of the immediate propagation of feeling, which might hew closer to its 
spiritual, quasi-Stoic forebears, then, 
 
it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are 
his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than 
by representing to what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the 
impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our 
imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, 
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were 
into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, 
and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something 
which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His 
agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when have thus 
adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then 
tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain 
or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or 
to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in 
proportion to the vivacity or dullness of the conception. 38 
 
We are here a long way from sympathy understood as a kind of pre-existing 
affinity or connection between similar creatures. Presumably, of course, a condition of 
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this imaginative exercise—and perhaps of its degree of vivacity—is still our perception of 
our similarity with the person in whose situation we place ourselves. We do not usually 
imagine ourselves in the place of a kicked stone or swatted fly, though of course we may; 
and that it is a less frequent and surely much weaker feeling than sympathy for the pains 
of other humans can be explained by the relatively greater distances in kind that our 
imaginations have to cover to do so.  
In fact, though, our imagination never covers any distance: sympathy, for Smith, 
has no ‘spatial’ character. It is not spread out between feeling individuals; it is not a 
relation. As Karin Brown notes, Smith’s concept of sympathy is “individualistic.”39 It is a 
feeling for others, but it is generated entirely within ourselves, by ourselves; not given to 
us by others or by a relation in which we are both participants.  
“Sympathy, therefore,” Smith writes, “does not arise from the view of the passion, 
as from that of the situation which excites it.”40 We can sympathise with people on the 
basis of their situation, even if the emotion we thereby feel diverges from the real 
emotions of the object of our sympathy:  
 
We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be 
altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that 
passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in 
his from the reality. We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another, 
though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own 
behaviour; because we cannot help feeling with what confusion we 
ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.41 
 
Smith goes so far as to say that we can even feel sympathy for the dead in this 
manner (“it is miserable, we think, to be deprived of the light of the sun”).42 Though he 
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doesn’t say it, this view of sympathy also entails that there is no in-principle reason we 
cannot feel sympathy for rocks or flies, if we’re imaginative enough. I think these effects 
of Smith’s view grant it a certain intuitive plausibility: it seems we can feel sympathy (or 
empathy, we might say now) for people more on the basis of how they might feel than 
how they do—and such a tendency does not always have positive effects. But Smith is 
able to explain these effects because his view of sympathy as an imaginative exercise 
taking place within the individual is one that—as Brown evocatively puts it—“assumes we 
are alone first.”43  
De Grouchy, instead, starts from the view that “before everything we are similar 
and connected.”44 Her resulting conception of sympathy is one that, like those of 
Hutcheson and Hume, stays closer to its occult ancestors, rooted as it is in mutually-
recognised similarity.  
Unlike Smith, who—as de Grouchy herself notes—observes the obviousness of the 
existence of our feeling of sympathy against having to explain its origin, and is content 
just to explain the mechanism by which sympathetic feelings are generated by the 
imagination, de Grouchy is concerned to explain whence the tendency to have such 
feelings comes. “I regretted,” she writes, “that he did not dare to go further, to penetrate 
its first cause, and ultimately to show how sympathy must belong to every sensible being 
capable of reflection.”45  
Even here, at the beginning of the first of her Letters, de Grouchy carefully yokes 
together intellect and affect in her account of sympathy: “every sensible being capable of 
reflection.” She explains the necessity of sympathy to all such creatures with reference, 
first, to an investigation of the workings of pain. She notes that the immediate moment 
of pain contains two separable sensations: a “local” pain, in whatever part of our body is 
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currently afflicted; and “a painful general impression in all our organs, an impression 
very distinct from the local pain and that always accompanies the latter, but that can 
continue to exist without it.”46 
This general impression appears to be the emotional aversion or unpleasantness 
that we feel alongside specific, localised pains—hence its ability to persist beyond the 
existence of those pains. De Grouchy describes a “general feeling of malaise” that can 
often last for a long time after the cessation of particularised pains, “because the organs 
that are the principal seat of that general impression are the most essential for vital 
functions as well as for the faculties that make us sensitive and intelligent”—again 
suggesting that this general impression of pain is an emotional response.  
This general impression returns to us whenever we remember our particular 
injuries and pains. And, as soon as we have become sufficiently acquainted with this 
feeling and its causes, we can come to feel it even apart from our own pains:  
 
In the same way as the memory of an injury we have felt reproduces the 
painful impression that affected all our organs that formed part of the 
local pain this injury caused us, so, too, we feel this painful impression 
again when, being in a position to note the signs of pain, we see an 
impressionable being suffer or whom we know suffers.  
In effect, as soon as the development of our faculties and the 
repeated experience of pain permit us to have an abstract idea of it, that 
alone renews in us the general impression mady by pain on all our organs. 
47 
 
Here, there, lies the root of sympathy, at least insofar as it pertains to the physical 
pains of others: one part of our own sensation of pain—our general impression of it—is 
reproduced when we encounter its mere idea. This idea, as long as our sensibility is 
sufficiently acute and our intelligence attuned to the outward signs of pain, can be 
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generated easily enough at the mere sight of pain in others. An analogous, though 
weaker, process explains our ability to sympathetically feel the pleasures of others too.48    
The distinction between Smith and de Grouchy here is subtle but significant. For 
Smith, we feel the pains of others indirectly—by imagining ourselves in their place. From 
this it follows that we can feel even pains that are not felt by others, if we imagine that we 
would if we were in their place. For de Grouchy, by contrast, we feel the pains of others 
directly, albeit lacking the localised pain of their particular affliction. As for Smith, our 
capacity to feel sympathy is dependent upon, and responsive to, our reflective faculties: 
physicians and surgeons, de Grouchy says, are able to block the sympathetic propagation 
to themselves of the pains of their patients by their knowledge that such pain is all to the 
good.49 In this we are no more strings wound to the same note, moved by the same 
vibrations, for de Grouchy than we are for Smith. But the “general impression of pain” 
that we feel when observing the pains of others is precisely the same general impression 
that we have of our own. Though there is no mystical force at work here, we are hence 
much more intimately connected with one another on de Grouchy’s picture than we are 
on Smith’s—sympathy spreads among us along the channels of our affective and 
intellectual machinery, which are of the same kind, if not of the same degree of 
sensitivity or control, in every person.  
 De Grouchy explains that our capacity to sympathise with others begins “in the 
crib,” at our first realisation of the dependency of our happiness and well-being on the 
care, and therefore happiness and well-being, of others.50 As Brown notes, in this respect 
de Grouchy’s ethics resembles a feminist ethics of care avant la lettre.51 And this 
sympathy, induced by the care of others for us, causes us—as we become more sensitive 
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and reflective as we age, if properly nurtured—to extend our sympathetic feelings yet 
further. In large societies, we rapidly come to understand our similarity to, and 
dependence on, a great many other people, and our sympathy follows behind this 
realisation.52 
 From this basis, much follows. For our purposes, most important is the role that 
sympathy plays in the creation and maintenance of ethical and political order. Our 
principles of moral goodness and badness are derived from sympathy: our ability to feel 
the pains of others is compounded and intensified by our own pains when we grasp that 
we are the cause of those others’ misfortunes; likewise our capacity to feel pleasure in the 
happiness of others can be joined by a pleasure in having been the cause of that 
happiness.53 These second-order pleasures and pains can also persist beyond the 
immediate moment of their cause and can be reignited by memory; and, like sympathy 
itself, with adequate intellectual reflection and generalisation we can derive from these 
sentiments our moral principles:  
 
This more lasting feeling of satisfaction or pain connected to the 
recollection of the good or harm we have done to others is necessarily 
modified by reflection. And the modification which reflections entails lead 
us to the idea of moral good or evil and to the first and eternal rule that 
judges men before the laws, a rule that so few laws have consecrated or 
developed, that so many others have violated, and that prejudices have so 
often and absurdly stifled!54 
 
We are hence, thanks to our sympathy, naturally good creatures, at least in 
potentia, and it is only where social institutions have stifled our sensitivity and perverted 
our reason that we become cruel and selfish. Further abstraction through reason leads us 
to rights, as “preference[s] commanded by reason itself in favor of a particular 
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individual,”55 and thence to justice, which is merely the character of actions in 
conformity with right.56 The moral correctness of all this abstraction is confirmed to us in 
our sentiments, which are more greatly pained by an injustice than by “a simple 
wrong.”57 Sympathy, then, beginning just as the pain we feel on observing the pain of 
those that nurture us, underpins—through a rigorous rational progression—morality, 
human rights, and justice. And yet despite this progression, confirmed as much by our 
sentiments as it is by reason, it is easy enough for us to be led away from all these things 
in irrationally organised societies.  
As we saw in the quotation that opened this section, de Grouchy sees sympathy as 
an important—the important—counter to “the evils issuing from personal interests in 
large societies.” It is notable that she specifies that it is in large societies that these 
personal interests arise. Selfishness is not a natural human disposition, against which 
sympathy must function as a salutary check to an increasing degree as societies grow 
larger and more urban and egoistic beings increasingly rub up against one another. 
Rather, selfishness is a socially constructed phenomenon, and we, in our modern urban 
polities, would be in an even worse position than we are were not our natural sympathy—
arising, originally, from the apprehension by our affective-cognitive faculties of our 
dependence on others—struggling gamely against this younger threat.    
“In society,” she writes in the fourth letter, 
 
A vicious system of legislation, instead of uniting the interests of 
individuals, has set them at odds. Human greed has led men to the point 
where they all cannot satisfy these social fantasies at the same time, social 
fantasies that, turned into habits, have usurped the name of needs. From 
childhood these men tacitly acquire the habit of perceiving misfortunes 
and the goods of others as a given which fortune has bestowed on them 
for their own enjoyment. Civilized man, if he is governed by prejudices 
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and bad laws, is thus naturally envious and jealous—and increasingly so, 
as vices of social institutions separate him further from nature, corrupt 
his reason, and make his happiness depend on the satisfaction of a greater 
number of needs.58  
 
Bad institutions hence create incentives for us to be selfish, possessive and 
envious, suppressing our natural tendency to sympathy. De Grouchy is a strong advocate 
of an education that would nurture the affective sensitivity and abstract thought 
necessary to work from our own sympathetic feelings to the principles of justice and 
right as she does in the letters:  
 
What an immense labor remains for education, not to develop or direct 
nature, but only to preserve nature’s beneficent inclinations, to prevent 
them from being stifled by prejudices that are so well accepted and 
common and that totally corrupt any sense of humanity and equality. 
These sentiments are as necessary for the the moral happiness of each 
individual as they are for maintaining fairness and security in all relations 
in the social order!59  
 
In addition to education, however, undoing human beings’ socially-implanted 
selfishness requires extensive political reform for de Grouchy. She claims that the four 
artificial needs that have been implanted into us by society, and that are the cause of all 
unjust action, are jealous or possessive love, desire for money, ambition, and vanity.60 All 
these things are encouraged and sparked by existing social structures, and would 
dissipate in a society with rational institutions— impoverishment, for instance, caused by 
laws that at present “favour the inequality of fortunes,” silences or overrides the natural 
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sympathy of the poor and makes them more likely to act unjustly from sheer need: 
“conscience,” she writes evocatively, “soon fades when entangled by chains.”61  
Law and other social institutions, therefore, must be rationally constructed such 
that they encourage, rather than suppress, our natural sympathies and desire to do good. 
Punishments under law must not be so nasty or disproportionate that we are blocked by 
our sympathy from administering them or from turning wrongdoers into the authorities; 
nor must they be applied unequally due to social privileges, wealth, or status. Under the 
current conditions of brutality and inequality, people distrust and dislike the law, which 
causes crime to propagate, rights to be threatened, and suspicion, fear, and envy to 
overrun sympathy. If the law is consistently applied and punishments are made 
reasonable, then people’s increased security will reverse the degradation of their 
sympathies:  
 
The social order, in preserving man his natural rights, would put men in 
the optimal position to lead them to mutually respect these rights, and 
then these rights would be guaranteed by the interest in each individual’s 
happiness and tranquility even more than by the laws.62 
 
Here we can see the finer mechanics of de Grouchy’s firm belief in the connection 
between sympathy and order. To the extent that contemporary societies are ordered at 
all—and for de Grouchy, writing only a few years after her husband died in a prison of 
the Terror, this is a questionable proposition—it is in spite of existing laws and 
institutions. But she is no anarchist. Rather, she believes that in an ideal and reasonable 
polity laws are a catalyst rather than a cause of order. Order arises from our perception 
of the rights of others, and our natural, strongly-felt disinclination to override those 
rights, both of which arise in turn from our sympathy: order arises, that is, from our 
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capacity to feel the emotions and even sensations of others as our own, through our 
recognition of our essential similitude, interconnectedness, and mutual dependence.  
Though she is a political thinker, writing only of the affective connections 
between humans and their consequences, there is much in de Grouchy that echoes the 
distant earlier voices of sympathy. Sympathy is an affinity, an emotionally-felt 
connectedness and similarity, and it grounds the capacity of otherwise wayward beings 
to work together and produce a harmonious social order, even without the direct 
intervention of gods, spirits, or lawgivers. For Van Helmont sympathy explains how a 
salve can work to cure a distant wound; for de Grouchy it explains how I can desire to aid 
those that I’ve never seen in distant places.  
In the eighteenth century, thus, sympathy is internalised by humanity, taken out 
of nature at large and confined within the individual psyche. It becomes a check upon 
our own most selfish desires, making possible (if Hanley is right) the kinds of states and 
societies that were developing at the same historical moment. The cost, of course, is that 
sympathy ceases to be the kind of relation that can hold between the non-human 
elements of nature; while human actions can be explained by these fine (and less fine) 
moral sentiments, the actions of the brute matter of the universe must be explained in 
mechanistic, lifeless terms.  
But for Cavendish no such cost is incurred. It is with all these parallel threads in 
mind that we can finally turn to her, and to the question of just how and to what extent 
order is manifested in her image of Nature—an image that is, as much as that of the 
polity is for de Grouchy or Smith, irreducibly a social one.    
 




1.3.1 Cavendishean Nature 
 
De Grouchy, then, in fine republican tradition, is able to show that social order 
needn’t necessitate top-down legislation or control. Rather, it can bubble up from the 
mass of the polity itself, thanks to a natural emotional and reflective endowment held by 
each individual within that polity. In the forthcoming I will argue that this model is the 
best way for us to think through the orderliness of Nature in Margaret Cavendish’s 
metaphysics; and in so doing I hope also to show how her conception of sympathy can be 
read as standing at a unique, and complex, historical intersection. To get there, I will first 
sketch the building blocks of Cavendish’s metaphysical system, and then turn to the 
contemporary debate regarding how this system is to be ordered.  
Cavendish is a thoroughgoing materialist. In the early Poems, and Fancies 
(1653), she appears to be an atomist, as described in many of her poems:  
 
Small Atomes of themselves a World may make, 
As being subtle, and of every shape: 
And as they dance about, fit places finde, 
Such Formes as best agree, make every kinde.63  
 
I say “appears” because there is much controversy regarding how seriously to 
take any of Cavendish’s metaphysical claims, particularly in this avowedly fanciful early 
work, in which, as Jay Stevenson notes, much of the text is presented by Cavendish as 
being digression, distraction, idle imagining, or the therapeutic discharge of unruly 
thoughts.64 Stevenson argues that all this is to Cavendish’s favour in her presentation of a 
true vitalist atomism, in which even thoughts may be made from the contrary moments 
of independent atoms. He gives a Straussian reading that suggests that her later 
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disavowal of atomism (beginning, it seems, in her Philosophical and physical opinions of 
1655) is not as strong as it appears, and more strategic than substantive.65  
For my part, I am persuaded by Detlefsen’s argument against this reading of 
Cavendish,66 and will proceed taking her later rejection of atomism, and endorsement of 
plenism, at face value—as expressed, with more or less consistency, in the Philosophical 
and physical opinions, the Philosophical letters (1664), the Observations upon 
experimental philosophy (1666), and the Grounds of natural philosophy (1668). 
Significant, however, for my purposes is Stevenson’s emphasis on Cavendish’s belief 
that, however matter is organised or divided, it always carries the potential for 
dissolution, disorder, and conflict: “order,” he writes, “for Cavendish is not absolute, or 
even rational in a Hobbesian sense, but contingent on the interplay of autonomous, 
independent forces.”67 This is true whether Cavendish endorses atomism or plenism; and 
I think that my forthcoming sympathetic explanation for the inherence of (some) 
orderliness in Nature can equally apply to either reading.  
Nevertheless, let us understand Cavendish as endorsing the view that all of 
Nature is comprised of an infinite, and infinitely divisible, material plenum, without 
interruption or vacuum. Everything, hence, is material: there may be spirits and there is 
certainly a God, but—as material beings with material brains within which are material 
thoughts—we cannot even think of such things. Everything that we experience, and 
indeed everything that happens, must be explicable in terms of matter and its motion—
and indeed, perhaps, matter and motion are ultimately the same thing.68  All matter 
contains, or has, three aspects or “degrees”—inanimate, sensitive, and rational—that are 
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infinitely commingled; that is, mixed such that no part of matter, however divided, is 
small enough that it does not contain all three.69  
Inanimate matter is brute matter, dumb and (of course) immobile; sensitive 
matter is animate, able to perceive other parts of nature around it, and able too to move 
inanimate matter when it moves; and rational matter is rarefied, agile, and able to move 
the most freely; so rare and agile, in fact, that it cannot move inanimate matter with it. 
All motion in Nature is hence explained by the free self-generated motion of matter 
itself; because everything is animate, there is never any transfer of motion between 
different bodies. This is most strikingly illustrated in the Philosophical letters, where 
Cavendish explains that a body falling into snow does not, itself, move the snow to create 
its own imprint. Rather, the rational and sensitive matter which constitute the snow 
perceive the falling body and pattern out themselves—the sensitive matter hauling 
inanimate matter with it—into the body’s shape.70 All changes and processes in Nature, 
from learning to medicine, can be explained thus. 
As both the sensitive and rational forms of matter have life and knowledge, all of 
Nature has life and knowledge.71  The creatures of Nature are, of course, formed by the 
free self-motion of their constituent parts:  
 
All Creatures are Composed-Figures, by the consent of Associating Parts, 
they joyn into such, or such a figured Creature: And though every 
Corporeal Motion, or Self-moving Part, hath its own motion; yet, by their 
Association, they all agree in proper actions, as actions proper to their 
Compositions: and, if every particular Part, hath not a perception of all 
the parts of their Association; yet, every Part knows its own Work.72  
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 At this early juncture in the Grounds, then, Cavendish seeks to explain the 
persistence and consistency through time of the bodies of natural creatures with 
reference to the rational agreement and “consent” of their constituent parts. A 
“Composed-Figure”—such as you or I, a partridge or a hawk, a chair or a desk, a rock or a 
tree—here resembles nothing so much as a social organisation, an organic collective or 
commune of self-moving, freely associating parts. Indeed it is striking that Cavendish 
explains here how a rock or partridge or I can exist and hold together (albeit imperfectly, 
as shown by disease and death and the like) without recourse to any kind of top-down 
authority. But as the controversy among contemporary Cavendish scholars regarding 
orderliness demonstrates, she does seem to resort to such an authority at times—
understanding Nature, it seems, either as an imperial lawgiver, giving commands from 
on high that have more or less efficacy, or as a kind of tinkerer that reaches directly into 
the motions of all her parts to guide them.  
The character, extent, and—importantly—provenance of this ordering authority is 
the central concern of this section of the chapter, a concern with which a deeper 
contextual understanding of Cavendishean sympathy can help  us. Once we have an 
image of how sympathy functions for Cavendish, one that can be illuminated by the 
historical context of the preceding sections, it will be possible, I think, to show that 
neither of the conceptions of the authority of Nature given above are necessary to explain 
her orderliness. It is, hence, to how Cavendish presents sympathy that I turn next. 
 
1.3.2 Cavendishean Sympathy 
 
Fixing precisely what the terms sympathy and antipathy mean for Cavendish is a 
complicated endeavour. One of the central theses of this chapter is that Cavendish, by 
virtue of the unique affective-vitalist character of her metaphysics, exhibits both the early 
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causal-explanatory and the later ethical-ordering tendencies of sympathy in her own 
usage of the term. Naturally, given her own position in the history of the term, she never 
states this explicitly. Coming to this conclusion is therefore a matter of reconstruction 
from the available textual evidence.  
The most overt statement about sympathy in Cavendish is in the fifteenth of the 
third section of her Philosophical letters.73 The letter is striking for numerous reasons. 
Like the other letters in the third section, it is addressed to a hypothetical female 
interlocutor (“MADAM”), but it concerns the work of Van Helmont, referred to by 
Cavendish as “your Author”74:  
 
MADAM, [...] Concerning Sympathy and Antipathy, and attractive or 
magnetick Inclinations, which some do ascribe to the influence of the 
Stars, others to an unknown Spirit as the Mover, others to the Instinct of 
Nature, hidden Proprieties, and certain formal Vertues; but your Author 
doth attribute to directing Ideas, begotten by their Mother Charity, or a 
desire of Good Will, and calls it a Gift naturally inherent in the 
Archeusses of either part: If you please to have my opinion thereof, I 
think they are nothing else but plain ordinary Passions and Appetites.75 
 
There is an undeniable, and doubtless self-conscious, bathos in the precipitous 
fall from the divine Archeus of Van Helmont—that spirit that comes from God and 
grounds the sympathetic connection of all creatures—to the “plain ordinary Passions and 
Appetites” of Cavendish. Wacky as her metaphysics may appear to contemporary 
readers, with its sentient snow and the like, Cavendish is a hard-nosed realist in her own 
idiosyncratic way. She will have nothing to do with the spirits of Van Helmont. After all,  
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who is able to conceive all those Chymaeras and Fancies of the Archeus, 
Ferment, various Ideas, Blas, Gas, and many more, which are neither 
something nor no-thing in Nature, but betwixt both, except a man have 
the same Fancies, Visions and Dreams, your Author had?76 
 
Such things are hallucinatory nonsense for Cavendish. “Nature is easie to be 
understood,” she writes, “and without any difficulty, so we stand in no need to frame so 
many strange names, able to fright any body.”77 Understanding sympathy, then, like 
understanding anything else, oughtn’t be a complex matter, and we certainly can’t help 
ourselves to spiritual emanations or hidden properties where our understandings falter. 
Hence we should should emphasise the plainness and ordinariness of the passions and 
appetites that, for Cavendish, comprise sympathy.  
The bathetic juxtaposition of the seemingly magical, the scientific, and the plainly 
human is a frequent literary technique of Cavendish’s, and she deploys it with notable 
effect in the letter on sympathy. In comparing the “many sorts of Sympathyes and 
Antipathyes, or Attractions and Aversions,” she brings in the famous weapon-salve, in 
comparison to magnets and compasses:  
 
In some subjects, Sympathy requires a certain distance; as for example in 
Iron and Loadstone; for if the Iron be too far off, the Loadstone cannot 
exercise its power, when as in other subjects, there is no need of any such 
distance, as betwixt the Needle and the North-pole, as also the Weapon-
salve; for the Needle will turn it self towards the North, whether it be near 
or far off from the North-pole; and so, be the Weapon which inflicted the 
wound, never so far from the wounded Person, as they say, yet it will 
nevertheless do its effect.78  
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The diversity of examples of sympathetic action arrayed by Cavendish is 
reminiscent of that of Sennert, above, dismissively noting that the believers of the 
weapon-salve seek to explain everything from cat allergies to the effectiveness of 
astrology with reference to a “hidden Sympathy or Magnetisme as they call it.” As well as 
magnets, compasses, and the weapon-salve, Cavendish explains sympathy with reference 
to infectious diseases, the feelings of men for one another, “good Cheer draw[ing] 
abundance of People,” the attraction of predators to prey, humans and animals’ food 
preferences, flowers turning toward the sun, “faithful Servants watch[ing] and wait[ing] 
for their Master,” “hungry Beggars at a rich man’s door,” the migration of birds, the 
feelings of herself (Cavendish) for her hypothetical interlocutor, and, surely to be saved 
for last:  
 
I have seen an Ape, drest like a Cavelier, and riding on Horse-back with 
his sword by his side, draw a far greater multitude of People after him, 
then a Loadstone of the same bigness of the Ape would have drawn Iron; 
and as the Ape turn’d, so did the People, just like as the Needle turns to 
the North; and this is but one object in one kind of attraction, viz. 
Novelty: but there be Millions of objects besides.79 
 
While Sennert gathers his menagerie with the aim of showing the presumption of 
those, like Van Helmont, that would seek to ground the effectiveness of the salve in a 
force that pervades all Nature, Cavendish—apparently herself a believer in the salve—
gathers hers to show the wide variety of effects that are explicable by her own, non-
mystical, conception of sympathy. As well as emphasising the mundanity of sympathy by 
showing that, even in the cases of the weapon-salve or the movement of flowers, it is just 
the same feeling that humans—including Cavendish herself—sometimes have for one 
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another, she also explicitly reiterates its “ordinariness” and “plainness” twice more in the 
letter:  
 
As I said in the beginning, Sympathy is nothing else but natural Passions 
and Appetites, as Love, Desire, Fancy, Hunger, Thirst, &c. and its effects 
are Concord, Unity, Nourishment, and the like: But Antipathy is Dislike, 
Hate, Fear, Anger, Revenge, Aversion, Jealousie, &c. and its effects are 
Discord, Division, and the like.80 
 
The regularities—with the inclusion of the weapon-salve, the precise same 
regularities—that for Van Helmont and Fludd are explained by a quasi-spiritual force 
permeating the firmament are hence explained by Cavendish as arising from 
commonplace emotions. Indeed, in the above quotation we see that for Cavendish 
sympathy is not a single thing at all, but a name for a set of emotions that have concord 
and unity as an effect—with antipathy being the converse. It is notably strange, however, 
that she includes hunger and thirst—not obviously positive feelings—amongst the 
passions of sympathy. What they have in common, of course, with love, desire, and 
fancy, is that they too draw creatures toward other creatures: “the Wolf’s stomack,” she 
writes, “hath a sympathy to food, which causes him to draw neer, or run after those 
Creatures he has a mind to feed on.”81 
Perhaps this shows that sympathy is still a confused notion for Cavendish: the 
mixture between physical explanation and individual feeling that is evident throughout 
her account of sympathy, as well as in her metaphysics more widely understood, includes 
little quirks like this one that elides love and hunger. But, though we might think of 
hunger as being a generalised feeling that does not always have a particular object, for 
Cavendish to hunger is clearly transitive. She writes that sympathy needn’t be a 
reciprocated feeling:   
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Neither is it required, that all Sympathy and Antipathy must be mutual, or 
equally in both Parties, so that that part or party, which has a 
Sympathetical affection or inclination to the other, must needs receive the 
like sympathetical affection from that part again; for one man may have a 
sympathetical attraction to another man, when as this man hath an 
antipathetical aversion to him; and the same may be, for ought we know, 
betwixt Iron and the Loadstone, as also betwixt the Needle and the North; 
for the Needle may have a sympathy towards the North, but not again the 
North towards the Needle; and so may the Iron have towards the 
Loadstone, but not again the Loadstone towards the Iron.82 
   
With an understanding of this unreciprocated sympathy in hand, Cavendish’s 
inclusion of hunger and thirst alongside love makes more sense: to hunger for something 
is surely to have a motivation to positive action in its direction, even if—as in the case of 
the wolf’s stomach—it’s a stretch to imagine that the object of that attention feels the 
same way.  
The above-quoted passage, however, is remarkable for other reasons. It shows 
the distance of Cavendish’s departure from Van Helmont and his ilk in her 
understanding of sympathy. Like the later eighteenth century writers, she has decisively 
torn it from the heavens, broken it up, and propagated it out into the mass of individual 
creatures, with all of the contradiction and disagreement that such an action entails. No 
longer a peaceful unifying force suffusing all things, sympathy becomes the individual 
possession of individuals; causing them, to be sure, often to act in one another’s 
interests, to imitate one another, to draw close to one another—“proceeding,” as 
Cavendish puts it, “from an internal sympathetical love and desire to please”83—but with 
no hard-and-fast rules and certainly no requirement of balance or equality. As passions 
and appetites, sympathy and antipathy can have chaotic, unpredictable, unbalanced 
effects.  
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Unlike the eighteenth century theorists, however, who also see sympathy as an 
individual feeling, Cavendish does not confine sympathy to the human or even to the 
animal world. She helps herself to sympathy as a causal explanation for a great many of 
the phenomena of the natural world, from magnets to flowers to magical cures. Indeed, 
as I shall argue shortly, I don’t believe that the (imperfect) order of Cavendish’s material 
universe is explicable without reference to the individual sympathetic passions of its 
creatures. So once again Cavendishean sympathy is brought closer to that of de Grouchy: 
for both women, a feeling within separate individuals is the cause of self-ordering and 
self-organisation.  
Before moving to order as such, however, it will be helpful to consider briefly 
what the claim that sympathy is a passion or appetite entails for Cavendish. A clue is 
visible at the end of the letter on sympathy, where she restates its ordinariness:  
 
And thus, to shut up my discourse, I repeat again, that sympathy and 
antipathy are nothing else but ordinary Passions and Appetites amongst 
several Creatures, which Passions are made by the rational animate 
Matter, and the Appetites by the sensitive, both giving such or such 
motions, to such or such Creatures; for cross motions in Appetites and 
Passions make Antipathy, and agreeable motions in Appetites and 
Passions make Sympathy, although the Creatures be different, wherein 
these motions, Passions and Appetites are made; and as without an object 
a Pattern cannot be, so without inherent or natural Passions and 
Appetites there can be no Sympathy or Antipathy.84 
 
Her remark about “inherent or natural Passions and Appetites” suggests that they 
are essential qualities of, respectively, rational and sensitive matter. This would mean 
that all matter in the universe, containing as it does both rational and sensitive aspects, 
has the capacity for passions and appetites and hence, also, the capacity for sympathy. I 
think this is the correct understanding of Cavendish’s metaphysics. If so, then her tight 
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integration of passion and appetite with rationality and sensitivity is another wrinkle in 
Cavendish’s thought that sets her apart from a dominant intellectual tradition that sets 
rationality as separate from, and often superior to, emotion.  
To confirm this reading, however, we should turn to precisely what Cavendish 
says about the passions elsewhere in her work. The fifth and sixth parts of the Grounds, 
about human beings, contain a remarkable materialist account of the passions in which 
Cavendish associates different emotions with different kinds of motion amongst the 
rational parts of the human creature, or of motion of the rational parts with respect to 
the sensitive parts:  
 
When some of the Rational Parts move sympathetically, to some of the 
Sensitive Perceptions; and those Sensitive Parts sympathize to the Object, 
it is Love. If they move antipathetically to the Object, it is Hate. When 
those Rational and Sensitive Motions, make many and quick repetitions 
of those sympathetical actions, it is Desire and Appetite. When those 
Parts move variously, (as concerning the Object) but yet sympathetically 
(concerning their own Parts) it is Inconstancy. When those Motions move 
cross towards the Object, and are perturbed, it is Anger. But when those 
perturbed Motions are in confusion it is Fear.85 
 
And so on and so forth, down to the passions associated with dilation (joy), 
contraction (grief), contraction plus attraction (covetousness), dilation plus sympathy 
(generosity), et cetera. It will be noted, first, that this is another wonderful example of 
Cavendish’s commonsensical approach to materialism; but it will be noted, also, that in 
all this great list sympathy appears not as its own particular passion—as do pride, pity, 
horror, good-nature, et al—but rather alongside contraction, dilation, and attraction as a 
kind or character of motion from which the ‘higher-level’ passions can arise. This is 
reminiscent of Digby’s account of sympathy, in which it is again just a way of 
characterising a kind of harmonious motion that has a mechanical-atomist explanation. 
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Sympathetic motion, as we have seen multiple times, is for Cavendish agreeable motion: 
it is the kind of concord of motion that occurs when separate parts decide to move with 
one another, in unity or harmony. And if this unity or harmony of motion occurs 
between the rational and the sensitive parts, and between the sensitive parts and an 
external object, we call it love.  
Does this mean that Cavendish is just confused or incoherent when she describes 
sympathy as resulting from love in the Letters while describing love as resulting from 
sympathy in the Grounds? I don’t think so; I think there is a deeper explanation that has 
the virtue of being properly Cavendishean.  
First, we must ask what causes parts to move together in sympathetic ways—what 
motivates them to do so. In the letter, Cavendish—in speaking of reciprocal sympathy in 
particular—says that agreeable sympathy, “a conforming of the actions of one party, to 
the actions of the other,” proceeds from “an internal sympathetical love and desire to 
please.”86 If Cavendish were an atomist, the parallelism of this explanation would be 
pernicious circularity: at some point, she’d have to decide whether sympathy causes love 
or love causes sympathy. In the Poems, and Fancies, indeed, when she is an atomist, she 
does suggest that atoms just have sympathy innately: “By Sympathy, Atomes are fixed 
so, / As past some Principles they do not go.”87 
But circularity of this kind is not a problem for Cavendish the theorist of the 
infinitely divisible plenum. Recall that for her as far as one divides matter one will find 
rational, sensitive, and inanimate aspects; and as far as one divides matter one will find 
corporeal motion. This means that the very idea of differing levels of description does not 
apply in Cavendish’s universe; any bit of matter, no matter how small, can be understood 
simultaneously at all levels of description; it is always a moving part and always made up 
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of moving parts. Indeed everything in Nature is both citizen of a society and a society 
itself. One can explain sympathetic motions by love, and love by sympathetic motions, 
because one can always penetrate deeper into matter and always find both. If I wish to 
explain the love that I feel, I can point to the sympathetic motions of my rational parts; if 
I then wish to explain that sympathetic motion, I can point to the love those parts have 
for one another; if I wish to explain that love, I can point to the sympathetic motion of 
their own parts; and so on into the infinite guts of the universe. There is no level of 
complexity necessary for passions that we cannot find in the thinnest imaginable slices of 
being and beyond.  
This also explains another seeming contradiction. Digby argued that sympathy 
was just a name for a particular kind of motion that was explicable in physical-atomist 
terms. Cavendish frequently suggests both that sympathy is innate to matter and that it 
is a kind of motion between separate parts. Again, for an atomist this is a contradiction. 
But for a plenist it is no problem at all. Sympathy can be both innate to matter and a 
characteristic of the motor interaction of separate parts of matter because to be made of 
the motion of separate parts is, itself, innate to matter. It’s motion, interaction, and 
therefore agreement (and disagreement) all the way down. If this is incoherent, the 
problem lies in the idea of infinite divisibility itself.  
Sympathy, then, along with the other passions, must be innate to matter as a 
consequence of the innateness of rationality, sensitivity, and motion. As far as we 
penetrate into the plenum we will find agreement, love, and sympathy—alongside their 
negative converses. As I stated at the outset, for Cavendish sympathy is both a 
particularised feeling of love or connection that individuals have for one another and a 
phenomenon suffused into every corner of the universe, there to explain all kinds of 
physical processes. It is not put there by God or by any of his vicegerents—it is already 
there in matter. And, I argue in the forthcoming, it can explain how that universe can 
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appear so ordered without necessitating any such top-down rule; including from Nature 
herself.  
 
1.4 The Order of Cavendishean Nature 
 
I contend, therefore, that for Cavendish Nature is societies all the way down, and 
all the way up. Explaining how Nature appears ordered is then as much a political 
question as a metaphysical one—it is as much a question for political theorists like de 
Grouchy as it is for physicists like Van Helmont. And as we have seen, at the beginning of 
the Grounds Cavendish does explain how “figures”—that is, individual creatures like 
hawks and partridges, rocks and trees, you and me—come to be “composed” by the 
“consent of Associating parts” and their “agree[ment] in proper actions.”88 This consent 
and agreement is explained by Cavendish, particularly in the Letters, as arising from the 
sympathy that individual parts have for one another. It is clear, then, that for Cavendish 
sympathy plays an important role in explaining how Nature can appear organised, 
coherent, and orderly.  
In fact, I argue, sympathy—and its corollary positive emotions, such as 
agreeableness and love, with which Cavendish sometimes takes sympathy to be 
synonymous—can be used to explain much, or all, of the order that we observe around us 
in Nature. The parts of Nature have their own individual sympathetic motivation to act 
in orderly fashion, one that is generated from their own parts and not imposed from 
above or without. This allows us to assess and intervene in the contemporary debate 
regarding the order of Nature in Cavendish from a new direction.  
As I noted in my introduction, this disagreement in the contemporary literature 
on Cavendish regards the extent to and the method by which Nature is ordered. 
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Doubtless this debate in part arises from what appear to be inconsistencies of 
Cavendish’s own. She suggests both that real disorder is possible in Nature—we have 
already seen that her discussions of sympathy and love are very frequently accompanied 
by discussions of antipathy and hate—and, at other times, that Nature is perfectly 
regular. On the latter point, David Cunning points to this passage in the Letters:  
 
  And as for Irregularities, properly there is none in Nature, for Nature is 
Regular; but that, which Man (who is but a small part of Nature, and 
therefore but partly knowing) names Irregularities, or Imperfections, is 
onely a change and alteration of motions; for a part can know the variety 
of motions in Nature no more, then Finite can know Infinite …89  
 
Our judgements of the disorder or irregularity associated with war, disease, 
death, et cetera are hence, for Cunning, to be understood as arising from our own 
ignorance as limited parts of Nature; looking, perhaps, from her own point of view, we 
would see that these changes or alterations in motion were no more disorderly than any 
other—as Cunning puts it, “there is no such thing as disorder; instead there are events 
that run counter to our parochial expectations and concerns.”90 
Of course, this does not entail that there is no conflict or disagreement in Nature; 
we have already seen that for Cavendish antipathy and hate are almost as important 
explanatory feelings as sympathy and love, that Nature contains cross motions as well as 
agreeable ones, discord as well as concord. It just means that those motions that result 
from hatred and antipathy, and that run across one another rather than move together, 
are—strictly speaking, at the universal level—no more disorderly than those motions that 
are agreeable, loving, or sympathetic.    
This view is also given by Lisa Walters, who points out that “oppositions which 
occur in Nature are necessary for the creation of a variety of figures” and that irregular 
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motions are not true disorders but are “necessary aspects of how matter is balanced into 
a peaceful order.” “While Nature herself cannot make mistakes as she is a whole, infinite 
body,” Walters writes, “the individual parts within her make local errors of perception 
because they lack the capacity to comprehend Nature in its entirety.”91 
There are, I think, a number of problems with this view, and in particular with 
the notion that disorders are balanced out in creating a perfectly regular universe. The 
first problem is that Cavendish at times suggests that the perfect regularity of Nature is 
just the result of her being a single, infinite individual. Walters, for instance, cites a 
passage in the Observations upon experimental philosophy in which Cavendish says, 
explicitly, that all Nature’s actions “are ballanced by their opposites; as for example, 
there is no dilation but hath opposite to it contraction; no condensation but has its 
opposite, viz. rarefaction,” et cetera, “All which produces a peaceable, orderly, and wise 
Government in Natures Kingdom.”92 She then goes on to say that  
 
although the actions of Nature are opposite, yet Nature, in her own 
substance is at peace, because she is one and the same; that is, one 
material body, and has nothing without her self to oppose and cross her; 
neither is she subject to a general change, so as to alter her own substance 
from being Matter, for she is Infinite; but because she is selfmoving, and 
full of variety of figures, this variety cannot be produced without variety of 
actions, no not without opposition; which opposition is the cause, that 
there can be no extreams in particulars; for it ballances each action, so 
that it cannot run into infinite, which otherwise would breed a horrid 
confusion in Nature.93  
 
The first half of this long sentence implies that the orderliness of Nature is a 
trivial point in that it results just from her being a single individual, with “nothing 
without her self to oppose and cross her”; that is, nothing with respect to which she can 
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be disordered. If this is right, Nature can no more be disordered than can a helium atom 
in an infinite vacuum; disorder requires interaction, and Nature, from her own infinite 
viewpoint, interacts with nothing. This would also explain why Cavendish qualifies the 
passage about the regularity of Nature in the Letters with “properly”: it is a technical 
point, trivially true but substantively false.  
This is a minor point, and not one that I believe can take much interpretive 
weight, especially as later in the same sentence Cavendish says that things balance out 
within Nature’s body in some way too. The deeper and more troubling problem for this 
view is the question of how this balancing occurs. Nature, we know, is infinitely wise by 
virtue of her being an infinite plenum of rational and perceptive matter. But the 
centrepiece of all Cavendish’s metaphysics is that that matter is able to move itself, which 
means that—individual parts not being infinitely wise, but limited and made stupid by 
their finitude—it should be possible for them to move in ways that contradict this fine 
balance.  
What’s more, if Nature herself somehow acts to keep this balance, we must limit 
ourselves to explaining that action strictly in terms of matter and its motion, which for 
Cavendish constitutes the full extent of the contents of the universe. If Nature reaches 
into her own innards to ensure that a big outbreak of discord here is balanced out by a 
concordant pressure there, we cannot turn for aid to a tinkering God or to the spiritual, 
sympathetic emanations of Fludd or Van Helmont to explain how she does this. My 
concern is that Nature’s balancing act cannot be explained without improperly deifying 
or spiritualising her, attributing to her a power that extends beyond the limits of 
Cavendish’s physics.  
The most substantive problem here was identified by Karen Detlefsen, who 
argues that this image of Nature as perfectly and wholly self-organising at the universal 
level contradicts Cavendish’s commitment to occasional causation—that is, the thesis 
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that all parts of Nature are the principal causes of their own motion, with other creatures 
acting only as occasions for that motion.94 Allowing that Nature’s parts are their own 
causes allows that they can act freely95; and allowing that they can act freely allows that 
they can make moral and epistemological mistakes based on their limited knowledge.96 
Such mistakes inevitably manifest themselves as disorders within Nature. This explains 
Cavendish’s apparently strong commitment to the real evil and disorder of civil wars and 
disease.97 In her explanation in the Grounds of how “cordials” function to rid the body of 
disease, she combines these two preoccupations:  
 
… in Disputes between Two different Parties, a Third may come into the 
assistance of one Side, more out of hate to the Opposite, than love to the 
Assisted. The same may Cordials, or such like Applications, do, when the 
Corporeal Motions of Human Life are in disorder, and at variance: for, 
oftentimes, there is as great a Mutiny and Disorder amongst the 
Corporeal Motions, both in the Mind and Body of a Man, as in a Publick 
State in time of Rebellion: but, all Assistant Cordials, endeavour to assist 
the Regular Parts of the Body, and to perswade the Irregular Parts. As for 
Poysons, they are like Forrein War, that endeavours to destroy a 
Peaceable Government. 98 
 
This is a particularly useful example of Cavendish’s frequent combination of the 
natural or physical and the political or social. And though the passage does not prove 
that the balancing-act view of Nature’s order is false—the disorder of disease is 
rebalanced by the use of cordials—it does suggest that she thinks such disorders are of 
real ethical import. Indeed, Cavendish expends an inordinate amount of energy in 
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explaining how diseases, madness, and other bodily disorders occur, which would be odd 
for someone who considers such things to be parochial perceptual mistakes. This, also, 
suggests that if there is a perspective from which Nature is perfectly orderly, it is not 
ultimately an important one.  
Nevertheless, the most significant counter to the balancing-act view is 
Detlefsen’s: it is difficult to see how Nature could physically intervene in the actions of 
her parts to ensure that order is produced without compromising the freedom of those 
parts. This is complicated yet further when we consider that Nature is made up of those 
parts, and has no being separate from them. If an act proceeding from Nature’s wisdom 
is to be propagated through her infinite body, it must be through the consent and 
through the sympathetic motion of the parts that constitute that body, and not through a 
unilateral force that cannot exist in Cavendish’s universe. But this would mean not that 
Nature acts to balance out order and disorder within her body, but that she suggests or 
asks of her parts that they act to balance it out; much as when I raise my arm, a chain of 
suggestions, reciprocations, agreements, and sympathies proceeds from the rational-
material spark of my brain through all the moving matter of my nerves and muscles to 
cause my arm to move in a  particular way. It is the principal cause of its motion; my 
desire that it move is merely the occasion for it to move itself. (Presumably, when my 
arm loses feeling after having been slept upon, and my desire is unable to occasion my 
arm to move, it is because somewhere this chain of sympathies is broken—some part of 
me is distracted or stroppy.) 
This is precisely the view of Nature’s orderliness that Detlefsen proposes.99 She 
argues that Nature prescribes regularity within her parts, and that this comes about not 
because Nature herself acts as the principal cause of orderly movement—that would 
contradict Cavendish’s foundational metaphysical views—but because, being rational 
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and perceptive, the parts understand this prescription and act in accordance with it. As 
Detlefsen notes, the law of Nature is hence closer to the laws of human societies than it is 
to the tight mathematical regularity that the term was coming to mean at the time.100 
Disorder is real, then, and can be explained as the result of limited and ignorant 
creatures misinterpreting or ignoring Nature’s rational prescription toward regularity:  
 
So infinite Nature, as infinitely wise, knows what all the parts of finite 
nature ought to do in order to follow the one peaceful law, but finite parts, 
which are the source of both the occasional cause and principal cause in 
any given interaction between two finite parts, will and act upon their 
volitions to either follow or to dissent from the overall, peaceful law, and 
what law prescribes in individual causal interactions.101  
 
I think Detlefsen’s critique is correct and her reconstruction of order as resulting 
from affective and rational interaction between perceptive parts, rather than as a top-
down imposition, is much closer to both the spirit and letter of Cavendish’s metaphysics. 
Detlefsen also notes, importantly, that a key plank of Cavendish’s methodology is to use 
social interactions between humans—of which we have direct knowledge—to explain how 
things work in Nature.102 Or, as Boyle puts it—though perhaps in the opposite direction—
for Cavendish “the mode of organization and values appropriate for human societies can 
be found in the natural order itself.”103 This is borne out by passages like those regarding 
sympathy in the Letters, where Cavendish moves smoothly from magnets and compasses 
to her own feelings for her recipient; further, this is a core insight on which a central 
thesis of this chapter—that sympathy for Cavendish is both a personal feeling and an 
explanatory power—rests.  
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Detlefsen’s position is also given support by other passages, such as this one in 
the Letters, which emphasises that individual parts of creatures are free to do as they 
please:  
 
… it is impossible, that one single part should be King of the whole 
Creature, since Rational and Sensitive Matter is divided into so many 
parts, which have equal power and force of action in their turns and 
severall imployments; for though Nature is a Monarchess over all her 
Creatures, yet in every particular Creature is a Republick, and not a 
Monarchy; for no part of any Creature has a sole supreme Power over the 
rest.104 
 
Nature then stands in relation to her parts as a queen to her subjects, able to 
hand down pronouncements that have power, and have effects, but are not completely 
binding or causally determined. Let us reflect on this image for a moment. An important 
difference between a monarch and Nature is that a monarch is a separate person from all 
her subjects, an individual in some way invested with power, while Nature, it seems, is 
entirely and only the sum of her parts. In this sense she resembles more the artificial 
person of Hobbes’ commonwealth than an ordinary individual. When Nature prescribes, 
of me, that I act regularly or in an orderly fashion, I receive a prescription from an entity 
of which I am a constituent part. If there is a law of Nature, I am a participant in its 
creation and propagation, and not merely subject to it—though Cavendish mightn’t 
accept it, an extreme consequence of this view would be that Nature and her laws are just 
the general will of the infinitely divisible (and divided) universal community.  
We needn’t run to this extreme, however, to reflect further on this line of thought 
about the composition of Nature. If, as Detlefsen persuasively argues, the law of Nature 
is a rational suggestion or command, we should ask ourselves how this command is 
communicated and, indeed, what it’s like to receive it. Though Cavendish emphasises the 
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explanatory power of ordinary human experience, we oughtn’t trust our own perceptions 
too closely for this reflection; humans, after all, seem to act in much more chaotic and 
unpredictable ways than other creatures, like rocks or planets. Perhaps those creatures 
have a more direct or clear experience of Nature’s law towards order than we do—Boyle 
notes that, for Cavendish, humans differ from other creatures in that we suffer from 
ambition and pride, which may well cloud our perception of the law.105  
We should, however, work with what we have: and from our perspective, I think, 
any motivation toward regularity we have seems to come more from within than without. 
We do not feel an external pressure from an infinitely wise being to act in a harmonious 
and orderly fashion; rather, much in the vein of Hume or Smith or, especially, de 
Grouchy, our motivations to create order and ameliorate disorder seem to arise from our 
own feelings. If we were to attempt to describe our moral phenomenology in eighteenth-
century terms, we might indeed say that it is because of our sympathy for the individual 
creatures immediately around us that we act in roughly orderly ways, and not because of 
an ethical commitment that we have to orderliness writ large across the universe. As 
Cavendish emphasises in her letter, sympathy is the individual possession of individual 
creatures, and it seems to be that possession that motivates them to act in orderly ways, 
not any kind of external commandment.  
From this observation there are three paths that can be taken. We might say that 
the sympathetic desire to act in orderly ways in one’s immediate surroundings is, 
precisely, the universal law of Nature that Detlefsen identifies. Nature the monarchess, 
then, propagates her law not through external commands but through the emotional and 
rational motivations of her creatures. In de Grouchean fashion, we might even note that 
when we fail to act harmoniously it is still because of an ignorance that causes our 
natural rational and emotional tendency in that direction to be obscured or co-opted; 
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perhaps we might even construct, in Cavendishean terms, social critiques that can 
explain such ignorance, in the way de Grouchy critiques the sympathy-cancelling effects 
of her own society.  
The second path turns out to be closely related, for if the motivation to act in 
orderly ways comes from within we can return to the balancing-act, interventionist view 
of Natural order while dispensing with the troubling incompatibility with the freedom of 
creatures. If Nature acts directly on the motivations of her parts, then she can balance 
herself into an orderly whole while still allowing those parts to be the principal causes of 
their own motion—she doesn’t force them to move in particular ways, but tunes their 
feelings so that they choose to act in those ways. This is, admittedly, an attenuated view 
of freedom, and—as I have argued elsewhere—one that, politically, we ought reject in the 
sphere of human relations. But it is not implausible to say that I am the principal cause 
of my action even when my motivation to act comes from elsewhere.  
Bringing the phenomenological experience of sympathy into the picture, then, 
can bring these two explanations of Natural order a little closer together. There is, 
however, still a problem with both. We still need a physical, thoroughly materialist 
explanation as to how sympathy and its corollary order-creating feelings (including, at 
times, negative ones) come to be inscribed into the hearts of creatures by the infinite 
intelligence of Nature of which they are, themselves, constituents. This is not a 
persnickety or arcane technicality, either. Recall that sympathy itself is a kind of motion 
for Cavendish. If, as Cavendish consistently maintains, all parts are the principal causes 
of their own motion, then sympathy cannot be implanted into creatures by Nature, 
because this would entail that Nature orchestrates or forces certain motions to ensure 
that sympathy arises. This is another consequence of Cavendish’s belief in an infinitely 
divisible, self-moving plenum: there is no way for Nature to act on her parts that does 
not contradict something’s self-motion. If I act from my sympathy, it is true that I am 
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still the principal cause of my motion even when my sympathy is implanted; but for my 
sympathy to be implanted at all, something at a lower level has to be moved rather than 
self-moving.  
We might, then, reject this phenomenological picture of Nature’s law that sees it 
expressed by our own sympathetic feelings. Perhaps Nature has some other way to 
propagate her laws, a chain of communications and consents and sympathies that 
involves no over-running of individual creatures’ freedom. This is a complicated 
proposition, given that Nature is not an individual part but, it appears, and unlike 
everything else, only a community of parts; we would have to identify a space in which 
she can act without tyrannising, and the location or articulation of that space is not 
obvious to me. This would also ignore what seems to be phenomenologically true for us, 
and textually supported in Cavendish: that our own felt sympathy does cause us to act in 
roughly orderly ways.  
To be sure, ignorance remains possible, and at times sympathetic action might 
have disorderly effects; in the Grounds, for instance, she describes how the sympathy of 
sensitive matter for rational matter in the minds of mad people causes their disorderly 
thoughts to find outward expression, causing more disorder than if their madness was 
confined to only their rational parts.106 In general, however, sympathy creates order, and 
Cavendish frequently avails herself of this fellow-feeling to explain what would otherwise 
be mysteriously harmonious behaviour—most obviously in the letter that I discussed in 
detail. We ought not throw out this effect of sympathy too hastily.   
A third path here becomes visible. This path puts sympathy at the centre of an 
account of the orderliness of Nature. It also emphasises what we might call the 
communitarian image of Nature, the view that holds that it is central to our 
understanding of her that she is a society of rational and emotional individuals. We can 
                                                        
106 Cavendish GNP 127 
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say, then, that Nature is not orderly because of any top-down ethical imposition, but—
following de Grouchy—because of the intrinsic sympathetic motivations of her creatures 
and their positive, loving feelings towards one another.  As such feelings are imperfect, 
and as their converses are also possible, disorder is a real and constant presence. But in 
general, and most visibly in their capacity to persist through time—some, like stars, for 
much longer than others, like butterflies—creatures freely create their own order.  
Taken as a whole or as an individual, Nature might indeed have, or manifest, or 
even prescribe a general ethical commitment to order. She might yet be, as Cavendish 
describes her, a monarchess. But in such things, I think, she must be posterior to the 
sympathetic order of her parts. Following de Grouchy, who explains how conceptions of 
right and justice follow rationally from sympathy, we might say that the universal ethical 
prescription towards order is a result of the sympathy that creatures innately feel for one 
another, rather than vice versa, or rather than a view that relegates sympathy to a 
handmaiden or helper for a law that Nature generates herself. If I do feel an external 
Natural pressure to act in an orderly way, that pressure is in part the result of my own 
motion, a growth from my own sympathetic motivations, alongside those of every other 
thing in the universe; it is the self-generated law of a community of which I am, 
inescapably but freely, a part. Again following de Grouchy, while it cannot be its cause, 
perhaps that law is a catalyst of orderly behaviour. And if I choose to act according to 
that law, it is because I already have, as an essential function of my being a society of 
living matter, an affective motivation to create order—with more or less success. 
Sympathy, or agreeable motion, or love, as Cavendish will sometimes call it, is thus the 
individual possession of individual creatures while remaining, still, the power that orders 






Sympathy, therefore, allows Cavendish to explain why Nature can appear so 
orderly without compelling us to see Nature herself as the sole creator of her own 
ordering and, thereby, contradicting Cavendish’s commitment to occasional causation. 
For Cavendish the creatures of the universe, just like the citizens of the Enlightenment 
polity, are free and self-moving. But, just as de Grouchy hopes for citizens of the polity, 
the creatures of Cavendishean Nature are imbued with a sympathetic fellow-feeling that 
constrains their baser motivations and causes them to work together to further one 
another’s interests. The quantitative aggregate of these sympathetic relations causes the 
qualitative order that we see when taking a higher-level perspective on Nature. Order is 
not, therefore, generated by Nature ruling as absolute monarch over her constituent 
parts and running roughshod over their own self-motion; rather, Nature is herself a 
sovereign generated by the free association of her parts. Her orderliness is an emergent, 
bottom-up property of the sympathy that her parts feel for each other.  
In many ways, therefore, the picture we get of sympathy in Cavendish is one that 
has more in common with the eighteenth century sociopolitical views than the 
seventeenth century metaphysical or occult ones. Sympathy is an individual feeling of 
individual parts; they may all come together in a single whole from Nature’s perspective, 
but sympathy is not itself a feeling acquired through the intervention of an external 
being, as it is for the likes of Van Helmont and Fludd. 
On the other hand, of course, Cavendish differs greatly from the eighteenth 
century theorists in that, for her, sympathy is not merely something that obtains between 
human beings. It really does permeate all of Nature, in the same way that the 
seventeenth century philosophers thought. It has an important explanatory role to play 
in everything from the existence of animals to the operation of diseases to the 
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functioning of magnets to, of course, the attraction of large crowds to the sight of an ape 
on horseback. Sympathy, for Cavendish, is significantly both sociopolitical and natural, 
because in her philosophy everything is always both. Nature acts like our political 
institutions, made up of feeling, rational parts, with their own agendas, running up 
against each other, and occasionally or often finding ways to work together. 
She thus resolves a tension between individual and universal in the Natural 
sphere in much the same way that later political theorists would in the smaller social 
sphere. Sympathy is a universal or near-universal ordering force because it is an 
individualised feeling spread universally throughout a collectivity. As Lisa Sarasohn puts 
it, for Cavendish “harmony should be the state of natural and manmade entities, and it 
cannot be imposed from above but must be the product of the constitutive parts of the 
whole.”107 That she was able to reach this sociopolitical view of metaphysics before most 
theorists had even managed to reach this view of politics is remarkable, and worthy of 
further study; but for Cavendish, sympathy has an important role to play in explaining 
physical interactions in nature because it has an important role to play in explaining 
social interactions in human life. In this sense, she represents a reversal of the trend 
taken by history itself, where what began as a supernatural force was dragged from the 
heavens and placed into the mind. Cavendish instead studied her own mind and 
propagated the results out into Nature herself, filling her entirely with all the emotional 
and political life that we usually reserve for ourselves. Again, Cavendish’s philosophy 
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The problem of autonomy for feminism is usually construed as one of how 
autonomy is conceptualised. In its traditional philosophical and political images, the 
ideal autonomous agent is sketched as one whose actions are not influenced by 
circumstances or conditions external to themselves, but only by reason—which is, of 
course, something wholly belonging to, and internal to, the agent. These images are of an 
individualistic, atomised, self-interested, rational choice-maker, and these 
characteristics—feminist critics contend—are all ones that are coded as masculine in 
Western patriarchal societies. In the reciprocally reproductive mental and material 
realms of these societies women have, by contrast, been constructed as more relational, 
dependent, altruistic, and emotional; which is to say that, under patriarchy, women are 
both thought to be more essentially and naturally relational than men and are forced into 
roles that make them more so, not least by the thought itself.1  
Under the traditional conception of autonomy, one is heteronomous to the extent 
that one is moved to act by factors external to reason—including one’s own emotions, 
desires, and relations to others. While autonomy retains this atomistic connotation, 
then, and women retain their relational one, their exclusion from the category of 
autonomous agents is conceptual as well as historical.  
                                                        
1 This account of ‘patriarchal’ autonomy is perhaps somewhat caricatured, and not necessarily reflective 
of any particular philosopher’s considered views. Nevertheless it captures the view that, as an adversary, 
animates much feminist thought on freedom. A useful summary of feminist critiques of autonomy, as well 
as responses that seek to rehabilitate it, can be found in Mackenzie and Stoljar 5-12.  
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In this chapter I will consider some attempts by contemporary feminist 
philosophers to take into account these critiques while preserving a conception of 
individual autonomy. Preserving this conception is seen as important for at least two 
reasons: first, having some idea of autonomy allows for the articulation of critiques of 
gender oppression that might otherwise be submerged, and any emancipatory politics 
seems to require a belief in the capacity of people to act autonomously beyond the norms 
and algorithms that have been coded into them by oppressive social contexts.2 Second, it 
is necessary to hold on to the idea that people’s actions in some way bespeak who they 
are so that we can make normative assessments on the basis of those actions. If we 
abandon autonomy it is difficult to see how this ordinary ethical practice is possible 
without being tyrannical.3  
Attempts to rehabilitate individual autonomy, therefore, contend that 
“autonomy” needn’t connote a coded-masculine, perniciously atomised agent. These 
arguments claim that a more accurate and more morally fruitful image of autonomy 
would make clear its essentially relational and social nature, and take into account 
subjects’ status as socially situated—perhaps even socially constituted—beings. They seek 
to build a conception of autonomy that is intrinsically relational.  
In the forthcoming chapter I compare these relational theses of autonomy to the 
work of the early feminist nun Gabrielle Suchon, who also recognised that the social 
reality of women’s lives undermined both their well-being and their ability to act 
autonomously. This wasn’t just a matter of the circumstances and ideologies that kept 
women fettered in roles that severely limited their ability to do as they pleased. For 
Suchon, these social circumstances affected the way women thought, believed, and 
desired; they produced structures of thought that caused women to constrain 
                                                        
2 Mackenzie 7 
3 Benson 55. Benson uses the term “free agency” rather than autonomy, but his normative competence 
view is taken (e.g. by Mackenzie 5) to be a part of the relational autonomy literature.  
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themselves, and made impossible the rational use of the freely-willing soul that is God’s 
universal gift. In these senses she is a clear forerunner of the feminist critiques of 
autonomy; she shows that people are not self-regulating and self-transparent atoms.  
But if we follow the consequences of Suchon’s arguments a little further a 
significant problem arises. Once one allows the social to glom onto a person’s identity—
to come between them and their vision onto the world and into themselves—one 
introduces opacity into the self and into any possible faculty of self-scrutiny. And if we 
take the totalising effects of sociality seriously then we acknowledge that one cannot tell, 
easily, which parts of oneself derive from oneself and which come from outside—from 
one’s oppressive social milieu. There is thus an epistemological-phenomenological 
problem looming for any theory that introduces sociality into the soul while still hoping 
to preserve a space for autonomy.   
I aim to show that this problem is insoluble both for the seventeenth century 
theorists of women’s freedom and for the contemporary theorists of relational autonomy. 
Any foundation for autonomy that is erected within a socially-constituted self will 
collapse—either into heteronomy or into the old rationalist image of an autonomy 
immune to the social. And the idea that there was ever an autonomy immune to the 
social was, always, a socialised heteronomy by a different, ideologically constructed 
name.  
Though the problem stands for both Suchon and the contemporary theorists, it is 
fatal only for the later thinkers. Suchon has religious beliefs that allow her to skirt the 
problem of self-knowledge for social beings. Both of the contemporary reasons for 
holding onto autonomy—its apparent centrality to emancipatory politics and to 
normative assessment—require a kind of self-knowledge or self-transparency that cannot 
be generated from relational conceptions of autonomy. I do not believe this necessarily 
leaves us in a dim spot with regards to liberation. And if an ethics grounded in the 
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normative assessment of individuals by their actions is rendered impossible without 
autonomy, I contend, then we have a good reason to reject that individualistic ethics. In 
this, as shall be seen, I follow Theodor Adorno in his critique of Kant, the almost-sole 
object of his lectures on the Problems of Moral Philosophy. As will perhaps also become 
obvious, I am moved—and somewhat guided by—Adorno’s frequent assertion that “in 
the bad life a good life is not possible.”4  
So it is in the effects of the apparent unknowability of the autonomous self that I 
think an encounter between Suchon and the contemporary theorists is instructive. 
Ultimately, the solution to the problem of the contradiction between autonomy and 
society is not to be solved by any kind of conceptual reworking of autonomy. It is to be 
solved by the revolutionary reworking of society—that is, by politics.  
 
2.2 Three Axes of Relational Autonomy 
 
Before I go on, a quick note about liberation. Resistance to the oppressive 
structures of patriarchy is, of course, the primary animus of feminism. I have already 
given away that this chapter ends with the repudiation of the ability of the agent to ever 
know that she is acting autonomously under current conditions, but I do not mean by 
this to repudiate the possibility of resistance to oppression. I do not endorse 
hopelessness. At the same time, however, I do endorse a grim realism about the extent 
and nature of the task that confronts us. Patriarchal structures have been influencing the 
mental and material conditions of society for thousands of years. They have conditioned 
and determined the ways that all of us think about ourselves and each other, and they 
                                                        
4 Adorno 167. I don’t provide any argument for the persuasiveness of this formulation. But I take it that, 
even if we do not share Adorno’s world-beating pessimism, the readers of this chapter will agree that the 
world and society are currently beset by a great number of harmful structures and conditions. This seems 
to me to be a prerequisite for feminist philosophy and political philosophy in general. I believe my 
arguments are persuasive using this as a starting point.  
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have structured thought and language to such an extent that, in many places and for 
many centuries, the catastrophe of its own existence was almost impossible to express 
despite its horrendous consequences.5 Our present position is one of several centuries of 
hard-fought struggle, but we are still very much within patriarchy, as we are within white 
supremacy and imperialist capitalism and other structures yet unnamed. The reciprocal 
mental and material effects of these structures are totalising or very close to totalising; 
we shouldn’t imagine that there are easy ways out, and should be suspicious of any that 
present themselves. Resistance to patriarchy is a vital political duty, but it is also one that 
is extremely difficult—not just to achieve but to articulate. In our theorising we should 
face up to this difficulty.  
Nevertheless I believe that there are ways to express the goals and impetus of 
emancipatory politics without recourse to the language of autonomy. In many cases, the 
forthcoming qualities that are taken to be important to autonomy, and that are 
systematically denied to marginalised populations, can be understood without the 
implantation of the concept of autonomy; the harm of their denial can be understood as 
harms that are not necessarily grounded in the restriction or limitation of an 
autonomous soul. Charting the hopes of emancipation beyond the limitations of 
patriarchal language and concepts is a big project, for another day. I hope here merely to 
militate against despair.  
With all this in mind, I turn first to the contemporary theories of relational 
autonomy. In doing so I follow the taxonomy of theories used by Catriona Mackenzie in 
her excellent multidimensional analysis of relational conceptions of autonomy. 
Mackenzie argues that the usage of the concept of autonomy shifts according to 
“different social and normative contexts,” and that any unitary notion of self-governance 
fails to capture everything that we want autonomy to be. She therefore identifies three 
                                                        
5 For a moving discussion of this, see Rowbotham 29. 
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“distinct but causally interdependent” axes of autonomy: self-determination, self-
governance, and self-authorisation.6  Many of the preceding decades’ theories of 
relational autonomy can be grouped along these axes.  
I will deal only briefly with one of these axes. For Mackenzie, self-determination 
is defined as “having the freedom and opportunity to make and enact choices of practical 
import to one’s life.”7 It identifies “external, structural (social and political) conditions 
for individual autonomy.”8 These include basic political and personal liberties and access 
to an adequate array of opportunities to instantiate one’s life-plans. Mackenzie 
references the capabilities theories of Martha Nussbaum, Elizabeth Anderson, and Ingrid 
Robeyns as providing relational autonomy theorists with a “useful vocabulary for 
articulating the opportunity conditions for self-determination,” including importantly 
relational ones.9 
I agree with Mackenzie about the importance of amenable external structural 
conditions necessary for people to live lives that they can endorse as meaningful to 
themselves, and find little to criticise in the substance of her depiction of the self-
determination axis. Paying close attention to the extent to which these structures limit 
self-determination, and how these limits fall unevenly across different social groups, is a 
significant part of any political liberation movement. The self-determination axis of 
autonomy hence gives us a useful tool in analysing—and hoping to overcome—
oppression. It’s worth noting, of course, that under present conditions the great majority 
of people on earth are some distance—some a much greater distance than others—from 
being able to autonomously self-determine in this way. Insofar as autonomy is taken to 
be self-determination it is therefore mostly impossible at present—and this is a fact that 
                                                        
6 Mackenzie 17 
7 Ibid 17 
8 Ibid 25 
9 Ibid 28 
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we should loudly and repeatedly express, not one that we should submerge within other, 
more internal accounts of autonomy. The solution to this global lack of self-determining 
individuals is political change, and such change has most frequently been fought for by 
the very people who face external impediments to their flourishing. That autonomy, 
understood as self-determination, is impossible for many people, does not render 
political emancipation impossible. Indeed, it makes it morally, if not historically, 
necessary.  
As it is, autonomy is not just taken to be the absence of external structures hostile 
to one’s life-plans, or the presence of ones that move in sympathy to them. It is also 
taken to be a freedom from, or within, those structures’ influence upon the self. It is the 
construction of an autonomous self from the pieces of the socialised self that I take to be 
the substantive aim of the relational autonomist project—without it, our world that is 
radically hostile to self-determination would render individualistic ethics impossible. 
This substantive aim is instantiated by the self-governance and self-authorisation axes. It 




Mackenzie says that the self-governance dimension of autonomy “involves having 
the skills and capacities necessary to make choices that express, or cohere with, one’s 
reflectively constituted diachronic practical identity,”10 referring to the Korsgaardian 
notion of one’s identity as a “description under which you value yourself … under which 
you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”11 
According to Mackenzie, the self-governance axis identifies conditions of competence 
                                                        
10 Mackenzie 17 
11 Korsgaard 101 
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and authenticity for autonomy.12 Many of the other conceptions of relational autonomy, 
including those of Meyers, Stoljar, Barclay, and—in some lights—Benson, can best be 
described as falling under the self-governance axis and as articulating conditions for 
authenticity and/or autonomy competences.  
Autonomy competences are sets of skills that “a person must possess, to a certain 
degree at least, to be self-governing.”13 On relational accounts these competences are 
ones that agents develop or acquire (or not), partly or wholly, through their social 
situation. Autonomy competences can be content-free critical or self-reflective skills or 
they can be substantive normative competences requiring that an agent understand 
particular norms in particular contexts.  
Authenticity conditions are those that, in Mackenzie’s terms, specify “what it 
means for a choice, value, commitment, or reason to be one’s own.”14 An action that in 
some way proceeds from one’s true or authentic self—with which one’s true self 
identifies—is an autonomous one, and agents who have the capacity to programmatically 
perform such actions are autonomous agents. Perhaps the best-known example of an 
authenticity condition for autonomous action is Harry Frankfurt’s account of the 
endorsement, by a second-order volition, of a first order desire.15 A person is thus 
autonomous if, in their action, there is some agreement between their self-reflective life-
plans or self-images—their authentic self—and their desires or reasons. For Frankfurt, 
this is a matter of the higher-order volitions ruling hierarchically over one’s otherwise-
wayward lower-order desires. Marilyn Friedman proposes an integration model wherein 
one’s lower- and higher-order motivations reciprocally inform one another.16 Under a 
                                                        
12 Mackenzie 31-2 
13 Ibid 32 
14 Ibid 31 
15 “It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions [...] that a person exercises 
freedom of his will.” Frankfurt 15 
16 Friedman 32 
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relational conception it is understood that this authentic self, choosing whether or not to 
endorse its desires and actions, is itself constituted or strongly influenced by social 
forces.  
These two ways that one can self-govern are not unrelated—on Diana Tietjens 
Meyers’ account, for instance, the authentic self is one that is formed by the effective 
exercise of one’s autonomy competences. To possess an authentic self, for Meyers, is to 
be within a dynamic process of self-definition guided by one’s autonomy competences. 
The authentic self is not in a fixed state; it is defined by an ongoing activity of constant, 
reflective, autonomous re-constitution. In Meyers’ own terms, the authentic self is 
“nothing but the evolving collocation of attributes - analogous to a musical ensemble’s 
sound - that issues from the ongoing exercise of this repertory of skills.”17 She identifies 
seven—though there may be more—areas of competence that are “needed” for self-
definition: introspective skills, imaginative skills, memory skills, communication skills, 
analytical and reasoning skills, and interpersonal skills.18  
Meyers is guided by intersectionality theory. A large part of the self-knowledge 
required to define one’s authentic self, she argues, is of the subject’s situation within 
intersecting planes of oppression and privilege, as defined by that subject’s social milieu. 
When one accepts one’s intersectional identity as a “feature of one’s authentic self,” 
according to Meyers, one acknowledges one’s placement at particular intersections, and 
understands and analyses how this placement has influenced one: one “disclos[es] to 
oneself the ways in which associated norms have become embedded in one’s own 
cognitive and motivational structure, appreciat[es] how entrenched they are, and 
assum[es] responsibility for the ways in which one may enact them.”19 When one’s 
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process of self-definition is guided by this knowledge of one’s intersectional identity, one 
is able to define an authentic self.  
Meyers gives the example of a “young, white, middle-class, heterosexual (let us 
suppose, recently married), Italian-American woman” who is trying to decide whether or 
not to become a mother. Through her knowledge of her social placement, and her 
knowledge of the history of maternal norms within her identity-groups, she is able to 
bring resources to bear on her decision to which she would not otherwise have access. 
She might, for instance, observe that there is a long history in the United States of 
encouraging  white women to procreate ‘for the good of the race’; this knowledge might 
cause her to pause while considering if she is motivated by such racist norms. Attending 
to one’s group identities in this way, and their histories and interactions and tensions, 
“authorizes individualized reflections and choice.” “In the end,” Meyers writes,  
 
a woman might refuse on principle (antiracist or ecological)  to reenact 
the maternal norm, but alternatively she might conclude that the 
satisfactions of motherhood would probably outweigh the negatives and 
decide to have children.20 
 
Her knowledge of herself, her constitution by intersectional identity, and the 
history of her own social situation, combined with the seven (or more) critical 
competences that Meyers identifies, allows the woman to autonomously define how she 
relates to the motherhood norm: to what extent it is constituted within her historically, 
what it means historically, to what extent this meaning contradicts or accords with her 
values and desires. And an authentic self is one that is self-defined, in the light of its 
social situation, by this sort of dynamic, never-ending process.21  
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Meyers’ conception has a strong intuitive pull. We are tempted, I think, to believe 
that a woman who decides to become a mother without any knowledge of the ways that 
femininity is intertwined with motherhood within patriarchal culture does so less 
autonomously than a woman who thinks hard upon the norms surrounding motherhood; 
we might also then conclude that a white woman who also reflects upon the ways in 
which white motherhood is inflected by white supremacy acts more autonomously than a 
white woman who does not. Alongside feminist standpoint theory, Meyers also argues 
that an authentic self and autonomous agency “may be more accessible” to more 
oppressed individuals: for those on the dominating or privileged sides of these axes, 
acknowledging one’s social situation entails acknowledging that much of the good in 
one’s life does not proceed from within the self, which may be more threatening to one’s 
self-image than the knowledge that much of the bad in one’s life comes from an external 
oppressive structure.22    
We are then left with the satisfying conclusion that the better one understands 
one’s oppressive milieu, and the better one applies this knowledge self-reflexively and 
critically, the more autonomous and authentic one is able to become. As we shall soon 
see with Suchon, for Meyers knowledge begets freedom, even within systems of 
suffocating oppression. And it is an important insight that autonomy—or freedom—is 
birthed from a struggle in which we are all intertwined through our different subject 
positions. But I am doubtful that it is the kind of struggle that people can undertake 
within themselves, even when those selves are understood to have help from outside in 
the form of education—the learning of competences—and emotional support. 
For Suchon the epistemological problem for autonomy posed by society is that of 
differentiating the autonomous parts of the self—which she knows exist—from those 
constituted heteronomously. When taking an outside view upon the self, these two 
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separate realms are not easily differentiated. Meyers and most of the other contemporary 
theorists avoid this problem by denying that there is some unsocialised part of the self to 
be distinguished—“autonomy unfolds in situ,” as Meyers puts it, “and autonomous 
individuals must work with whatever material is at hand.”23 This material is one’s 
oppressive milieu and the self that it constitutes.  
Nevertheless, Meyers’ view of autonomy and others that rely upon the 
autonomous action or creation of an authentic self do not successfully circumvent the 
opacity of the social self. When one engages in the reflexive activity of self-definition that 
Meyers describes, one takes oneself as an object of knowledge—with all the situatedness 
and vulnerability to external forces that that implies—but one also sets oneself up as an 
opposed subject of knowledge, reflecting on that object. Acknowledging the extent to 
which we are constituted by the social requires acknowledging the extent to which we are 
constituted as perceiving subjects, and not just as objects. But it is difficult to see how 
one could have the kind of objective knowledge required of one’s own subjectivity; one 
cannot make judgements about one’s subjectivity without immediately constituting it as 
an object, and generating a new, still abstracted subject.  
This matters for autonomy because if—as both I and the relational autonomists 
think we should—we accept and allow that we are creatures shaped in heteronomous 
ways by oppressive social forces, then we must also accept and allow that our judgements 
about our own and others’ autonomy could be so shaped. When we look upon ourselves 
we do not know the whole etiology of the thing observed but we know even less the 
etiology of the thing observing, except to know that both have origins in a catastrophic 
and oppressive society. We do not know, to borrow an evocative turn of phrase from 
Donna Haraway, with whose blood our eyes were crafted.24 So when I engage in the 
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activity of self-definition described by Meyers I could just as easily be using a 
heteronomous subjectivity to denounce “authentic” parts of myself, and to lionise 
heteronomous parts, as vice versa; more likely I am heteronomously denouncing other 
heteronomous parts, and nothing resembling authenticity enters into the picture. Saying 
that these authentic parts of the self are themselves the products of social forces does 
nothing to solve the problem of telling them apart from inauthentic parts when using an 
opaque subjectivity. Though Meyers and others assert that authenticity and autonomy 
are matters of degree, not absolutes, and that we are thus never wholly free from the 
social, our constitution by the social prevents us from ever even apprehending the scale. 
Even allowing the possibility that we sometimes look along heteronomous lines rules our 
the possibility that we could ever know the extent of our autonomy.  
For her part, Meyers is careful to problematise the visual metaphor of which I 
have been making such use above. “People cannot be expected to cast their gaze inward,” 
she writes, “behold their intersectional identity, and intuit its import, for culturally 
transmitted cognitive schemas and emotional scripts organize introspection, and those 
frameworks are not hospitable to intersectional self-definition.”25 She thus readily 
accepts that there is some nugget of heteronomy within our powers of self-scrutiny. 
Instead of armchair introspection she describes a spate of heterogeneous critical, 
intellectual, emotional, and social strategies of which subjects can make use in their self-
definition. She advocates curiosity about other people and cultures and attentiveness to 
one’s emotions in different situations as well as “critical thinking skills” as important 
directions toward self-definition. But all these activities presuppose an autonomous 
subjectivity that is able to make free decisions about the information it gets from itself, 
from its emotions and its cultures—decisions about how to sort this information, how to 
weigh it, what to keep and what to reject. This autonomous subjectivity looks a lot like 
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the old masculinist one of the abstracted and rational observer. It resembles the soul-
part of the self immune to the social in which Suchon believed. And if this asocial 
homunculus is removed from the picture, we are left with a self buffeted by information 
from all sources, making choices in the dark. This self is not free. 
Take Meyers’ example, above, of the white woman who decides that, in spite of 
her close knowledge of how white supremacy and patriarchy structure her decisions, “the 
satisfactions of motherhood would probably outweigh the negatives” and she should 
therefore have a child. The “negatives” of patriarchal and racist norms are not 
weightless, of course; they are assigned a weight in decision making. They are not only 
assigned that weight by the woman in question, but by the social force of the norms 
themselves, or by other norms generated in the woman’s milieu. Even when she does 
seem to assign a weight herself she is affected from the outside. So generated, too, is the 
relative weight she gives to the satisfactions of motherhood, which are themselves 
handed to her by social forces that are far from innocent. Given all this, there is, I think, 
no reason for us to think that a decision that takes all these things into account is more 
autonomous than one that does not, though doubtless it is still better in other ways. To 
do so we must either suppose that the standpoint from which that accounting is made is 
already more autonomous—which begs the question—or suppose that accounting as such 
somehow generates autonomy, even when it is done from a heteronomous standpoint. 
But even in this second case we need an autonomous observer who can judge that 
autonomy, rather than disguised heteronomy, has indeed been generated— again 
begging the question.  
As much is true, I think, of any conception of autonomy in which an authentic self 
organises the heteronomies in its experience—be it Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires or 
Friedman’s reflective equilibrium of desires and life-plans. Any procedural conception of 
autonomy is vulnerable to the critique that there is no way, in a world of socially-
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constituted subjects, to apply a procedure that generates autonomy without first 
presupposing autonomy—or at least, no way to apply the procedure and then make an 
autonomous judgement about its results.  
More substantive competence conceptions of autonomy, like Natalie Stoljar’s, 
perhaps provide a way out of this. For Stoljar, being autonomous is not merely a matter 
of reflectively endorsing one’s actions as having emerged from an authentic self, or as 
resulting from a sound procedure: “even women socialized through stereotypical 
feminine socialization will often have developed good capacities of critical reflection and 
hence [according to procedural views] autonomy.”26 But, Stoljar argues, there is a 
“feminist intuition” that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity 
cannot be autonomous.”27 She therefore proposes a content-thick account of autonomy—
what she calls a “strong substantive theory of autonomy”—which holds that a subject 
cannot be autonomous if she has internalised, and acts upon, a norm that is “false.” “And 
because of the internalisation of the norm,” she writes, “they do not have the capacity to 
perceive it as false.”28  
Stoljar uses the example of women surveyed by Kristin Luker in a California 
abortion clinic in the 1970s.29 In many instances, these women had decided not to use 
contraception, and this decision was reflectively endorsed in ways similar to the 
endorsement provided by the authentic self of procedural theories like Meyers’. But, 
Stoljar argues, feminists have the intuition that their decision was not an autonomous 
one, as the women’s reasons for endorsing their action to forgo contraception were 
predicated on false (and patriarchal) norms, such as that women shouldn’t initiate or 
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plan for sex or that bearing a child increases a woman’s worth or femininity.30 Hence 
autonomy requires a strong and substantive idea of normative competence—that is, 
autonomy requires, at the very least, that one not be motivated by false norms.  
Stoljar’s account might be termed ‘externalist’ in that it is used to make 
judgements about when other people act heteronomously, unbeknownst to themselves. 
They presumably perceive that they act according to a true norm or just according to 
some kind of natural order of things. The account can thus skirt the phenomenological 
problem by making autonomy or heteronomy objective features of people’s actions 
rather than ones constituted in their subjective perceptions of endorsement or non-
endorsement. There is just a fact of the matter about whether someone acts 
heteronomously or not, and how they or anyone else feels about it doesn’t matter. 
(Stoljar says that not acting according to false norms is a necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient, condition for acting autonomously.31 It is thus less clear if on her account 
there is also just a fact of the matter about whether someone acts autonomously or not.) 
The problem arises, of course, in how we are to make use of this account. All 
structures of domination and oppression operate by the propagation of false32 and 
harmful social norms which appear as socially useful, necessary, or just true. Given how 
totalising the structures that beset us are, we can assume that we have all internalised 
many more of these norms than we know—and, as Stoljar points out, internalisation 
disables our ability to perceive these norms’ falsehood and harm. So there is a fact of the 
matter about our heteronomy too, and it’s one that’s inaccessible to us; but we can safely 
assume that a great many of the norms that underpin our actions are false. There is an 
arrogance in presuming to impugn the actions of others as structured by false norms 
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from a position itself structured by false norms. Even our action of judging another to 
have acted heteronomously may be motivated by our internalisation of a false norm—
and again, there is no way to know one way or another. So even a substantive, objective 
account of heteronomy faces this same knowability problem.  
But, it could be argued, there do seem to be some false norms that we know about 
and that do properly seem to disable autonomy. The “feminist intuition” is well-named. 
There are even more uncontroversial-seeming examples than Stoljar’s of the women who 
forgo contraception: a sexual assault survivor, for example, who structures her choices 
according to a belief that she is responsible for her assault, has surely internalised a 
harmful, morally reprehensible, false norm. Surely, too, we can rightly say that choices 
that proceed from this norm are heteronomous, even if there are many cases where we 
cannot.  
Perhaps we can say these choices are heteronomous. It could even be a central 
feminist strategy to point out the harm of such choices—a case where we do not allow a 
sceptical worry to impede political action. As subjects constituted by harmful structures 
we cannot know much about what a freer world would look like, but we can at least 
demand that it not include such terrible social phenomena as victim-blaming and 
internalised victim-blaming. It is a harrowing and obvious manifestation of a 
heteronomy that pervades many more of our actions than we realise. But it should be 
noted that in labelling her actions heteronomous we do not thereby gain a coherent or 
usable account of autonomy appearing in opposition. It may well be that in our current 
condition heteronomy is sometimes easy to identify and autonomy always impossible. 
We don’t recognise it by denouncing the autonomy of others. (This suggestion—that we 
can constitute autonomy from the recognition of heteronomy in others—is not one made 
by Stoljar. To this extent we are in accord.) 
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This should give us reason to militate our paternalism, or the impulse toward 
purity or righteousness that underpins it, in instances where—perhaps due to sheer 
rage—we insist that no free person could ever act in such ways or believe such things. 
Such an insistence is proper and right, but it should be accompanied by an insistence on 
a humility motivated by our recognition that we, too, are not free from socialisation by 
harmful structures. I think mutual recognition of this kind should push our responses in 
such clear-cut cases of socially-constructed horror closer toward solidarity, or shared 
suffering, than the paternalist intervention implied by the abstracted impugning of 
another’s autonomy. The horror of anyone coming to believe that she is responsible for 
being sexually assaulted is a severe indictment of the society that would cause that belief; 
that it might cause her to act in ways that will further harm her is a more severe 
indictment still; it is this fact upon which we should reflect and act, not the authenticity 
or autonomy of her choices. We can express the badness of this state of things without 
recourse to the language of heteronomy.  
The self-governance theories of relational autonomy, therefore, must either 
resign themselves to the result that the governor is as unfree as the governed, and is 
hence no source of autonomy at all, or arbitrarily declare some part of the self to be the 
source of autonomy despite its potential infection by the heteronomies of a bad society. 
But the arbitrary exaltation of a socialised part of the self as the seat of autonomy was 
just what the old patriarchs of autonomy did with reason, for which they were rightly 
criticised. Just acknowledging that that part of the self is socialised is more honest, but is 
not enough to reconcile the contradiction between autonomy and society if we still have 
to make normative assessments predicated upon the autonomy of ourselves or others. A 
normative assessment—a moral judgement—requires both an object and a subject; but if, 
as the relational autonomists presuppose, both are constituted by social forces whose 
own normative character is at best suspect then any assessment made by the subject is, 
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itself, open to insoluble charges of hypocrisy or tyranny. The judging subject collapses to 





For Mackenzie, the self-authorisation axis of autonomy “involves regarding 
oneself as having the normative authority to be self-determining and self-governing.”33 
It is thus a self-reflexive attitude in which one regards oneself as a competent moral 
agent in a community of other moral agents: as someone who can account for, explain, 
and take responsibility for her actions, and who is “authorized” to expect the same from 
others. Hence, being self-authorising requires that an agent think of herself as capable of 
explaining her actions to others in ways that are at least in principle acceptable to those 
others. Self-authorisation is thus relational in two senses: because it involves an agent’s 
perception of herself in the light of others, and because it involves reasons, 
commitments, and values that are themselves socially constituted within the agent.34  
Mackenzie writes that “regarding oneself as accountable involves having a sense 
of one’s epistemic and normative authority with regard to one’s life and one’s practical 
commitments.”35 The points I have raised above regarding the opacity of the self and the 
ubiquitous badness of the social that constitutes it serve to undermine the sense any of 
us could have of ourselves as normatively or epistemically competent in an authority-
conferring way with respect to our own actions. Mackenzie herself observes the apparent 
demandingness of self-authorisation, saying that these self-evaluative attitudes “may 
seem to assume an unrealistically high level of confidence in oneself.” She emphasises in 
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response that it only requires “appropriate” self-evaluative attitudes, and that—like the 
other relational theorists—she takes autonomy to be a matter of degree.36  
But there are other interesting questions raised by Mackenzie’s characterisation 
of self-authorisation as involving a sense of one’s normative competence. There is a 
question, for instance, about whether successfully navigating social norms—and taking 
oneself to be capable of doing so—really confers or constitutes any form of autonomy in 
situations such as ours in which a large part of the norms are hostile to one’s well-being 
or self-image. For people in oppressed groups, confidence in expressing one’s reasons 
and one’s ability to account for oneself involves confidence in speaking the language of 
the oppressor. Certainly someone who feels a sense of dislocation, alienation, or 
incompetence within their social milieu—who finds themselves unable to find the words 
to account for themselves in an oppressive tongue, and who is conscious of that—is 
robbed of a kind of well-being and respect. They will find the world to be a hostile place 
largely arranged against them. But they are right about this, and from their position of 
dislocation they have the potential to articulate some opposition to that world that 
someone who navigates it with confidence is likely to miss.  
Mackenzie might simply respond that all this is true, but that someone who 
misses this self-confidence is nevertheless in some sense less autonomous than someone 
who has it. But this implies that someone who internalises bad norms, and thinks of 
themselves through these norms, is more autonomous than someone who cannot. This 
flatly contradicts Stoljar’s “feminist intuition” that internalising false norms harms one’s 
capacity to act autonomously. It also strikes me as a bad conception from which to 
attempt to construct a resistance to oppressive structures.  
In his relational theory of autonomy as normative competence, Paul Benson 
raises a similar question regarding the norms with respect to which an agent’s autonomy 
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is to be judged. Under Benson’s account, the “norms which, in fact, we must be capable 
of recognizing and appreciating in order to act freely are those that actually play a part in 
the particular personal and social relationships in which we are involved.”37 A person’s 
freedom is thus always judged according to the particular normative domain—made up 
of the people around them—in which they act, and they are free to the extent that they, 
themselves, appreciate and recognise those norms. “Apart from specific norms,” Benson 
writes, “freedom is vacuous, since those norms set the terms in which free actions may 
reveal pertinent features of agents.”38 And as Benson himself points out, this gives the 
account a supple approach to oppressive normative contexts:  
 
If one’s freedom seems irremediably splintered because the norms that 
one is expected to comprehend in order to be minimally respected as a 
free and accountable agent are themselves contradictory or incoherent, 
then one is not at fault for feeling alienated from one’s agency. The cause 
of one’s feeling need not be some gender-specific defect in one’s inner 
volitional machinery. Rather, it can be attributed to the alienating, 
gender-bound expectations of oppressive social institutions and 
practices.39 
 
Benson’s normative competence account hence allows the expression of an 
important feature of oppressive social structures: that they can not only frustrate one’s 
autonomy but can also, paradoxically, invoke one’s autonomy as a weapon to be used 
against one. The common norm of victim-blaming, in which a sexual assault survivor’s 
autonomy is invoked just so that she can be subjected to blame for her assault, is a good 
example of the paradoxical nature that autonomy can take on under patriarchy. The 
survivor is subjected to blame because she used her autonomy to flout oppressive social 
norms regarding modesty in women—survivors are told, sometimes by a person invested 
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with significant institutional authority, that the way they were dressed, or that they were 
drunk, or that they invited someone in for coffee, makes them at least partly culpable for 
the subsequent attack. In all these ways she failed to act as someone who is 
fundamentally a passive object of outside forces; she is expected always to be thinking of 
herself as something potentially acted upon, rather than as an agent with her own ends 
to pursue. She is thus blamed for failing to use her autonomy in essentially autonomy-
nullifying ways.  
I take contradictions like this to be a good reason to be suspicious of the utility of 
the concept of autonomy within current social conditions. It can easily be pressed into 
the service of those conditions, and turned against their most vulnerable victims. 
Benson, too, thinks that prevailing social norms confront women and other oppressed 
people with contradictory and alienating judgements regarding their freedom. He is, 
however, more optimistic about the possibility of moving into other normative realms in 
which one can be judged in less hostile and alienating ways: “many persons’ 
relationships,” he writes, “give rise to ways of understanding the meaning and value of 
human activity which diverge sharply from values predominating in the society at 
large.”40  
I’m not sure that these alternative ways of understanding can give rise to a 
workable conception of autonomy as normative competence. It is certainly true that 
there are interpersonal relationships that appear to diverge from a large part of the 
oppressive social norms that structure society at large. But these alternative normative 
domains are subject to the same knowability question as the norms with which one 
identifies or one’s application of an authenticity procedure: the most insidious ways in 
which they are structured by the oppressive milieu in which—despite everything—they 
are situated are likely to be the ones that are most difficult to identify and express. For 
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Benson, so long as we feel competent—are confident in our competence—within a 
normative domain, and our agency does not appear “irremediably splintered” within it, 
then our actions can rightly be taken to “reveal who we are,” and we are free.41 As I’ve 
said, I don’t think that confidence in navigating an oppressive normative context can be 
taken to track one’s freedom or autonomy, and nor do I think that one’s feeling of 
confidence within a particular normative context is necessarily a sign that it is not 
oppressive. Nevertheless, Benson’s account does give us a useful way to express an 
important operation of oppression, and a standpoint from which to internally critique 
societies that take themselves to promote autonomy while constituting it in hostile and 
contradictory forms.  
With all this in mind, however, self-authorisation is cut adrift. Under current 
conditions one’s confidence in one’s ability to account for oneself to others does not lead 
to anything resembling autonomy. Confidence in one’s own normative competence is an 
important part of well-being, and we should fiercely criticise all the structures that rob 
people of it, but this doesn’t entail arguing that people within those structures ought to 
feel confident in this way. It entails that those structures ought to be destroyed. 
Confidence can be misplaced; one can be wrong about one’s competence—one’s ability to 
self-govern or self-scrutinise—or one can be confident in the usage of the wrong norms. 
Self-confidence alone cannot confer or constitute autonomy. Like Stoljar, I believe that 
the content of the norms with which one explains oneself is important. But I am doubtful 
about our ability to access or know when we are using good norms within a society so 
thoroughly constituted by bad ones. To see how the contradiction between society and 
autonomy could—potentially—be reconciled, we turn next to a far older account of 
freedom, based upon a different conception of ethics entirely.  
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2.3 Society and Freedom in the Philosophy of Gabrielle Suchon 
 
To a certain extent, of course, it is anachronistic to include a discussion of a 
seventeenth-century nun in a chapter about autonomy, a term which extended only to 
polities until a hundred years after Suchon wrote. But as Lisa Shapiro has pointed out, 
there is a remarkable consonance between Suchon’s theorising about freedom and later 
depictions of autonomy: in particular, Shapiro says, Suchon’s views on freedom could be 
cast as a “prototype” of the Kantian view of autonomy as self-governance.42 What’s more, 
Suchon recognised the threat that an oppressive society poses to the achievement of self-
governance, as it conditions lives without real choices and conditions minds unable to 
imagine other choices. On the other hand, she articulated a rationalist theory of 
autonomy similar to the one that was later repudiated as antifeminist.43 She thus stands 
in a hazy position with respect to the history of autonomy that she presaged, answering 
some of its problems and instantiating others. Ultimately, I think, the ethics of obedience 
to and identification with God that Suchon espouses tempers some of the force of the 
contradiction between society and autonomy that becomes so fraught for later theorists.  
Suchon begins her 1693 Treatise on Ethics and Politics with a long discussion of 
the nature of freedom, which she places deep within the essence and nature of the 
rational soul. She defines it as “a precious gift that divine generosity bestows on rational 
and intelligent creatures [...] by which they become mistresses of all their actions,”44 pre-
echoing later theorists that would locate autonomy in self-mastery and self-
accountability. She also identifies free action with action guided by or “conduct[ed]” by 
reason, and says that freedom is  the differentiating principle of an “intellectual 
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substance” like the human or angelic soul. We are ourselves, then, only to the extent that 
we act freely—and to act freely is to act according to reason (“animals”, she says, “have 
no freedom because they can neither speak nor reason”45).  In contrasting “the reason of 
man” to “the intelligence of angels,” however, she already acknowledges a potential 
threat to this rational autonomy:  
 
[Angels] are endowed with contemplative reason; in other words, they 
comprehend without language only through their vision and 
understanding of the ultimate good. But man’s reason is discursive and 
consists exclusively in reasoning. He achieves an understanding of all he 
wants to know through specific acts and operations that depend on 
external and internal senses.46 
 
The “bod[ies] full of corruption and misery” with which we are saddled muddy 
the waters for reason and tempt the will toward acting upon base inclinations that pull us 
further from our essential freedom. But it is especially noteworthy here that Suchon 
writes of reason’s dependence on “internal senses” to gain understanding, as it suggests 
that reason must work with what it is given in directing action; and what it is given is a 
psyche partly conditioned by the limitations of the body with which it is unified and—as 
we shall see later—by the society in which it is formed. This raises a question about just 
how trustworthy we ought to consider the actions that appear to us to be dictated by 
reason; couldn’t they, just as easily, be the deceptive rationalisations of a disordered and 
desirous body?  
Compounding this so-far inchoate problem is Suchon’s strong endorsement of a 
Hellenistic conception of freedom that sees it residing only in a soul that is untroubled by 
intemperate emotion and the vicissitudes of desire. “We will never be free if we have 
desires in abundance,” she writes, “because they completely undermine the freedom of 
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our hearts and tear them apart unceasingly.”47 Desires produce strong emotions that can 
pull our motivations away from those mandated by reason and make us less free.  
Suchon differs from other philosophers interested in the untroubled soul in her 
insistence upon the ways that troublesome desires and emotions are propagated and 
maintained by bad social circumstances and norms. Unfreedom in society can instigate 
unfreedom in the psyche for Suchon as much as for the later feminist theorists of 
autonomy. Women’s subjected social position, Suchon writes, closes off opportunities for 
them to rid themselves of troublesome emotion and move toward freedom:  
 
Desire is a sign of neediness and poverty. And because the most 
disadvantageous traits are most eagerly ascribed to women and girls, 
they are always said to have a multitude of desires [...]. To this we can 
respond that it is extremely unfair to attribute such faults to women, 
while at the same time to deprive them of the means to get rid of them. 
Achievement and possession are tried and true means of stifling and 
extinguishing all desires that are both rational and proper. Why are 
women not allowed to satisfy their desires and achieve their goals, when 
these goals are just and gratifying?48 
 
That Suchon suggests one method of dealing with desires is just to satisfy them 
marks her as a more socially-minded thinker than other philosophers that advocate 
desire’s subjugation to the clinical operation of reason. But it is not just by closing off 
this opportunity to satisfy one’s “just and gratifying” goals that society propagates 
unfreedom within the minds of women. By forcing women into vocations to which they 
are unsuited, and making them dependent upon the whims of others, society generates 
new and yet more troublesome emotions that can only serve to constrain them further. 
As creatures essentially characterised by freedom, anything that constrains us and denies 
our ability to act according to this nature “gives birth to tempests and to the most 
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pernicious storms of passion”49; these storms will, themselves, serve to cloud the 
judgements of reason and estrange us still further from our essence as free and rational 
beings. And, of course, it is “persons of the fair sex [...] who suffer the deprivation of the 
greatest advantages of moral and political freedom” and who are thus most likely to be 
subject to these freedom-denying emotions. Society perpetuates the unfreedom of 
women by externally constraining them in ways that generate the internal constraints of 
passionate emotion and unquenchable desire. She thus has an image of the reciprocity of 
the social and the mental in the construction of heteronomy, but—unlike the relational 
autonomists—she does not imagine that there is any space within this cycle to build a 
foundation for autonomy. To the extent that society acts to constrain you, for Suchon, 
you are just not free—you are estranged from your essence.   
This might make surprising the harshness with which Suchon condemns the 
behaviour of other women. But there are moments in the Treatise on Ethics and Politics 
where she is strikingly critical of (what appears to be) women’s own complicity in their 
unfreedom. She writes, for instance, that  
 
The vanity of women’s dress, the flirtatiousness of their gestures, the 
affectation of their compliments, and the fakery that infects their 
kindnesses, along with several other behaviours, can rightly be called 
puerile and artificial constraints. They provide evidence that women are 
their own enemies, opponents of their own freedom, which they 
unfortunately manacle by themselves. To be sure, those little amusements 
I mentioned above appeal only to society people, for wise and judicious 
women do not display these base behaviours, which are the daughters of 
constraint and the enemies of true freedom.50  
 
Acknowledging as Suchon does that these behaviours are the “daughters of 
constraint” ought, one would expect, temper any harsh criticism of those that fall into 
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them; they are, after all, not the result of free action. But Suchon sees these 
counterproductive behaviours as arising out of an ignorance that at least some women 
are capable of overcoming even in their subjected state, and she later confines her harsh 
judgement to only those women who “have the means to escape ignorance, but who are 
occupied with weak-minded vanities and pernicious friendships.”51  
Suchon thus advocates education as a method to break the cycle of unfreedom in 
which the subjected women of her time found themselves. And she also advocates 
widespread social reform to enable women to receive education: in the Treatise on 
Ethics and Politics she advocates the creation of “colleges, universities, and academies” 
in which women could study the human sciences and from which men would be barred.52 
Her later On the Celibate Life Freely Chosen is devoted entirely to arguing that women 
should be permitted, in law and custom, to live “Neutral” lives outside of the convent or 
marriage in which they could dedicate themselves to study.  
Until these institutions are in place, Suchon writes, women  
 
are obliged to wage war against their passions without knowing where 
they are seated or being able to differentiate passions that reside in the 
lustful appetite from those that dominate the irascible. And women enact 
habits without knowing if they are inborn or acquired, and practice virtue 
without knowing whether a virtue is moral in general or Christian in 
particular.53 
 
Suchon therefore anticipates the potential objection that I articulated earlier—
that of not knowing which of our motives inhere in bad desires and which in our true 
freedom, the operation of reason—and prescribes education, via social reform, as a 
solution. We might ask whether, from within this position of ignorance, one is capable of 
fooling oneself into believing one is really free; and if so, whether any amount of 
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education is enough for us to really know that our actions are free. If, as she seems to 
allow here, it is sometimes impossible to differentiate inborn and acquired habits, it 
could be the case that it’s possible to confuse the actions of reason with actions 
motivated by the pernicious effects of the social. Certainly Suchon does not want to 
undersell the power of the negative forces that beset us, saying at one point—though with 
reference to original sin—that “corruption inheres in us and we carry it everywhere.”54 By 
arguing that some women remain in their position of ignorance despite having the 
opportunity to leave Suchon also closes off the possibility that the emotional turmoil of 
unfreedom is, itself, a sufficient cue that we are ignorant and dependent and should work 
to self-improve. If we agree with Suchon, we agree that we are in essence free and that 
we have this capacity as a gift from God; but we also agree that a great many of our 
actions are born of unfreedom. How do we tell them apart from the ones that proceed 
from our nature? 
Suchon would probably just respond that there is no mistaking the contentment 
that results from the agreement of one’s essence with God’s purpose. We might find this 
an unsatisfying response. But it is here that the temporal gulf between us and Suchon 
makes itself known. She may be surprisingly modern in her treatment of freedom and 
society, but ultimately her ethics is grounded in obedience to God and fulfilment of our 
natural commitments to him.55 We are free when we fulfil our true nature by exercising 
our reason and obeying God. This is also when we are good. As a result the problem of 
the opacity of the socialised self is somewhat tempered, though not outright cancelled: 
for Suchon’s purposes it doesn’t hugely matter if we cannot know precisely how free we 
are, as God knows the extent to which we fulfil his purpose for us. Her ethics does not set 
out to give us a standard by which we judge ourselves or others according to the 
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character of our, or their, actions; it tells us how to live in a way favourable to God. It is 
thus not fatal to her project if her account of freedom and its social opponents makes it 
difficult or impossible for us to make such judgements. As we saw, however, if we 
estrange ethics from God, and instead locate it in the interpersonal actions of 




In the lectures on the Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno criticises Kant for 
(as he saw it) failing to adequately reconcile necessity and spontaneity—from which 
freedom could be derived—in the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant 
fails, Adorno says, because in our current society—and he takes Kant to be the exemplary 
thinker of that society—moral philosophy is “necessarily a theory of private ethics,” an 
ethics centred around the interpersonal actions of individuals in an individualistic 
society. Adorno claims that the “highest point” of such an ethics is the “antinomy of 
causality and freedom which figures in Kant’s philosophy in an unresolved and for that 
reason exemplary fashion.” And, importantly, Adorno notes that “what appears in Kant 
as the intertwining of man and nature is also the intertwining of man and society.”56 An 
individualistic ethics, for Adorno, cannot reconcile freedom and society any more than it 
can reconcile freedom and causality.  
I believe that this problem is visible in the difficulties into which the 
contemporary accounts of relational autonomy run in their attempts to hold onto both 
the socially-constituted self and an idea of autonomy. As I noted at the outset, in his own 
account of autonomy as normative competence Paul Benson takes the significance of free 
agency or autonomy to be “the power of our actions to reveal who we are, both to 
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ourselves and to others, in the context of potential normative assessments of what we 
do.”57 Alongside the necessity of autonomy to political emancipation, this need for 
normative assessment is the motivation for preserving a concept of autonomy against the 
social. Allowing that we are thoroughly socialised would seem to render confused the 
ideas that what we do reveals who we are in some stable or uncomplicated way, and that 
who we are is the kind of thing that is properly subject to normative assessment. 
Procedural conceptions of relational autonomy attempt to resolve this confusion by 
installing within the self a place from which a critical perspective can be taken upon the 
ways in which that self is socially constituted; with this critical perspective in hand, one 
is properly the subject and object of normative assessments. But as we have seen, this 
location within the self must either be a homunculus implausibly immune to the social, 
and subject to all the same critiques that feminists levelled against the old masculinist 
conception of autonomy; or we must nihilistically accept that it is just whichever one of 
our numerous heteronomous parts is currently most powerful in our subjectivity. 
Substantive conceptions allow that we are unfree when motivated by bad norms, even 
ones that are reflectively endorsed by the critical procedures of authentic selves. But 
without some account of how to identify these bad norms, given that they press 
themselves upon us as insistently as good ones, we are not left with anything from which 
autonomy could be constructed.  
As we also saw, Suchon’s admittance of the social into the self—if not the soul—
was not as problematic for her ethical project. She does not need to ground a standpoint 
from which normative judgements of ourselves or others are possible and that is not 
itself vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy or inhumanity. A perfect standpoint for 
normative judgement exists in God; to expect that we too could have such a standpoint is 
not just overly optimistic, given our vulnerability to society, but impious. For Suchon, 
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ethics is not a matter of our accountability to others but our accountability and closeness 
to God. The social exists within her philosophy as a threat to women’s freedom that is to 
be overcome through institutional and social reform, but it does not have to be 
conceptually overcome, as the unknowability of the social self does not render ethics 
itself impossible for Suchon.  
The problem for the relational autonomists, then, is that their critique of the 
masculinist atomised conception of autonomy does not go far enough. They recognise, 
correctly, that the old view of autonomy is based on this atomised, individualistic image 
of competing individuals constituting a fragmented society; but they fail to recognise that 
so too is ethics itself. A view of ethics grounded in the interpersonal actions of 
individuals, and of the individualised assessment of those individuals and actions, 
requires a self that is autonomous and knowably so. Without it all normative assessment 
is open to charges of hypocrisy or nihilism, the denigration of one socially-constituted 
subject by another according to norms or self-beliefs which have no graspable 
independent standing. But, as I hope I have shown, or given some reason to believe, 
society muddles the knowability of this autonomous self, and hence muddles autonomy 
itself as a ground for normative judgement. This is especially true in a society as 
oppressive and, we think, distorted as ours.  
As Adorno argued, the contradiction between society and autonomy is an artefact 
of this individualised view of ethics. While we retain this view, we are committed to 
attempting to reconcile autonomy and society conceptually—and, given how bad society 
is, this reconciliation strikes me as politically suspect. We ought, I think, properly 
recognise that society as it currently stands makes its own ideological conception of 
autonomy impossible, and use this as one critique to motivate the revolutionary 
reworking of society into one that does not contradict freedom. The views currently 
articulated in defence of autonomy could be very useful in this task, as they identify in 
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the negative many of the ways in which society assaults the psyches of its most 
vulnerable denizens: they are unable to determine the content of their own life-plans, 
they make decisions that harm themselves, they feel morally and socially incompetent or 
isolated, they are seen by others or by society at large as being so. They are, in short, 
unable to self-determine, self-authorise, and self-govern: they are alienated and unfree. I 
don’t think that any of the attempts to derive a theory of a currently-possible autonomy 
from these harms succeeds. Worse than being conceptually fraught, such attempts to 
find pockets of autonomy within an unfree society end up making that society seem more 
free than it is, and they make the obvious need for radical change seem less pressing. But 
the relational autonomists do give us a new and better image of heteronomy than the old 
patriarchs, from which an internal critique of this society can be formulated, and 
progress toward reshaping it can be made.  
For Suchon, reshaping society involved turning it into one in which women were 
not estranged from their essence and were hence able to realise it in their relation to 
God. Obviously I do not share the same religious or metaphysical beliefs as Suchon, but 
her case is instructive. If society renders freedom incoherent, it is not because we need to 
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 In 1600, Lucrezia Marinella wrote in her polemical The Nobility and Excellence 
of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men that “man needs to love beautiful things, 
and what more beautiful thing adorns the world than woman?”1 Beauty, both that of 
performance and adornment, the natural and affected, is contested ground for Marinella 
as it had been for many other writers, misogynist and counter-misogynist: aesthetics as a 
discursive realm has long structured and been structured by gender ideology, with the 
common association of women with beauty serving to inform notions of the place, 
function, and nature of beauty as well as those of women. Marinella, concerned to 
counter Giuseppe Passi’s misogynist tract Dei donneschi difetti, released the previous 
year, makes extensive use of beauty as both a social and natural phenomenon in her 
defence—and exaltation—of women. In the process she produces a particular, heavily 
theological aesthetics that defends a place for beauty and for women, configured as 
beauty’s exemplary objects, within the social and divine order. In this way, Marinella’s 
work at the very opening of the 17th century exemplifies the three-sided conflict that I 
will discuss in this chapter: a network of complex interactions between beauty, gender, 
and social and political power.  
These three things, and their influences upon one another, are present in the 
backgrounds of many of the writers—pro- and anti-woman—of the early modern period. 
Writers may lean on particular ideas of women’s place or character—those ideas 
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themselves influenced by women’s social position—to justify or explain aesthetic 
theories. They might use those aesthetic theories in the service of existing power or in the 
service of revolution. Or they might seek to change the position of women through a 
cunning use of existing ideas on beauty. 
This chapter is situated within the eighteenth century British context, and it 
presents a reading of the work of Mary Wollstonecraft as seeing many of the contours of 
this three-sided conflict and coming down decisively on its “power” side; that is, 
Wollstonecraft argues that gender and aesthetic ideologies are both the products of 
existing oppressive social orders, and that hence only major ‘on the ground’ political 
change can go about shifting them in favour of women. In this way Wollstonecraft can be 
presented as a torch-bearer within a materialist revolutionary tradition—albeit one 
whose sympathies and faith lie firmly with the bourgeoisie of eighteenth century Britain.  
To get to this point we will first have to see how Wollstonecraft sees beauty, 
gender, and power interacting in her two Vindications of 1790 and 1792. We will also 
have cause to examine the other intellectual currents of the time—here represented by 
the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Edmund Burke, and Frances Reynolds. Before all that, 
however, and by way of continuing this introduction, I will briefly sketch out how I see 
the work of Marinella falling within the triangular contest that I have described.  
 Beauty does have a certain kind of power for Marinella, predicated on what 
seems to be a fact about its nature—“man needs to love beautiful things.” This power is 
explained earlier in the text with reference to the perceived power of women as objects 
over presumed heterosexual male subjects: “men are obliged and forced to love women,” 
she writes, and “women are not obliged to love them back, except merely from 
courtesy.”2 Again, then, beauty and gender are intertwined, with the pleasure and appeal 
of beauty referred back to the pleasure and appeal of women understood merely as 
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objects. (“Everyone will be convinced of these matters one day,” she adds, “and the 
obstinate oppressors of women who trample on their dignity with greater insolence each 
day will be overcome.”) 
Beauty has another power too, one that is—for Marinella—far more important 
than any kind of appetitive inducement. Beauty leads to knowledge of God; and, again, it 
is the beauty of women in particular that is of most significance here: “women’s beauty 
leads to the knowledge of God the supernal intelligence, and shows the way to heaven.”3 
She describes beauty as a “golden chain” upon whose links the soul progresses to heaven, 
beginning with “corporeal beauty” but then quickly ascending to the second link that 
“gazes with the internal eye at the soul that, adorned with celestial excellence, gives form 
to the beautiful body.” From there - the beauty of the soul that shines through the body - 
the soul then progresses further, to contemplate “the angelic spirits” and God himself.4 
Reflecting on the beauty of women, then—again from the perspective of a presumed 
heterosexual male subject—leads an adequately contemplative mind directly to 
knowledge of God.  
This theological picture has many consequences. Situating women within a divine 
system is, of course, itself a strong defence of their significance and virtue; so, too, is 
Marinella’s insistence that a more beautiful body is an indicator and consequence of a 
more beautiful soul, which she lays out explicitly earlier:  
 
Now, if we wished to apply the common reasoning, we would say that 
women’s souls are equal to men’s. But the complete falseness of this 
opinion will become apparent to everyone whose mind is not totally 
committed to the opposite point of view if we consider the body, because 
the nobility of the soul can be judged from the excellence of the body—
which is ornamented with the same character and beauty as the soul, 
“which such a body manifests in itself.” The greater nobility and 
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worthiness of a woman’s body is shown by its delicacy, its complexion, 
and its temperate nature, as well as by its beauty, which is a grace of 
splendor proceeding from the soul as well as from the body. Beauty is 
without a doubt a ray of light from the soul that pervades the body in 
which it finds itself, as the wise Plotinus writes …5  
 
Through aesthetics and its attendant associations, then, Marinella claims for 
women a superior personal virtue to that of men, as well as greater favour from God and 
a divinely-ordained social, epistemological, and theological role within the natural order 
of things.6 In a heavily religious society, this role—if taken seriously by men—would 
translate to significant social and political power, with women, merely by virtue of their 
beauty, acting as guarantors of the moral fabric of society itself (we will see a strange 
mirror of this in the work of Frances Reynolds more than a century later). In Marinella’s 
work, then, aesthetics lies in the heart of a complex of moral and political questions—
ones that surround not just the position and experience of women (seemingly inert 
objects in all this, even on the counter-misogynist side), but the shape of the society in 
which those women live.  
Ideology surrounding women and beauty, itself a complex and interpenetrative 
knot, has frequently served as a locus of sprawling political contexts. Marinella, writing 
at the very beginning of the seventeenth century, mediates her arguments about the 
political and moral value of women through an aesthetic and theological lens. Several 
decades later, François Poulain de la Barre argued that women’s adherence to and 
apparent obsession with the rituals of performative beauty was a result of their 
oppression—it was a sort of palliative, and an illicit avenue toward an informal power 
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that was the only form not denied to them.7 This shifts the ideology of beauty to a 
different ground: the beauty of women and their participation in its practice is no longer 
a natural given from which arguments of the kind Marinella made can proceed, but a 
social fact in need of explanation. This in turn can lead to a reorientation of the political 
aspect of beauty: rather than arguing alongside a known, established order—for 
improvements within that order—beauty, its effects and fellow-travellers, can be made to 
argue against that order. Hence the relationship between beauty and power - at least in 
theory - needn’t always be unidirectional. 
In this chapter, as I have said, I will focus on another knot of ideology 
surrounding beauty, gender, and political power—this time in eighteenth century Britain. 
I argue that the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, right at the end of that century, is able to 
penetrate much of this fog, arguing as she does for a revolutionary reworking of society 
that would change the bases of beauty and of the subject- and objecthood of women. This 
argument is itself refracted through various lenses, not least that of the growing 
economic and cultural power of the bourgeoisie as a class; these lenses, too, will need to 
be scrutinised. But I begin by turning to how Wollstonecraft understood the interplay of 
beauty and power to function within her society at large, and with regard to the 
contested position of women in particular. 
 
3. 2 Beauty and Social Power in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft 
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Wollstonecraft sees the relation between beauty and power in much more 
complex and dynamic terms than Marinella or Poulain. Like Poulain, she understands 
that the dominance of performative beauty over the lives of women is a result of their 
exclusion from the realms of institutional power: they are “confined … in cages like the 
feathered race” with “nothing to do but to plume themselves and stalk with mock 
majesty from perch to perch.”8 But unlike the relatively straightforward therapeutic role 
that performative beauty plays in Poulain’s analysis, in Wollstonecraft’s works —in the 
Vindications of the Rights of Men and Woman and in the Historical and Moral View of 
the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution—beauty is situated in a dialectic with 
power; a dialectic subjugatory of women which beauty actively advances. From this, 
Wollstonecraft is able to combine the view of Poulain—that an emphasis on beauty is a 
direct result of a lack of power—with a sort of corollary or consequence of that of 
Marinella—that beauty grants its wielder a kind of social power—and show that both 
conditions conspire to keep women in a state of spiritual, mental, moral, and physical 
enervation. Only some kind of liberatory political effort can break this exhausting cycle.  
This critique is formed alongside, within, and around Wollstonecraft’s critique of 
the aristocracy. The attack on aristocracy takes centre stage in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Men, an early rebuke to Edmund Burke’s counterrevolutionary Reflections on 
the Revolution in France that participates in the discourse on gender, beauty, and power 
of which Burke’s much earlier Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful is the paradigmatic text of eighteenth century Britain.9 
Though with some significant differences—foremost among them being that aristocrats 
have real power—Wollstonecraft sees the same process that degrades and enervates 
women at work in the indolence and moral decay of the aristocracy, and uses this 
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process’ corruption, not just of the aristocracy or of women but of society as a whole, to 
justify French Revolution in 1789. The harm of this process to society in its entirety will 
also justify the famous “revolution in female manners” for which Wollstonecraft calls in 
the Vindication of the Rights of Woman.10  
I will begin with the aristocracy, whose slovenly otium and the vanity that is its 
effect Wollstonecraft decries throughout her work. As Claudia Johnson notes in 
Equivocal Beings, Wollstonecraft’s first Vindication—the Rights of Men—“refutes the 
Burkean axiom” that “to make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.”11,12 
Indeed, in his Reflections—whence the axiom comes—Burke mourns the loss of the 
“mixed system of opinion and sentiment”of the European ancien régime, of which by 
Burke’s lights the French Revolution is just the beginning of the end; a regime that 
depended for its power not just on the bare light of reason, but on the “superadded ideas, 
furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the 
understanding ratifies.” The power of the old aristocratic regimes, Burke argues, comes 
from such “pleasing illusions,” and from the incorporation into politics of “the 
sentiments that beautify and soften private society”; the new revolution proposes to burn 
all these traditional affects away, leaving us with our “naked shivering nature.”13  
In sum, for Burke in the Reflections, aristocracy as a system of government is 
justified by its beauty: that is, by its appeal, both sensuous and imaginative, to the 
sentiments.14 As he wrote in the Enquiry, beauty for Burke is a “social quality,” because 
the “sentiments of tenderness and affections towards [the] persons” of others that it 
inspires causes us to enter “willingly” into relations with them.15 Hence the axiom that 
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the institutions of power ought to inspire love rather than appeal merely to the 
calculating strictures of reason so fêted by the archetypal French revolutionaries. In the 
Rights of Man, published mere weeks after the Reflections in 1790, Wollstonecraft treats 
this notion with unvarnished contempt:  
 
If there is any thing like argument, or first principles, in your wild 
declamation [i.e., the Reflections], behold the result:—that we are to 
reverence the rust of antiquity, and term the unnatural customs, which 
ignorance and mistaken self-interest have consolidated, the sage fruit of 
experience: nay, that if we do discover some errors, our feelings should 
lead us to excuse, with blind love, or unprincipled filial affection, the 
venerable vestiges of ancient days. These are gothic notions of beauty—the 
ivy is beautiful, but, when it insidiously destroys the trunk from which it 
receives support, who would not grub it up?16 
 
Throughout her work Wollstonecraft never tires of cataloguing the abject, rotten 
condition of the ruling class, and she locates this condition precisely in the tendency of 
the ruling class to derive its continued power from appeals to the sentiments—what she 
so acidly calls “feelings” above—rather than to reason. Burke, in defending them, has 
made himself an “adorer of the golden image which power has set up,”17 and this 
adoration is poisonous both to society as a whole and to the characters of those idle 
aristocrats. “Luxury and effeminacy” have introduced “much idiotism into the noble 
families which form one of the pillars of our state”; “restless idleness, and its 
concomitant, vice” have spread as a “contagion” through society.18  
The spread of this contagion proceeds by, first, rendering the rich themselves 
indolent, stupid, and shallow: placed in a “torrid zone, with the meridian sun of pleasure 
darting directly upon them” they experience none of the wants and needs that 
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17 Ibid 11 
18 Ibid 23 
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Wollstonecraft sees as necessary for the development of solid virtues.19 With an 
education that focuses on refinement and manners rather than the “practice of those 
duties which dignify the human character,” the rich soon soon become conditioned as 
“vain and helpless.” For Wollstonecraft, this social conditioning operates “by the same 
law which in nature invariably produces certain effects”20: the characters and virtues of 
the rich—like those of anyone else—are inevitably formed by the social structures in 
which the rich are situated and the material conditions on which those social structures 
supervene.  
The arbitrary system of property and position that Burke considers so lovely thus 
has a debilitating effect on the minds of the people it exalts:  
 
The mewing babe in swaddling-clothes, who is treated like a superior 
being, may perchance become a gentleman; but nature must have given 
him uncommon faculties if, when pleasure hangs on every bough, he has 
sufficient fortitude either to exercise his mind or body in order to acquire 
personal merit. 21 
 
Wollstonecraft consistently aestheticises this state as gaudy, deformed to the 
point of putrescence and—in a sign of her participation in and (arguably) subversion of 
the discourse of gender and beauty given zenithal expression in Burke’s Inquiry22— 
effeminate. We will have cause to return to this aesthetic characterisation of the melting, 
relaxing effects of power shortly.  
Worse than the deformed state of the ruling class alone, however, is the effect 
that this deformation has on wider society. Wollstonecraft (correctly) notes that the great 
men of the nobility all achieved their status by some inaugural injustice or deceit— chiefs 
“touching the most powerful springs of savage conduct, hope and fear”—rather than 
                                                        
19 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 124 
20 Ibid 73 
21 Wollstonecraft Rights of Men 15 
22 See Johnson 27 
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through any kind of natural right. Nevertheless these despots must make a “shew of 
right,” and they must make ever greater shows of right as the progress of civilisation 
expands the intellectual opportunities and capacities of their subjects. They are 
“compelled to make covert corruption hold fast the power which was formerly snatched 
by open force.”23 The power of the aristocracy cannot be grounded in reason or the 
intellect. It is itself irrational and unjust: hereditary power “clash[es] with the mental 
superiority that naturally raises a man above his fellows.”24 The best way, then, to grant a 
legitimate sheen to the power of the aristocracy is to, as she puts it, make a great show of 
pomp and circumstance, luxury, extravagance, superstition, and “the pestiferous 
purple”25: that is, to generate the “pleasing illusions” masking despotism that Burke 
explicitly celebrates. By gilding their power they make it temporarily tolerable, but they 
make themselves stupid.  
Worse yet, this power structure makes the contagion more virulent by creating 
perverse incentives for those lower down the hierarchy. The pathetic creatures of the 
ruling class warp the fabric of society around them such that the acquisition of true merit 
pales as a method for social advancement compared to appealing to their own cramped 
and shallow sentiments. Virtue, talent, and industry are neglected as the game of wealth 
and rank is played with pride, flattery, and adornment—an immoderate obsession with 
appealing to the sensuous:  
 
                                                        
23 Wollstonecraft, Rights of Woman 82-3 
24 Ibid 80  
25 Ibid 83. This tendency of the good effects of civilisation—expanded intellectual ability among them—to 
generate through the operation of repressive power the bad effects of indolence, flattery, and amour 
propre forms the backbone of one of Wollstonecraft’s substantive critiques of Rousseau: she accuses him, 
perhaps unfairly, of seeing the bad effects as effects of civilisation as such, rather than part of a dialectic 
of civilisation grounded in the irrationality of despotic power: “Disgusted with artificial manners and 
virtues, the citizen of Geneva, instead of properly sifting the subject, threw away the wheat with the 
chaff, without waiting to inquire whether the evils which his ardent soul turned from indignantly, were 
the consequence of civilization or the vestiges of barbarism. He saw vice trampling on virtue, and the 
semblance of goodness taking place of the reality; he saw talents bent by power to sinister purposes, and 
never thought of tracing the gigantic mischief up to arbitrary power.” Ibid 79-80  
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Have ye not heard that we cannot serve two masters? an immoderate 
desire to please contracts the faculties, and immerges, to borrow the idea 
of a great philosopher, the soul in matter, till it becomes unable to mount 
on the wing of contemplation.26 
 
For Wollstonecraft, this is a necessary consequence of the coincidence of that 
which is appealing to the senses—beauty—with power: in this case, the very real power of 
property and rank. A harmful cycle is therefore formed in which beauty and power each 
feed off and structure the other: power grants access to the objects of beauty without any 
need to first acquire virtue or talent, thus cramping the mind; these beauty-cramped 
minds, easily appeased by frippery and flattery, then control access to power and 
reputation, encouraging further vitiation of both themselves and others. This whole 
process is based not on any principles but on sentiment and—as Todd puts it—
“mystification,” demanding “emotional acceptance” of the ruling class’ power “without 
cause.”27 And in her Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution Wollstonecraft 
makes clear that it is this dynamic of decay and degeneracy that leads to—and justifies—
the revolutionary break in which the industrious, soberly virtuous bourgeoisie seize 
power from the luxuriant aristocracy in the name of reason and liberty:   
 
The idle caprices of an effeminate court had long given the tone to the 
awe-struck populace, who, stupidly admiring what they did not 
understand, lived on a vive le roi, whilst his blood-sucking minions 
drained every vein, that should have warmed their honest hearts. 
But the irresistible energy of the moral and political sentiments of 
half a century, at last kindled into a blaze the illuminating rays of truth, 
which, throwing new light on the mental powers of man, and giving fresh 
spring to his reasoning faculties, completely undermined the strong holds 
of priestcraft and hypocrisy. 28 
 
                                                        
26 Wollstonecraft Rights of Men 22 
27 Todd xiii 
28 Wollstonecraft Historical and Moral View 292 
133 
 
With a rational social hierarchy in place—one structured by the “natural” 
distinction of mental prowess rather than by arbitrary divisions of power—there is no 
longer any reason for those in power or those seeking to gain it to indulge in their own 
sentiments or others’.29 The self-evident justice of the system means it needn’t hide its 
power behind awesome rituals of wealth or extravagance, and the holds of superstition 
and sentiment over society are broken.30 Individuals rise on the true merits of their 
virtues and capacities which, exercised now by necessity, are cultivated and expanded.31 
This necessity of exercising ability and virtue is one that Wollstonecraft sees as already 
holding over “the middle rank of life”—the men of that middle rank, that is—with the 
consequence that “the middle rank contains most virtue and abilities.”32 With the 
aristocracy deposed, the structures of beauty and sentiment that hold back others from 
exercising their abilities are deposed too: the middle classes, then, are for Wollstonecraft 
the subjects of revolution not just because their circumstances permit them to undertake 
it but because the revolution forms a societal structure aligned with the values, as she 
sees them, of the (current) middle class.33 
 Changing the deep structure of power, therefore, changes too the influence that 
beauty holds over society. Wollstonecraft, however, would not allow for the exclusion 
from this formula of the circumstances of women, whose oppression and enervation 
                                                        
29 As Alan Coffee puts it, “a republican society cannot permit or tolerate any form of arbitrary power 
within its midst because the dependence that this creates has the potential to undermine everyone’s 
freedom.” Coffee 195 
30 Wollstonecraft’s desire to see reason elevated above superstition and sentiment does hot, however, 
necessarily translate to a whole-hearted denigration of feeling or the passions; see Reuter 50-66 for a 
useful discussion of the relationship between the passions and reason in the Vindications’ account of 
virtue.  
31 For a much more detailed account of the nature of virtue in a “Wollstonecraftian” virtuous republic, see 
Coffee 187-92.  
32 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 127 
33 Wollstonecraft is sympathetic and sensitive to the plight of the poor, and is harshly critical of the 
hierarchy that oppresses them. She does not consider, however, that hope for reform or revolution can 
spring from the peasantry or proletariat, believing that their horrendous circumstances prevent them 
from gaining the abilities necessary to penetrate the smoke-and-mirrors of the wealthy; see for example 
Rights of Men 59-60 
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renders the hope of reform or revolution remote for everyone. And we can now turn 
more specifically to the way that Wollstonecraft sees this dialectic of beauty and power 
operating on the social position of women—a critique that Wollstonecraft makes 
alongside that she makes of the aristocracy, rather than artificially separating them as I 
have here—and the way that she responds to the gendered account of beauty given by 
Burke. This will hopefully also temper, though probably not eradicate, any lingering 
concern that Wollstonecraft’s contemptuous characterisation of the “effeminate” is itself 
misogynist or antifeminist.  
The vast majority of women, of course, did not enjoy the real power of wealth and 
rank of the aristocracy. But Wollstonecraft does believe that, through beauty, women—at 
least, women of the middle and upper classes—do become trapped in a similar cycle to 
that of the aristocracy. In the case of women, however, it is not generated by plenitude 
but by a lack of rational and virtuous paths to power and self-efficacy. The rich have no 
incentive to expand their minds or virtues because they want for nothing and are 
surrounded by idle pleasures; women have no opportunity to do so because they are 
systematically denied any such opportunities by patriarchal institutions and traditions.34 
The industry and necessity for and by which middle class men are cultivated is closed 
away from almost all of their women counterparts (Wollstonecraft herself seeming to be 
a rule-proving exception). Middle and upper class women receive only “a disorderly kind 
of education”35 from which emerge “uncultivated understandings [that] make them 
entirely dependent on their senses for employment and amusement.”36  
                                                        
34 Though I focus exclusively on her analysis of the depredations to which women are subjected through 
beauty, Wollstonecraft herself is highly sensitive to many other forms of subjection; see, for example, the 
discussion of her novel Maria, or the Wrongs of Women in Bergès 90.  
35 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 88 
36 Ibid 94. In fact middle class women are in this respect worse off than both upper and working class 
women, according to Wollstonecraft: upper class women receive a helpful “smattering of literature” in 
their leisure and working class women are able to cultivate a rough-and-ready form of virtue - “to use the 
word in a comprehensive sense”—through their labour, especially child-rearing; see ibid 148. As we’ve 
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This forced dependence on the senses narrows the horizons of women’s activity, 
and—because “the employment of the thoughts shapes the character both generally and 
individually”—the effect is that women are constructed as objects and subjects of taste 
and little else.37 That is, women are constructed both as beautiful bodies to be admired 
and adorned and as beings in thrall to their own senses and sentiments, who can 
participate in refined, pretty conversation on matters of taste. This significantly 
demonstrates a slippage between the division of subject and object wherein being a 
subject is itself objectified by the demand that opinions be appealing. Both sides are 
thereby weaponised against women’s characters. As Wollstonecraft observes, the two 
also participate in their own self-reinforcing cycle: being a beautiful object requires the 
cultivation of the senses and faculties of sensuous taste; this devotion to the senses, 
rather than to reason  or truth, reduces one’s self-efficacy and makes the appeal to the 
senses of others yet more necessary. 
Wollstonecraft’s acerbic—and at times mournful—depiction of this condition 
takes up much of the prose of her Vindications and even of the Historical and Moral 
View, all of which are outstanding polemics. A couple of examples will suffice, though 
there are many from which to choose:  
 
Women are every where in this deplorable state; for, in order to preserve 
their innocence, as ignorance is courteously termed, truth is hidden from 
them, and they are made to assume an artificial character before their 
faculties have acquired any strength. Taught from their infancy that 
beauty is woman’s sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and, 
roaming around its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison.38 
 
Where is the dignity, the infallibility of sensibility, in the fair ladies, 
whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
already seen, she believes that this working class virtue is insufficient to effect radical change, preferring, 
it seems, the more abstract intellectual virtues of the bourgeoisie.   
37 Ibid 148 
38 Ibid 112 
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all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent? It is 
probable that some of them, after the sight of a flagellation, compose their 
ruffled spirits and exercise their tender feelings by the perusal of the last 
imported novel.—How true those tears are to nature, I leave you to 
determine.39 
 
As with the wealthy, this impoverishment of women’s intellectual and moral 
faculties is both symptom and cause of their single-minded focus on the performances of 
beauty and taste. For, again like the wealthy, the enervated state of refinement that is 
cultivated in women really does work to grant women access to a form of power that 
otherwise would—like all others—be closed off from them: “if women,” Wollstonecraft 
writes, “are not permitted to enjoy legitimate rights, they will render both men and 
themselves vicious, to obtain illicit privileges.”40 Women, shut out from political or 
institutional power,41 adorn their bodies and refine their opinions to appeal to the base 
sensualism of men, who—themselves vitiated by the moral malaise generated by the 
pestiferous purples of aristocracy and patriarchy—find themselves taken in and setting 
up women as despots. As Johnson puts it, for Wollstonecraft, “women’s weaknesses 
render them imperious rather than docile … Men ought to resent in women the same 
power they resent in kings”42: that is, an irrational and arbitrary power based on the 
senses rather than reason.  
So the “passions of men have thus placed women on thrones,” and while this 
continues to be the only possible avenue for women’s access to power and self-efficacy it 
will continue to be one frequently walked, and women will continue to cramp their 
                                                        
39 Wollstonecraft Rights of Man 45 
40 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 68 
41 See Halldenius 166-182 for a discussion of nature and possibility of republican representation in 
Wollstonecraft, and the ways by which women might come to political and institutional power. In 
particular, Halldenius notes that for Wollstonecraft women must participate directly in their own 
government; this is the only way that their interests might be represented. 
42 Johnson 33 
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intellects and spirits in the pursuit of these “illicit privileges.”43 The two conditions—
enervating beauty and illicit, sensual power—reinforce one another for women as they 
do, in a different way, for the aristocracy. And of course, as well as being undesirable 
from the point of view of its vicious effects on the mind, soul, and body, the arbitrary 
power women gain through beauty is also exclusionary of the great many women who 
are unable for whatever reason to meet the arbitrary demands of men’s desires. To be a 
beautiful object or a refined subject is expensive and difficult; it excludes the poor, the 
old, those whose appearance deviates from a societal norm. As the dialectic turns 
between beauty and social power it leaves more and more women behind—the vast 
majority of them, in fact. Even those women who can meet the demands of male lust are 
excluded for most of their lives: “the usefulness of age, and the rational hopes of futurity, 
are all to be sacrificed to render women an object of desire for a short time.”44  
This dialectic is therefore in a dynamic of “patriarchal equilibrium,” as described 
by the historian Judith Bennett: a historical dynamic distinguished by the plasticity of 
patriarchal institutions, that is, their ability to persevere through time while 
accommodating and adapting to apparent or superficial changes in the status and 
condition of women.45 So despite—in fact because of—the despotic power of the 
imperious beauty, women as a category remain subjugated. As Naomi Garner notes, “the 
illusion of power through beauty that entices and entraps women is a manageable power 
that does not threaten male superiority.”46 We will have cause to return to the 
phenomenon of patriarchal equilibrium shortly.  
As Johnson demonstrates, Wollstonecraft therefore constructs a sweeping 
critique of a weak, ignorant, sensualist societal tendency: one that keeps the aristocracy 
                                                        
43 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 68 
44 Ibid 164. Emphasis original.  
45 Bennett 54-81 
46 Garner 90 
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in power, keeps women subjected, and “degrad[es]” men, whose own vicious sensualism 
is also enflamed by a society structured according to their desires.47 It this same 
sentimental aesthetic tendency that Burke celebrates (and whose passing he pre-
emptively mourns) in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, using his idea of 
beauty from the Enquiry: that quality which, “in bodies, [causes] love, or some passion 
similar to it.”48 In the Enquiry Burke also explicitly links this notion of beauty with 
women and with weakness:  
 
[Beauty], where it is highest, in the female sex, almost always carries with 
it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; 
for which reason they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit 
weakness, and even sickness. In all this they are guided by nature.49  
 
Wollstonecraft references this passage in the Rights of Man, addressing Burke 
directly:  
 
Thus confining truth, fortitude, and humanity, within the rigid pale of 
manly morals, they might justly argue, that to be loved, women’s high end 
and great distinction! they should ‘learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, and 
nick-name God’s creatures.’ Never, they might repeat after you, was any 
man, much less a woman, rendered amiable by the force of those exalted 
qualities, fortitude, justice, wisdom, and truth; and thus forewarned of the 
sacrifice they must make to to those austere, unnatural virtues, they 
would be authorized to turn all their intentions to their persons, 
systematically neglecting morals to secure beauty.50 
 
Wollstonecraft’s contempt for effeminacy or femininity, then, is predicated on the 
Burkean ideology that yokes together femininity, beauty, weakness, and love, and on the 
                                                        
47 Johnson 39. See also Coffee on the negative relation between dependence (of which the dependence 
caused by beauty is a particular kind) and virtue: “the corrupting effect of dependence affects parties on 
both sides of the relationship, dominator and dominated alike. Wollstonecraft stresses that the virtue of 
dominating men, no less than dependent women, has been compromised.” Coffee 192 
48 Burke Enquiry 73 
49 Ibid 88 
50 Wollstonecraft Rights of Men 45-6 
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dire social order that that ideology justifies and from which it emerged. As both Garner 
and Johnson observe, in different ways, Wollstonecraft’s attack is against a femininity 
understood (or “prescribed,” to use Garner’s more enlightening term) in the eighteenth 
century as one that uses weakness and smallness to enflame the sentiments.51 Indeed, 
her repeated invocation of the effeminacy of men—both in the otiose aristocracy and in 
the middle class men that chase women’s beauty—stands as a rebuke to Burke and, 
what’s more, to the notion that these aestheticised gender divisions really are “guided by 
nature.”52 She attacks femininity throughout society and across genders, and in so doing 
decouples “femininity” as an ideological construct born of the corruption of its times 
from women as real beings. As she says in one of her most revolutionary passages, her 
aim is nothing less than to “see the distinction of sex confounded in society.”53 And, as 
both Garner and Johnson note, this distinction, and the effeminate society around it, was 
created by men54: it was the intemperate libidinal social order created by effeminate men 
that placed women upon enervating thrones.55 
 
3. 3 Taste, Femininity, and Power in the Eighteenth Century 
 
                                                        
51 Johnson 35; Garner 92  
52 See Garner 91 
53 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 126  
54 Johnson 31; Garner 91-2 
55 Interpretations of this moment can differ, of course. Johnson (I think correctly) sees Wollstonecraft as a 
prototypical liberal feminist who valorises masculine virtues and argues that women can and should have 
equal access to them (Johnson 29). Presumably this would have the long-term effect of the terms 
“masculine” and “feminine” ceasing to make sense when applied to virtue. Whether Wollstonecraft’s 
position is convincing depends upon one’s own feminism. Some will argue that there is real sexual 
difference and that the feminine qualities ought to be celebrated and “owned”; others that this entire 
system of oppositions, as well as the notion of opposition itself, is linked with patriarchy and should in 
some way be rejected. For all Wollstonecraft’s radicalism she does not reject the masculine/feminine 
opposition as such (she does not, for instance, demonstrate ways that the two ideas might interpenetrate 
and structure one another); she only rejects its clean application to real men and women. If we were in 
the business of taxonomising the women of the past then she’d therefore fall into the “liberal” rather 
than “poststructuralist” basket.  
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Wollstonecraft’s anti-effeminate feminism and her republicanism are hence 
intertwined: both aristocracy and patriarchy depend for their operation on a particular 
gendered aesthetics that both hides and justifies the irrational power at their cores, and 
to do away with the despotic aristocracy one must also do away with the despotic 
patriarchy that shares its structural logic. We can thus begin to see the general shape of 
Wollstonecraft’s intervention in the three-sided contest between beauty, gender, and 
power that I identified in the introduction: the power of the aristocracy and of the 
patriarchy operates through, and helps create, a particular aesthetic order that makes 
use of ideological assumptions about gender that are themselves generated by existing 
power relations. Attempts to decouple the bad parts of these assumptions from the good 
or to rework the connection between beauty and women in a way that could be more 
positive or pro-woman are fruitless while material social relations—the domination of 
women by men, and of the lower classes by the aristocracy—are pushing back in the 
opposite direction. The only solution is to reject such ideologies entirely and to work to 
overthrow their bases within those material social relations.  
 This in itself is evidence of Wollstonecraft’s radicalism. But in this section I will 
attempt to grant some particularity to the shape that Wollstonecraft’s radicalism can 
take when read in the context of a wider discourse that took place in the eighteenth 
century at the intersections of class, gender, and beauty. This discourse, according to 
Robert W. Jones in Gender and the Formation of Taste in Eighteenth Century Britain, 
sought to make the social function and meaning of taste accessible to the rising 
bourgeoisie and amenable to their class interests, rather than just to the interests of the 
aristocracy. Within this debate the role of women as arbiters of a private, domestic realm 
and as subjects and objects of beauty was contested.56 Situated in this light, 
Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the analysis of patriarchy into the debate can be read as 
                                                        
56 Jones 114 and 95 
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a dialectical manoeuvre that both refutes the middle classes’ attempts to turn taste to 
their own ends and uplifts or confirms their rejection of the aristocracy’s own claims for 
it. To see how, we’ll examine the contours of this discourse by turning to two of the 
eighteenth century writers analysed by Jones: Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, and the artist Frances Reynolds. Both have work that encompasses and 
interacts with, in various ways, all three sides of our triangular conflict between beauty, 
power, and gender—and both bring particular, distorting class interests to bear upon it.  
Shaftesbury, of course, is an aristocrat, and his Characteristicks of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times of 1711 gives a depiction of the relation between aesthetics 
and virtue that places virtue—and its attendant prestige and social power—firmly in the 
hands of the aristocracy. An appreciation and understanding of beauty—a refined taste—
is vital for Shaftesbury as a motivator toward virtuous action; an understanding of virtue 
in principle is hopelessly outmatched when it runs counter to the appetites and 
sentiments:  
 
Thus we see, after all, that ’tis not merely what we call Principle, but a 
TASTE, which governs Men. They may think for certain “This is right, or 
that wrong”: They may believe “This a Crime, or that a Sin; This 
punishable by Man, or that by God!” Yet if the Savor of things lies cross to 
HONESTY; if the Fancy be florid, and the Appetite high towards the 
subaltern Beautys and lower Order of worldly Symmetrys and 
Proportions; the Conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.57 
 
This—that the mind will not turn to the good while it has idle fancies or 
“subaltern Beautys” to keep it occupied—could have been written by Wollstonecraft. But 
for Shaftesbury the cultivation of taste means much more than learning to resist the 
temptations of those things which are charming but vicious. It means, too, an 
appreciation and love of “Order, Harmony and Proportion,” which is not just “highly 
                                                        
57 Shaftesbury, Characteristics vol 3 177. All emphases original.  
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assistant to Virtue” but is constitutive of it: virtue “is itself no other than the Love of 
Order and Beauty in Society.”58 
For Shaftesbury, this social aspect of virtue and taste is extremely important: he 
writes that “in this Case alone it is we call any Creature worthy or virtuous, when it can 
have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is 
morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong.”59 Virtue is expressed by the 
extent to which one works for the public good; the public good is that which lends order, 
harmony, and hence beauty to society. Indeed Shaftesbury argues later in 
Characteristics that “a Creature” cannot “be good or useful to himself” apart from “as he 
continues good to Society, and to that Whole of which he is himself a Part.”60 And it is 
taste, an appreciation for the beauty of the just society, that moves the creature to act for 
the good of that society and hence virtuously. Virtue, as Jones puts it, is defined for 
Shaftesbury as “the ability to rise above particular concerns or personal interests,”61 and 
the ideal life is that of an ideal citizen, one who—like the citizens of the old Greek and 
Roman republics—is guided by taste and beauty in the fulfilment of his civic duty.62  
And, as with the Greek and Roman republics, the characterisation of virtue as 
tastefully and disinterestedly transcending the particular is both gendered and classed, 
with the effect that truly virtuous citizens can only be drawn from the ranks of the male 
landed gentry or aristocracy. The new middle classes, who owe their position to their 
engagement in private commerce and industry (rather than land or heredity), are too 
tied to their own self-interest and to the particularised realm of the commodity to be 
truly virtuous: “aristocratic landowners,” writes Jones, “were thought to be above the 
particular and divisive economic interests which debarred the East India merchant from 
                                                        
58 Shafesbury, Characteristics vol 2 75 
59 Ibid 31. Emphasis original.  
60 Ibid 175 
61 Jones 17 
62 Ibid 16 
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the exercise of citizenship fully as much as the cobbler and the tallow-chandler.”63 
Referencing JGA Pocock, Jones argues that the “ability to be a citizen was thought to rely 
on the practices and principles of patrician landownership.”64 We can see this in 
Shaftesbury’s frequent excoriation of idle luxury, which—unlike the similar tone in 
Wollstonecraft—serves the interests of the old aristocracy, who needn’t purchase fame or 
their entrance to the public: “Equipages, Titles, Precedencys, Staffs, Ribbons, and other 
such glittering Ware, are taken in exchange for inward MERIT, HONOUR, and a 
CHARACTER.”65  
Like the Greeks and Romans of his model, Shaftesbury expects that the highest 
quality characters of a society will “fight against Luxury and Corruption in times of 
Prosperity and Peace,”66 imagining as Wollstonecraft does a link between access to 
beautiful objects and corruption. While Wollstonecraft thinks that having to work for 
such access is improving—and hence that the middle classes are in a better moral 
position than the aristocracy—Shaftesbury thinks that such work is indicative of a 
narrow, privatised self-interest alien to (or, at best, irrelevant to) a proper public virtue. 
The “public” is thus for Shaftesbury very narrow, consisting only of the landed 
aristocracy: those that, within the structures of the early eighteenth century, still hold 
onto institutional and political power.  
Shaftesbury thus takes a stand for a traditional civic virtue that finds beauty in 
the order and harmony of a well-functioning society and rejects the love of luxuries and 
pleasurable objects as a vicious, self-interested lack of taste. Hence it is important for 
                                                        
63 Ibid 18-9. 
64 Ibid 18 
65 Shaftesbury vol 3 169. Emphasis original. Contrasting somewhat with Jones, Terry Eagleton in The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic positions Shaftesbury “cusped conveniently between traditionalism and 
progress,” reconciling his “traditional aristocratic resources” with the bourgeois ethics of affect. On this 
reading Shaftesbury does not stand so firmly on the side of the aristocratic old guard, but himself 
represents a movement in the general privatisation of virtue via taste. Nevertheless Shaftesbury’s 
relentless focus on the public good over all else sets him apart from Reynolds, who, as we shall see, 
argues explicitly for the movement of virtue and taste to the private sphere. Eagleton 34-6.  
66 Shaftesbury vol 1 122.  
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Shaftesbury to delineate an understanding or image of the proper objects and subjects of 
taste; and it is here that we can see the work that gender does in structuring his account. 
Women appear throughout Characteristicks as both symbols of improper aesthetic 
appreciation - an over-sensual, “effeminate” taste - and as concrete objects of that 
improper appreciation that can drive otherwise virtuous men to distraction, indolence, 
and irrationality. In a parable he writes approvingly of a prince who resists the urge to 
gaze upon a beautiful woman (unknown to him, his own wife), believing that it will cause 
him to abandon his duties67; later he argues that women are “the chief subject” of many 
“civil turmoils” between “fine gentlemen.”68 The appreciation of women’s beauty hence 
appears alongside the appreciation of the beauty of equipage, staffs, and ribbons: as 
enervating indulgence in idle pleasures. And, traversing the subject-object distinction, 
this bad aesthetic sense is itself frequently derided as “effeminate” or otherwise 
associated with women.69 The acquisitiveness and commerce of the bourgeoisie is hence 
excluded from the realm of virtuous taste by its association with a ‘womanly’ aesthetic 
sense that is understood as too sensuous and too sensual.  
Shaftesbury therefore links taste intimately to virtue, and then uses misogynist 
associations to limit that taste to a particular kind: austere, aristocratic, and masculine. 
The ‘correct’ kind of beauty is understood to inhere in the abstract qualities of harmony, 
proportion, and order, and though for Shaftesbury a taste for such things is an “appetite” 
it is still opposed to the “effeminate, indolent, and amorous Passions” that characterise 
pleasure.70 Once again the three sides of our conflict—beauty, power, and gender—come 
clearly into view, with a gendered aesthetics that grows from existing power relations 
being leveraged to lend the lustre of virtue to those relations. 
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Burke, as we have seen and by strong contrast, holds women up as the absolute 
exemplars or ur-objects of beauty. Indeed he rejects the idea that proportion has 
anything to do with beauty—as it does for Shaftesbury—using, as an example, the beauty 
of a woman to a presumed heterosexual male reader:  
 
If you assign any determinate proportions to the limbs of a man, and if 
you limit human beauty to these proportions, when you find a woman 
who differs in the make and measures of almost every part, you must 
conclude her not to be beautiful, in spite of the suggestions of your 
imagination; or, in obedience to your imagination, you must renounce 
your rules; you must lay by the scale and compass, and look out for some 
other cause of beauty. 71 
 
As for Shaftesbury, the appreciation of beauty is appetitive for Burke (“the 
suggestions of your imagination”) but in decoupling it from the ideas of proportion or 
order he decouples it also from general principles that could be communicated and 
shared between separate individuals within a public, and which might inspire those 
individuals to virtuous social action. For Burke, the appreciation of beauty rests much 
more upon that which privately gratifies the sentiments and inspires individualised 
love—what Jones calls “an aesthetic of heterosexual excitement.”72 Nowhere is this 
aesthetic more obvious than in Burke’s description of the beauty of “gradual variation,” 
in which he expounds breathlessly upon the appeal of a woman’s décolletage: 
 
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most 
beautiful, about the neck and breasts; the smoothness, the softness, the 
easy and insensible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the 
smallest space the same; the deceitful maze through which the unsteady 
eye slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither it is carried. Is 
not this a demonstration of that change of surface, continual, and yet 
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hardly perceptible at any point, which forms one of the great constituents 
of beauty?73 
 
Jones’ discussion of Burke’s Enquiry dissects the ambivalence of his aesthetics 
and its political corollaries; certainly, Burke was no libertine, and he cannot without 
considerable violence be made to stand for a singular ethics of bourgeois 
acquisitiveness.74 As we’ve already seen, the private, sensuous aesthetics that we’re here 
contrasting with Shaftesbury’s aristocratic posture was nevertheless pressed into the 
service of counterrevolution a few decades later. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it’s 
enough to note the way gender ideology structures the aesthetic theory Burke outlines in 
the Enquiry. As taste retreats from the public realm, the perspective of the heterosexual 
male aesthetic subject on women as objects changes: from the dissolute and wanton 
desire injurious to virtue warned against by Shaftesbury to a private appreciation that 
acts as an exemplar or prototype through which the faculty of taste itself can be 
understood. To put it another way, and as Jones demonstrates, as taste becomes more 
private and more sensuous it becomes more closely associated with women—though the 
perceived moral threat of the lascivious and libertine woman never entirely dissipates.75  
This association between women and taste is demonstrated and positively 
articulated by the artist Frances Reynolds in her short Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c., of 1785. Even more 
so—and more explicitly—than Burke or Shaftesbury, Reynolds makes the gender division 
the axle and origin of her entire aesthetic system:  
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It is I imagine to the principles of the masculine and the feminine 
character, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any object 
whatever, throughout all nature, and all art that imitates nature …76  
 
For Reynolds, therefore, all our judgements regarding the beautiful and sublime 
refer back, either directly or “symbolically,” to the aesthetic judgement of human beings 
as objects,  with the “feminine character” as the “sweetest, most interesting image of 
beauty,” and the masculine “partak[ing]” of the sublime. “Thus it will be found,” she 
writes, “that, in every object that is universally pleasing, there exist principles that are 
analogous to those that constitute beauty in the human species.”77 And the “governing 
principle” of beauty in humans—and hence, by analogy, in everything—is “the moral 
sense.”78 That is, for Reynolds, that our apprehension of beauty in humans is an 
apprehension of the “moral virtue” of the object: “the body charms,” she writes, “because 
the soul is seen.” This ability to perceive virtue is a matter of cultivation: “the rustic” is 
charmed by the physical, but “to a man of taste the physical pleases only through the 
medium of the moral.”79 And in this schema it is only the “man” of taste that perceives 
“the real charms of beauty,” which is hence always an appreciation of inner virtue—or, in 
the case of non-human objects, a kind of anthropomorphism in which they are 
symbolically imbued with human-like mental qualities:  
 
Witness the charm of the infant innocence, of the snow-drop, of the soft 
elegance of the hyacinth, &c. and on the contrary, our disrelish of the 
gaudy tulip, the robust, unmeaning, masculine piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.80 
 
This mediation of the moral by the physical in aesthetic judgement is again 
explained by—and helps further justify—the gender binary; Reynolds yokes together the 
                                                        
76 Reynolds 28 
77 Ibid  
78 Ibid 22 
79 Ibid 20. Emphases original 
80 Ibid 30-1  
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physical charms of the sexes with essentialised moral and mental qualities in considering 
their forms of beauty, which exist distinctly from each other. “The beauty of each sex,” 
she writes, “is seen only through the medium of the virtues belonging to each,” just as the 
beauty of particular stages of human life (infancy, youth, “manhood,” etc) are seen only 
through the virtues particular to that stage (innocence, compassion, fortitude, etc).81 
Where there is an incongruity between physical appearance—no matter how formally 
charming that appearance might be—and the correct or expected virtues of a particular 
sex or age, Reynolds claims, we are disgusted: “without congruity, there could be no 
virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of taste.” 
 
The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would be 
displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of the rigid 
virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a woman. However 
perfect the form, if an incongruity that touches the well-being of humanity 
mingles with the idea, the form will not afford the pleasing perception of 
beauty, though the eye may be capable of feeling its regularity, &c. So far 
is it from pleasing, that it is the more disgusting from its semblance to 
virtue, because that that semblance is a contradiction to her laws.82 
 
As we’ve already seen, Reynolds also says that the feminine is the “sweetest, most 
interesting image of beauty”; with some more of her aesthetics in place we can now see 
that this constitutes a moral claim about women that opens a significant gulf between 
her and Shaftesbury (but, interestingly, brings her into a strange kind of alignment with 
Marinella). Far from seeing the beauty of women as “subaltern” and as a threat to an 
active masculine virtue, Reynolds forthrightly claims that the beauty of women is an 
expression of important inner virtues that are at least on a par with the masculine 
virtues. Indeed, later in the text she describes “woman” as “the most perfect existing 
object of taste in the creation,” taking the idea of feminine beauty as the prototype of all 
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beauty familiar from Burke and linking it with an explicit claim about the concomitant 
moral excellence of women.83  
This moral excellence is argued for even more strongly in Reynolds’ account of 
taste; that is, in her account of the subjects, rather than objects, of beauty. Here too 
Reynolds opposes the misogyny of Shaftesbury and stakes a claim for the significance 
and centrality of women to the aesthetic realm. As we’ve already seen, for Reynolds taste 
must be cultivated, and the true appreciation of beauty requires an appreciation of the 
moral virtues of which beauty is an expression:  
 
Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good, and 
beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle of the two 
former: and is that, in which the universal idea of taste is comprised. All 
are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by no means sensible, that 
the principles that make it pleasing, that constitute a form beautiful, are 
those, or to be more intelligible, relate to those, that constitute man’s 
highest excellence, his first interest, his chief good!84 
 
Somewhat vaguely, Reynolds identifies the “three co-existing principles of taste”  
which “run through all its perceptions” as virtue, honour, and ornament.  Honour and 
ornament form the “public character” of taste, and virtue the “private and domestic.” Of 
these three, private virtue is exalted as the most important: indeed, Reynolds writes 
(again confusingly) that it is in virtue that, “though unperceived by the vulgar, to the eye 
of taste she [taste] appears in her highest ornament, highest honour.”85  
As they are the “public characters” of taste, honour and ornament are prone to 
corruption by the social:  by the enervating influences of wealth, or by the “false honour” 
afforded to prevailing modes and fashions. Like Wollstonecraft, then (and like  
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Shaftesbury, though for very different reasons), Reynolds is conscious of the risk posed 
to true taste and virtue by extreme wealth:  
 
In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call taste, is 
chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest for both internal and 
external advantages: wealth accelerates the last degree of cultivation, by 
giving efficacy to the principles of true honour; but it also accelerates its 
corruption, by giving efficacy to the principles of false honour, by which 
the true loses its distinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay by 
degrees less and less existent. Wealth becoming the object of honour, 
every principle of taste must be reversed. Hence avarice, and profusion, 
dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love economy and 
domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections, &c. 
hence the greatest evils of society, the sorrows of the virtuous poor, the 
spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes; in a word, the general 
corruption of morals, and of course of true taste.86 
 
In such circumstances, true people of taste are disgusted by the ornament and 
honour incongruously afforded to unvirtuous things.87 Cultivating true taste therefore 
requires cultivating an understanding and appreciation of virtue, and this can only be 
achieved in the private and domestic sphere, where taste is insulated from the pernicious 
social effects that might unworthily co-opt it. And this private, domestic sphere—as it 
was for Shaftesbury, and more generally throughout the eighteenth century and 
beyond—is associated by Reynolds with the feminine. Women hence appear for Reynolds 
not as threats to taste and virtue but as their arbiters and cultivators—as they did, 
through the theological lens, for Marinella.  
 
The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation of taste, 
and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one in which it can 
appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly appropriated to feminine 
taste; and I may say, it is absolutely the only one in which it can appear in 
its true lustre. True taste, particularly the feminine, is retired, calm, 
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modest; it is the private honour of the heart, and is, I imagine, 
incompatible with the love of fame.88 
 
Reynolds, then, can stand at the apex of the movement that Jones describes 
taking place throughout the eighteenth century: one in which taste, and by association 
with it virtue, is shifted from the public sphere to the private, with “private” here 
referring both to the domestic realm—the interior of the home—and to the emotional 
realm on the interior of a person. By both connotations taste and virtue also come to be 
more closely associated with women, confined as they were to the domestic realm and 
thought of as more sentimental and more sensuous.  
Jones sees this change in the terms of the aesthetic debate in the eighteenth 
century as a consequence of the growing economic power of the bourgeoisie: the shift 
from the public, politicised and general taste represented by Shaftesbury to one more 
closely associated with the private and the domestic is favourable to the rising middle 
classes, who had plenty of money but did not yet have much access to formal political 
power.89 With taste, as we have seen, comes virtue; and with it comes too a kind of social 
and cultural power.90 
Jones’ account is much subtler than the schematic provided here, and well 
argued and evidenced. But the schematic will suffice for our purposes, which are to shed 
light on a particular reading of Wollstonecraft that can be situated within this contested 
aesthetic-political discourse. We have already seen foreshadows of her positions in the 
Vindications in the work of Reynolds and—even—Shaftesbury, but I believe that 
Wollstonecraft can be read as engaging with this discourse in a wholly different, 
revolutionary way.  
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3.4 Conclusion: Wollstonecraft’s Intervention 
 
The work of Reynolds in 1785 might seem to herald a significant improvement in 
the position of women when compared to that of Shaftesbury in 1711. After all, Reynolds 
argues forcefully for the pre-eminence of women as both subjects and objects of taste, 
and reiterates the significance and intimacy of the link between taste and virtue. 
Undoubtedly, then, and expectedly, Reynolds’ Enquiry is more pro-woman than either 
Burke’s one or the work of Shaftesbury. She puts an unquestionably positive spin on the 
linkage between women and beauty expounded by Burke. She carves out a role for 
women as important moral actors, participating in a long tradition of counter-
misogynistic cultural arguments that seek to exonerate or promote women’s virtue, and 
she does it—if Jones’ history is right—within the newly-produced private space of 
bourgeois virtue. Certainly, symbolically at least, there is a wide gulf between Reynolds’ 
opinion of women as aesthetic and moral subjects and Shaftesbury’s.  
And perhaps, indeed, a longer timeline could be drawn that would situate 
Reynolds’ moral-aesthetic arguments within a centuries-old discursive contest that leads 
to the present day and that does seem to coincide with some improvements in some 
aspects of some women’s lives. But cultural histories that locate the impetus for major 
material change in fairly isolated intellectual arguments are tenuous at best. 
Wollstonecraft, writing only a few years after Reynolds, already sees that the change in 
women’s position that Reynolds articulates and defends is not going to undo—and in fact 
participates in—women’s oppression.91  
                                                        
91 I do not here impute to Reynolds some kind of naïve idealist strategy vis-à-vis women’s liberation, nor 
even any particular political programme whatsoever. She is concerned entirely with her aesthetic project. 
Nevertheless, as Jones shows well, that aesthetic project has political antecedents and consequences; in 
the forthcoming I argue that Wollstonecraft sees that Reynolds’ centring of women as aesthetic or moral 
subjects is insufficient for liberation.  
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Here we can again make use of Judith Bennett’s description of patriarchal 
equilibrium. The cultural shift that occurs in the symbolic relation of women to taste and 
virtue through the eighteenth century,  metonymised in the shift from Shaftesbury to 
Reynolds, leads to a change in the tenor or tone of women’s subjugation but not, for 
Wollstonecraft, to any kind of weakening of that subjugation. Patriarchy adapts: the 
centring of women as aesthetic subjects and objects—as people not just capable of but 
important for understanding beauty—becomes another part of its mechanism. As we saw 
in detail in the first section, the construction of women as exclusively or almost-
exclusively aesthetic subjects and objects—as people judged only by their beauty and 
their aesthetic sense—creates conditions pernicious to the moral, spiritual, and 
intellectual virtue, and thereby the freedom, of even those women able to meet the 
exacting and arbitrary standards against which they are held.92  
Further, Wollstonecraft explains the construction of women as primarily 
aesthetic subjects—even ones that can in some circumstances be quite influential—as a 
consequence of their lack of other forms of power. In this light Reynolds’ claim in favour 
of women’s virtue, depending on under-explained and essentialised gender traits, can be 
recast as a post-hoc rationalisation of already-existing oppressive relations ‘on the 
ground,’ as described by Wollstonecraft. The structure that limits women to being merely 
judged by their beauty and their aesthetic opinions is thereby justified, in a tendency we 
can see in Burke as well as Reynolds, by an appeal to women’s innate and exceptional 
suitability to that limited role. Even a justificatory account that exalts women on these 
grounds is then reconfigured by patriarchy towards its own perpetuation. It attempts to 
                                                        
92 Now, I think, we should be suspicious of—and in fact hostile to—the kinds of virtues that 
Wollstonecraft champions and that she sees threatened by oppressive beauty. History has shown that 
such virtues are not liberatory and that they are, perhaps, an ideological cover for oppressive social 
tendencies that tend to reverse their outward appearance. But I also think we needn’t accept the specific 
virtues of Wollstonecraft to see the value in her critique of the effects of oppressive beauty.  
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spin and alter perceptions of beauty and of women while failing to take notice of the 
final, and for Wollstonecraft most basic, side of the conflict: power itself. 
What, then, of Wollstonecraft’s own proposed route out from the cycle? We might 
expect that her “revolution in female manners” is as bound to the private realm and to 
the symbolic and cultural position of women as Reynolds’ own lionisation of domesticity. 
After all, both Reynolds and Wollstonecraft are suspicious of the effects that wealth and a 
dissolute social life can have upon the attainment of virtue, and much of Wollstonecraft’s 
polemic can be read as a pretty direct manifestation of the disgust that Reynolds declares 
accompanies our apprehension of the incongruity between outer beauty and inner vice. 
Reynolds argues that cultivation of the “social moral affections,” accomplished in private 
and primarily by women—who are naturally more suited to such cultivation—is a 
necessary defence against the moral dangers of unsuitable ornament and honour; 
Wollstonecraft, similarly, stresses the significance of education in overcoming the 
deceitful values of society at large,93 and often speaks glowingly of the virtues of domestic 
women.94 Is the distinction between the two really as great as I have suggested here?  
I think there is a significant political difference, one that places Wollstonecraft 
within a particular revolutionary tradition, and I think that much of the ground for 
understanding this difference has already been laid out. As we know, Reynolds believes 
that women have a natural role to fulfil as educators because they are exemplar subjects 
and objects of beauty, by virtue of their particular and essential characteristics as 
women. Wollstonecraft, by contrast, is clear that no such essentially and peculiarly 
aesthetic character exists in women; it is all the product of their construction by the 
contingencies of a patriarchal and aristocratic society—that is, a society characterised by 
the arbitrary and irrational exercise of power. Indeed, she goes so far as to say in the 
                                                        
93 Wollstonecraft Rights of Woman 193  
94 E.g., ibid 223 
155 
 
Rights of Woman that she “firmly wish[es] to see the distinction of sex confounded in 
society,”95 and that  
 
I here throw down my gauntlet, and deny the existence of sexual virtues, 
not excepting modesty. For man and woman, truth, if I understand the 
meaning of the word, must be the same; yet the fanciful character, so 
prettily drawn by poets and novelists, demanding the sacrifice of truth 
and sincerity, virtue becomes a relative idea, having no other foundation 
than utility, and of that utility men pretend arbitrarily to judge, shaping it 
to their own convenience.96 
 
Hence for Wollstonecraft liberating women requires shifting the conditions in 
which they are constructed: lionisation of their virtues will always be insufficient while 
those virtues—if virtues they really are—are understood and formed within currently-
existing oppressive structures. This determination to shift the conditions that create 
attitudes is one of the basic principles of revolutionary politics.97  
Wollstonecraft emphasises the importance of education in effecting this change; 
in particular overcoming the “enervating style” of education to which women are 
subjected that gives a “sexual character to the mind.”98 This acquired sexual character is 
responsible for the lasciviousness, wantonness, or irrationality of which women are 
frequently accused. With a manifestly Enlightenment tone, she invokes Reason—
capitalised—as that which will serve to liberate women from this false sexual character 
that so many take to be inborn:  
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97 Coffee reads the “revolution in female manners” as the creation of a society in which “women’s 
perspectives have helped shape the public culture so that the kind of pernicious ideas (such as that 
women are made rather to feel than reason) that impede their freedom cannot gain a foothold.” Coffee 
198. Attacking such pernicious ideas, I argue, requires the removal of those arbitrary powers that 
generate them.  
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… how carefully ought we to guard the mind from storing up vicious 
associations; and equally careful should we be to cultivate the 
understanding, to save the poor wight from the weak dependent state of 
even harmless ignorance. For it is the right use of reason alone which 
makes us independent of every thing—excepting unclouded Reason—
‘Whose service is perfect freedom.’99 
 
As we’ve now seen multiple times, excessive concentration on oneself as an 
aesthetic object or subject is a consequence—and cause—of a mind “not sufficiently 
opened to take pleasure in reflection,” and hence an education that turns the mind 
toward reflection is essential if women are ever to be free. Significantly, Wollstonecraft 
presents this progress away from excessive ornamentation of the body and toward 
abstract thought as a process of becoming ‘civilised’: she compares the position of 
European women with that of men “in barbarous states” for whom the “savage desire of 
admiration” is a “first inclination.” And further:  
 
An immoderate fondness for dress, for pleasure, and for sway, are the 
passions of savages; the passions that occupy those uncivilized beings who 
have not yet extended the dominion of the mind, or even learned to think 
with the energy necessary to concatenate the abstract train of thought 
which produces principles.100 
 
In arguing for the liberation of European women, then, and for their inclusion in 
the community of the free and reflective, Wollstonecraft invokes—and helps construct—
the narrative that associates European civilisation with abstract thought and rational 
progress; a narrative which the ascendant bourgeoisie used, and in the nineteenth 
century will use yet further, to justify the brutality and rapine which they exported across 
the globe.  
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As I noted earlier, alongside this apparent belief in the bourgeois division of the 
world into civilisation and barbarism, Wollstonecraft also has great faith in the 
importance of mental and physical exertion—work—in constructing virtuous, useful 
beings: she contrasts it with the pernicious effects that indolence has on the wealthy, 
trapped forever in the torrid light of the meridian sun, never incentivised toward self-
improvement. These beliefs in a disconnected abstract Reason and in the work ethic 
might seem reactionary in contemporary times—they are—but read in the context of 
Wollstonecraft’s intertwined critiques of aristocracy and patriarchy they become more 
explicitly revolutionary. This reading can be expounded in two ways. 
First, for Wollstonecraft, liberating women requires making accessible to them 
the values that were, at that time, only accessible to middle class men: the values of the 
bourgeois merchant who rises or falls solely by virtue of his conscientiousness, grit, and 
mental acuity. Abstractly declaring that such values should be made available to all is not 
enough: in aristocracy and patriarchy Wollstonecraft recognises the twin snakes 
constricting society, rewarding the uncivilised passions and undermining the possibility 
of meritocracy. Hence the necessity of a bourgeois revolution that sweeps away those old 
structures and replaces them with structures mirroring middle class values.  
Wollstonecraft, perhaps uniquely, recognises that to truly fulfil its promise such a 
revolution must overcome patriarchy as much as aristocracy.101 A revolution that failed 
to liberate women, she saw, would also fail to liberate men: both would find themselves 
still ensnared by an order that undeservingly rewards the sensuous pleasures and fails to 
reward true virtue.  
                                                        
101 Sandrine Bergès argues that Wollstonecraft believes “inequality should be combated gradually, not 
through a revolution, but by the individuals such as herself who see the need for it, through rational 
persuasion of both oppressed and oppressor”; Bergès 94. Wollstonecraft certainly does place great faith 
in the capacity of rational argument to effect change but, as Coffee notes, arbitrary power stands in the 
way of the creation of a public realm in which reasoned discussion, especially reasoned discussion that 
includes women, can be had; Coffee 198, passim. The removal of these powers must be a revolutionary  
change—it entails restructuring all the power dynamics and attitudes of society in a new image—though 
perhaps it needn’t be violent and sudden.  
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Second, Wollstonecraft motivates the overthrow of the aristocracy by associating 
an overly-feminine and indolent taste with them, rather than with the bourgeoisie as 
Shaftesbury does. At the same time she refuses to allow the cultural manoeuvre 
exemplified by Reynolds—the movement of the social sources of virtue from a realm 
dominated by the aristocracy to one more open to the middle classes—to stand as the 
middle classes’ only gambit in their war against entrenched power, recognising as she 
does that this manoeuvre is only made possible by the essentialised “sexual characters” 
for which Reynolds argued so firmly and which, in their current form, only help justify 
patriarchal and aristocratic power. She advocates a revolution in values that would 
render such manoeuvres unnecessary; and indeed, she motivates this revolution by, in a 
neat dialectical reversal, claiming for the middle classes the austere, manly, and public 
virtues whose inherence in the aristocracy was lionised by Shaftesbury. She thus, 
mediated by her critique of patriarchy, completes a turn that took the whole eighteenth 
century: at its beginning, public virtue was claimed for the aristocracy; later, in their 
growing economic power, and making use of a patriarchal discourse on taste, the 
bourgeoisie sought to move virtue into a private sphere more accessible to themselves; 
and, finally, Wollstonecraft advocates the revolutionary expansion of that bourgeois 
sphere to cover the whole of society, ‘re-publicising’ virtue and confounding the gender 
division in the process.  
The contrast with Shaftesbury and Reynolds helps us to see in starker relief the 
revolutionary character of Wollstonecraft’s intervention in the contest between beauty, 
gender, and power. Shaftesbury uses a misogynist aesthetics to justify existing power; 
Reynolds presents a pro-woman aesthetics that serves the interests of the rising powers 
of the bourgeoisie, but that fails to address the underlying patriarchal power structures 
on which that aesthetics is based—in particular, the patriarchal ideology that sees 
women as essentially, naturally beautiful and domestic. Wollstonecraft is able to 
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excavate through these layers, in all their complexity and seeming-contradiction, and 
find the subjugation at their bases. She recognises that the way we think about beauty, 
the way we think about women, and how those two are intertwined, is always dependent 
on power relations. Without altering those relations beauty can never be liberatory: 
shifting attitudes toward beauty and gender, and thereby creating people free from the 
dependence they generate, necessitates shifting—or destroying—the power structures on 
which, like ivy, they grow. 
Unfortunately, as we now know, and despite the significant involvement of many 
women, the bourgeois revolutions that did occur failed to deliver on the promise that 
Wollstonecraft saw for them. Kings were indeed swept away, and power placed in the 
hands of a slightly-expanded community of free men; but those same bourgeois values in 
which Wollstonecraft placed so much faith found, too, that—with the exception of 
working class women, whose newfound freedom to work in factories was hardly 
liberatory—maintaining the patriarchal order would also maintain the state of affairs in 
which women were domesticated and their productive and reproductive labour provided 
at no outside cost. Instead of an end to subjugation, new subjugations were formed, with 
different characters and ideologies.102 Patriarchy reasserted its equilibrium. But while 
it—and the other oppressive structures that it permeates and by which it is permeated—
continues to exist, Wollstonecraft’s more basic message keeps its hard core of revolution: 




                                                        
102 Arguably, indeed, the privatised virtue visible in the work of Reynolds—without its pro-woman 
aspect—remains the primary ideological face of virtue to this day, with it still mostly adhering to the 
individual choices of individual subjects.This lends some credence to Jones’ contention that it is an 
ideology strongly amenable to the interests of the bourgeoisie, who seized power in Wollstonecraft’s time 
and have held on since. 
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4.  Women’s Militancy and Women’s Republicanism During 





“It is these counter-revolutionary sluts,” declaimed François Chabot, at a session 
of the Jacobin Club, by then the dominant republican debating society in Paris, on the 
sixteenth of September 1793,  “who cause all the riotous outbreaks, above all over bread. 
They made a revolution over coffee and sugar, and they will make others if we don’t 
watch out.”1 The women that Chabot insulted were those of the Society of Revolutionary 
Republican Women (Société des républicaines révolutionnaires), a militantly radical all-
women political society, officially founded on May 10th of the same year and led by 
Claire Lacombe, an actress from the southwest of France, and Pauline Léon, a Parisian 
chocolatier.2 In the few months of their activity Lacombe, Léon, and the Society as a 
whole had already made their names several times over; including, indeed, in riotous 
outbreaks over bread (they were a ‘nucleus of potential mob-leaders, always ready and 
eager to transmute economic grievances into political rebellion’, as R.B. Rose describes 
them3). But the target of Chabot’s remark was not just the immediate one of the 
Revolutionary Republican Women: in his contemptuous invocation of revolutions over 
“coffee and sugar,” Chabot conjured the more diffuse, but no less concerning, spectre of 
militant women in general—those working-class women of Paris that had, to be sure, 
dragged the King out of Versailles in October 1789, but that had also rioted over sugar in 
                                                        
1 Journal historique et politique, no. 69, 18 September 1793. Cited in Rose 60 note 28 
2 George 410-437; Rose 56-72; “The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women Registers with 
Authorities at the Commune” in Levy et al 149 
3 Rose 60 
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early 1792.4 And these women, suddenly unbound by the rapid expansion of the horizon 
of political possibility, were—as the appearance of the Revolutionary Republican Women 
demonstrated—becoming a problem, even in nominally radical republican circles.  
As Sandrine Bergès discusses in her paper “Women Political Philosophers of the 
Eighteenth Century and Why They Matter,” this sudden boundlessness of political 
potential lays fertile ground for philosophical investigation: during times, of which the 
French Revolution is surely the paradigmatic example, when the assumptions 
underpinning society are being questioned, the technocratic debates of ordinary politics 
are supplemented or replaced by the contestation of bare and basic principles. 
Philosophy, as it were, comes to permeate thoroughly the social and political life of the 
people: during the Revolution, ‘any political writer was also a philosopher’ as Bergès 
succinctly puts it.5 Without old prejudices or heuristics to fall back upon, the political 
work of persuasion and power has to be tightly unified with the elucidation and defense 
of foundational values. Hence, Bergès argues, the journalistic polemics of women like 
Olympe de Gouges are properly read as philosophical texts, as they are participants in 
this dynamic philosophical contest. 
Bergès’s insight is significant and, I think, clearly correct both methodologically 
and philosophically. In this chapter I will expand out from here to consider the political-
philosophical values expressed in the demands and actions of other militant women of 
the Revolution. In so doing, I hope to show how the women of Paris tried to carve out an 
alternate vision of republicanism that was inclusive of them, their rights and their 
concrete needs, and that rejected the austere masculinity with which republicanism is 
sometimes associated now and that the men of that time were then in the process of 
constructing.  
                                                        
4  “Parisian Women Protest via Taxation Populaire in February, 1792” in Levy et al 115-8 
5 Bergès 7 
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In her paper, Bergès uses this first argument about what can constitute 
philosophy in revolutionary times to give us an account of republicanism that is more 
amenable to women and feminism through women’s own philosophical, political, and 
journalistic writings. In particular, she discusses the relationship that these women saw 
between republicanism and the private or domestic realm that was then—and is now—
most closely associated with women. In public, however, an alternate current played out. 
This current was no less republican and no less one instantiated and worked-out by 
women, but it had radically different goals and methods to those of the journalists. 
Nevertheless, these two sides of women’s republicanism could often be complementary, 
just as the texts of the Revolution often interacted dynamically with the on-the-ground 
interventions of its political actors. By their very nature, these actions show the militant, 
public side of women’s revolutionary republicanism. They also show us a possible way 
toward new methodologies and metaphilosophical principles in the history of 
philosophy.   
This chapter is hence put together from two separate, but intertwining, strands. 
The first of these strands follows the logic of Bergès’s argument for the inclusion in 
philosophical study, alongside “traditional” genres like treatises and essays, of 
pamphlets, speeches, and journalistic writings. By walking this path, I argue, we can 
open up the philosophy—the dispute over basic principles—latent in the times 
themselves, demonstrated not just in texts but in action: that is, in the deeds of those 
people in Paris, especially women, who challenged the assumptions of social life right in 
the process of living it. The Revolutionary Republican Women have texts: the club had 
written rules, and there are accounts of their meetings and their petitions before the 
National Convention—the first republican government of France—and the local Paris 
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Commune.6 Such texts are, of course, important philosophical documents for the reasons 
given by Bergès, in spite—or because—of the extra excavation that is necessary to find 
the philosophical underpinnings of the practical and political concerns expressed 
therein. But more important, I argue, are the actions of the Revolutionary Republican 
Women and their sisters in the struggle behind and beyond these texts.  It is by their 
actions that they asserted their rights, argued their humanity, and attempted to delineate 
a working-class republicanism with an equal or  liberated place for women. I hence 
propose searching for the philosophical expression to be found in these social 
movements and incidents.  
The second strand, then, attempts to sketch the philosophical contours of this 
women-led republicanism of the street: the principles of the sugar rioters and the so-
called furies of the guillotine. Work has already been done to elucidate the attitudes of 
these women and the political meaning of those attitudes: here, then, I will focus on the 
philosophical comparison of this militant women’s republicanism to more contemporary 
forms. Of particular significance here is the role played by subsistence and broadly 
economic concerns in the politics of the Parisian women; those concerns that are 
invoked in Chabot’s venomous dismissal of the Revolutionary Republican Women. And 
indeed there is a risk even today of dismissing an insurrection that is over bread as 
unprincipled because of that very fact: of labelling the agitation of Paris’s women 
regarding what, in the following century, would become the “social question” as 
unserious or unphilosophical when compared to the reasoned debates on abstract 
principles that—we imagine—occurred in the National Convention and the political 
clubs. But in their actions the women of Paris challenged this strict division of economic 
                                                        
6 See, for example, “The Regulations of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women,” “Accounts of a 
Session of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women,” and “Petition from the Revolutionary 
Republican Women to the National Convention on the Leadership of the Armies and the Law of Suspects,” 




and political or concrete and abstract. So I hope that the second strand can also, in some 
sense, constitute a defence of making a revolution over coffee and sugar.  
 
4.2 The Philosophy in Activism 
 
I begin, then, with the methodological question, in whose exploration we will 
have cause to reflect on much of the militancy of the Revolution’s republican women. Let 
us return first to Bergès’s discussion of the philosophical value of journalistic writings 
and speeches. She notes first that her subjects—Marie-Jeanne Philipon Roland, Olympe 
de Gouges, and Sophie de Grouchy—contrary to some assumptions that they were too 
concerned with activism, did produce a large corpus of philosophical texts, and that they 
are not any the less philosophical for their participation in contemporary debates: they 
constitute “applied philosophical reflection,” as Bergès puts it, referencing Quentin 
Skinner.7 They are indeed interested in providing individual and particular answers to 
the individual and particular questions then facing them, in much the way that Skinner 
advocates we read the history of ideas in general.8 It can only be some noxious mixture of 
parochialism, ahistoricism, and misogyny that would deny that this fact makes these 
women’s writings unphilosophical. Quite the opposite: it is this groundedness in the 
challenges and debates of the times that makes them philosophical. 
Bergès’s second point on this matter is that the particular time that supplied their 
questions—one of considerable social and political flux—led those questions, and their 
answers, to be especially philosophically interesting and significant. This is in part 
because in periods of revolution much of the structure of society is up for grabs, as it 
were, and ideological assumptions that might seem fairly fixed at other times are open to 
                                                        
7 Bergès 5 
8 Skinner 50 
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challenge at their bases. “Applied philosophical reflection,” then, by virtue of the times to 
which it is applied, allowed for considerable exploration and contestation of axiomatic 
first principles: without, that is, a ready-made (to use Bergès’s term) supply of ideologies 
and axioms on which to hang one’s actions and prejudices, just living one’s life—never 
mind actually labouring to create a new republic—required philosophical work.9 
During times of relative political stability, to illustrate, there might be political 
debate on the correct proportional allocation of government resources to, say, education 
as against arms, or police as against healthcare. The contours of the debate will be 
shaped by considerations of efficiency and feasibility, loyalty and enmity, prejudice, fear, 
party politics and electoral strategy, and more. First principles will be invoked, but those 
voices that demand that those principles be shifted—for instance, by demanding that 
governments ought as a matter of moral urgency provide healthcare for all their citizens 
and not get involved in foreign wars—are by that very fact revolutionary voices, forever 
trying to push debate toward axiomatic values. Those elements that reject the debate on 
the grounds that, say, governments should not have the right to use force to collect tax or 
that representative democracy is by its nature illegitimate will remain at best fringe 
elements; fringe enough that it is questionable whether they are engaged in applied 
philosophical reflection at all. 
During times of revolution, however, and surely during some revolutions more 
than others, these more basic questions surge forward into public view and public 
scrutiny. The demand that particular governments legitimate their very existence 
becomes less abstract, since it is entirely possible that those governments could be 
dismantled; the question of the basis of the relationship between citizen and state 
becomes live as the citizens assert a right to reshape the state as they see fit. There will 
still be debates over allocations of resources—people cannot eat principled reflection—
                                                        
9 Bergès 7 
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but those debates will be more malleable, more open to radical change: whether to fund 
education or arms might rest on one group convincing another about what education is 
for, or about what governments should do, or even about what governments are, rather 
than on what represents a better return on investment. The underlying logic of the 
particular order is laid bare and becomes an object of practical action. If philosophy is, 
on some level, the excavation, clarification, expression, and contestation of principles, 
and if practical action is at least partly guided by principles, then to do politics in such 
times is, to paraphrase Bergès, to do philosophy. 
Bergès is right, then, to say that the textual interventions of Olympe de Gouges 
and Madame Roland are philosophical. They are so because they are engaged in 
activism, because they aim to produce particular changes in their own times, and 
because they are polemical. If one takes the (perhaps vulgar) materialist view that 
principles follow practical reality, then, indeed, activism—practical action—is the only 
way to do philosophy; if one thinks that sometimes principles come first, then, at the 
very least, activism is one major constituent of philosophical work, and in times of 
revolutionary change to do philosophical work is to engage in activism.  
It is clear, I think, that these reflections need not only apply to textual 
interventions; nor is all of the political and philosophical import of a textual intervention 
to be found in the words themselves. A useful example is supplied to us by Olympe de 
Gouges. In Only Paradoxes to Offer, Joan Wallach Scott describes how, for de Gouges, 
publishing her texts—indeed, literally pasting them on the walls of Paris—was more than 
making available a vehicle for her reflections: 
 
For de Gouges, writing, signing, and publishing demonstrated, for her 
contemporaries and posterity, what the law erased: the fact that women could be, 
already were, authors. Under revolutionary legislation women did not have the 
rights of authors, of individuals who possessed their intellectual property, 
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because they did not have the rights of active citizens. To be recognized as an 
author, then, meant for de Gouges recognition as an individual and a citizen.10  
 
So not just the texts that she wrote—most prominently, of course, the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Female Citizen”—but the act of writing, 
signing, and publishing them expressed political, and hence philosophical, content. The 
production and dissemination of the text was itself an assertion of rights and active 
citizenship, and that the division of gender was no grounds for division between citizens. 
That she had asserted this claim in her actions—though, not of course, its truth—was 
even acknowledged in a contemptuous report of her death under the guillotine:  
 
Olympe de Gouges, born with an exalted imagination, mistook her delirium for 
an inspiration of nature. She wanted to be a man of state. She took up the 
projects of the perfidious people who want to divide France. It seems the law has 
punished this conspirator for having forgotten the virtues that belong to her sex.11 
 
 Pierre Gaspard Chaumette, the president of the Paris Commune, also invoked 
the spectre of this woman that had forgotten her place during his speech banning 
women’s deputations from appearing before the local government’s sessions, hectoring 
women citizens to  
 
remember the impudent Olympe de Gouges, who was the first to set up women’s 
societies, who abandoned the cares of her household to get mixed up in the 
republic, and whose head fell beneath the avenging knife of the laws. Is it the 
place of women to propose motions? Is it the place of women place themselves at 
the head of our armies?12 
 
                                                        
10 Scott 37 
11 In La feuille du salut public, cited in Scott 52 from Lairtullier 140 




De Gouges asserted that it was the place of women to propose motions and 
become mixed up in the republic by doing those very things; she philosophised in deed 
as well as word, as even her opponents saw, and paid a heavy price for it.  
There is not, then, anything particularly mysterious about the idea that one can 
do philosophy by acting beyond text or even speech. But de Gouges was an individual, 
and a writer, and even in her non-textual actions her intention is quite easy to interpret. 
I wish to assert what is perhaps a step further: that even mass popular actions such as 
the women’s march on Versailles in October 1789 or the insurrectional journées between 
Germinal and Prairial Year III (early April to late May 1795) can be interpreted in this 
way. Such actions have clear purposes and goals, and though—with a handful of 
exceptions from police reports and the like—we cannot necessarily ascribe an explicit 
goal to any one participating individual, we can nevertheless read the actions themselves 
as expressions or manifestations of popular values; and if we do so, we gain access to the 
principles and beliefs of those without institutional access to writing and publishing. We 
miss the radicalism inherent in direct action if we limit ourselves to studying only those 
values that are expressed in text or speech.  
Mary Wollstonecraft, perhaps—and understandably, given the havoc it wrought 
on her Parisian social circle—having soured on popular revolutionary justice by the time 
of its writing, is contemptuously dismissive of the women’s march on Versailles in her 
Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution. In it 
she sees little in the way of values or principles in the action:  
 
The concourse, at first, consisted mostly of market women, and the lowest refuse 
of the streets, women who had thrown off the virtues of one sex without having 
power to assume more than the vices of the other. A number of men also followed 
them, armed with pikes, bludgeons, and hatches; but they were strictly speaking 
a mob, affixing all the odium to the appellation it can possibly import; and not to 
be confounded with the honest multitude, who took the Bastille.—In fact, such a 
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rabble has seldom been gathered together; and they quickly showed, that their 
movement was not the effect of public spirit.13    
 
It was “designing men,” writes Wollstonecraft, “lurk[ing] behind them as a kind 
of safeguard, working them up to some desperate act” that were the cause of the 
insurrection of October 1789, and not any kind of reasons based on the beliefs of the 
women themselves regarding their relationship to the King and to the newly-formed 
National Constituent Assembly, or those institutions’ duties toward them. “A scarcity of 
bread,” she says, “the common grievance of the revolution, aggravated the vague fears of 
the parisians [sic], and made the people so desperate, that it was not difficult to persuade 
them to undertake any enterprize”14; and so are many of the women-led insurrections of 
the Revolution characterised: as the random, thoughtless reflex of a hungry multitude, 
reacting to any stimulus like a tapped knee. E.P. Thompson calls this the “spasmodic 
view of popular history,” and, against it, he asks the important question: “being hungry 
[...], what do people do? How is their behaviour modified by custom, culture, and 
reason?”15  
That is to say, to assert that a riot occurred due to a lack of bread might be true, 
but it fails to explain the particular shape of a bread riot: its goals, its targets, its effects. 
How a riot plays out will speak to the implicit assumptions and beliefs of those that take 
part. A crowd is not a knee, and a six-hour march from Paris to Versailles is not an 
involuntary kick. Being hungry, the women of Paris attacked the hôtel de ville, 
demanding bread and arms, then—also offended by rumours that the King had 
disrespected the new order through its symbol, the tricolour cockade16—walked to 
                                                        
13 Wollstonecraft 344 
14 Ibid 342 
15 Thompson 77-8 
16 The truth or falsity of these rumours does not, I think, affect the beliefs that are manifested in the 
actions that are based on them. If someone tells me that there is milk in the fridge, my walking to and 
opening the fridge manifests my belief that there is milk in the fridge regardless of the truth or falsity of 
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Versailles and demanded the same of the King and the Assembly17; these are not random 
targets. Rather, these targets express a set of political claims: that the King and the new 
governmental institutions have responsibilities and duties toward the people, including 
the provision of subsistence; that the symbols of the new order were important and to be 
respected; and, most significantly, that the people have the right to insurrection when 
these responsibilities are abrogated. In his study on the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century, Thompson speaks of a “consistent traditional view” held by the poor of England 
“of social norms and obligations, [and] of the proper economic functions of several 
parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral 
economy of the poor”; in their insurrections, the women of Paris defended and 
demanded this moral economy from both old institutions of power and new.18 
Their movement, then, was one of “public spirit,” if not the specific kind of public 
spirit that Wollstonecraft presumably would have liked to see. “In deeds,” as Darline Gay 
Levy and Harriet B Applewhite put it, “they shattered the traditional authority and 
sovereignty of absolute kingship. They demonstrated how the people itself functioned as 
sovereign legislator.”19 Their insurrection might have had economic bases, but it 
expressed explicit political views about how different sections of society ought relate to 
one another, and the rights and responsibilities of each; and at any rate, there cannot be 
a more basic political question than that of who gets to eat. And if, despite that 
philosophy is impossible without it, “I must have food” is not obviously a philosophical 
principle, during a time of great flux those notions that underlie it—about the 
commonweal, the duties of governmental institutions thereof, the right of insurrection—
                                                                                                                                                                     
the assertion. This is also why merely saying that the women were provoked by male agents provocateur 
is insufficient to demonstrate that the insurrection was unprincipled; the women acted on their political 
views, and even if lurking males provoked that action, they did not implant those views.  
17 Stanislas Maillard Describes the Women’s March to Versailles, October 5 1789” in Levy et al 36-42 
 
18 Thompson 79. For an illuminating application of Thompson’s framework to the French case, though less 
focused on the Revolution than I am, see Tilly 23-57.   
19 Levy and Applewhite 85 
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surely are. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, these notions could be based 
on other, perhaps deeper views about the natural rights of all human beings; those views 
too are expressed in insurrection.  
To participate in these direct actions—and there were many led by women during 
the revolution—is to lay a stake in philosophical ground.  It is not just to attempt to gain 
through force what one considers one is due; it is also to assert one’s belief that one is 
due those things, and that the kind of person one is is due those things, just as de Gouges 
asserted through publishing that she was due active citizenship as much as any man.  
To limit ourselves to hearing only those voices that expressed themselves through 
reasoned debate, that followed the subtlest rhetorical canons, is not just to miss out on 
much that was being said: it is to miss out on a very particular section of what was said, a 
section that was determined not by reason or philosophy but by an uneven and 
oppressive distribution of power that persisted from then till now. The Revolution 
emboldened many of the people—women—on the wrong end of that distribution to 
declaim their own views and to hence assert their right to be heard. It also emboldened 
many women to act, and hence assert their right to participate in the shaping of their 
lives by state power. If, like the women that Wollstonecraft called the ‘lowest refuse of 
the streets’, one cannot be heard through text or speech, direct action may be the only 
way to have one’s own principles become those of society itself. We ought hear those 
principles; but trying to hear them in the context of contemporary philosophy, or history 
of philosophy, raises an interesting tangle of issues. It is to the metaphilosophical 
outlines of the assertions of the women in Paris that I will turn next.  
 




There are therefore, I think, good reasons—methodological and political—to pay 
attention to the viewpoints that underlay the insurrections and riots of the Revolution 
and those that underlie activism and street action more generally. It not only broadens 
the scope of analysis, but it broadens it in the particular direction of undervalued and 
underheard voices that are, due to that very fact, more likely to be revolutionary ones. 
Nevertheless, we might ask whether this method really does, or really ought, take these 
insurrections to be philosophy. Might it not be the work of interpretation that constitutes 
philosophy, rather than the events themselves? After all, not everything in the world is 
philosophy, and nor should it be; does naming an insurrection as philosophy diminish 
the specific character of philosophy or—arguably worse—improperly circumscribe the 
nature of the event? In seeking to find what makes a riot philosophical, we oughtn’t lose 
track of what makes it riotous.20  
There are numerous tacks that might be taken in navigating these charges. In the 
previous section, I followed Bergès in arguing that the events I labelled as philosophy, or 
as philosophical, were so because they were concerned with providing answers to or 
expressing opinions on a particular set of basic or fundamental questions that are 
generally taken—though we might properly ask by whom—to be philosophical: questions 
about what kinds of things governments are, how they should relate to their citizens or 
subjects, whence their power comes, and what they should do. Even historical-contextual 
readings that, after Skinner, situate these questions in the live debates of their times 
nevertheless take them to be more basic, fundamental, or principled than, for instance, 
questions on the allocation of budgets. It is partly for this reason that such questions are 
taken to be philosophical; but more important, I think, is their simple resemblance to 
questions that are already established within the dominant institutions and canons of 
                                                        
20 I am thankful and indebted to Lisa Miracchi, Shereen Chang, Paul Musso, and Ben Baker for their 
insights and questions on another version of this chapter, which helped form the forthcoming section.  
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political philosophy. In the previous section, I implicitly argued that the women of the 
march on Versailles were doing philosophy because they were answering the kinds of 
questions that Rawls and Locke answer.  
This rhetorical strategy—the subject-matter approach—surely suffices in many 
cases. Making philosophy more inclusive and open surely includes making more 
available responses to its traditional questions that come from quarters that are 
underrepresented due to systemic oppressions, and that might include responses that 
are delivered through unusual media like insurrections. Nevertheless, on a broader scope 
this strategy is methodologically unsatisfying: it defers the big question by pointing to 
established traditions that mightn’t, themselves, have truly convincing bases. Perhaps 
worse, this approach might improperly shift the site of philosophising from the event 
itself to the later interpreter: if doing philosophy is merely a matter of providing 
responses to established questions then we are left open to the charge that it is us, 
contemporary historians of philosophy, that are really constructing these responses, and 
that the lives of the women of the past are just so much raw material in that process. For 
writings, even ‘non-philosophical’ ones, the risk here is lower; but for events, whose 
explicit values are by and large not verbalised or written, it is great.   
An alternative that skirts both of these issues is to argue that to do philosophy is 
not to respond to particular questions, or particular kinds of questions, but to make use 
of a particular method. This latter claim can arguably be drawn back to Plato, in whose 
Gorgias Socrates differentiates himself from the eponymous sophist by pointing to the 
difference in how the two convince their interlocutors or audiences: emotional 
persuasion for Gorgias, true reason for Socrates.21 With this in mind we might therefore 
say that to do philosophy is to aim to convince others about something by appeal to 
                                                        
21 Plato 464b-465e 
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reason: it is a rational method. It can hence be differentiated from arational methods 
that aim to convince by, for instance, emotion or force.  
This approach does not rest philosophy on resemblance to established works, as 
does the subject-matter approach. Nor does it confine philosophy, in non-verbal cases, to 
those doing the interpretation rather than those doing the initial activist work. But in 
avoiding these issues we may still have excluded the insurrections with which I am 
concerned from being philosophy. On this new schema, it would appear, insurrections 
and riots cannot be philosophy because they use force, which is arational, to achieve 
their aims. Indeed, perhaps even journalistic writings or polemics which appeal to 
emotion could be excluded from the realm of philosophy on these grounds. So in skirting 
the problems of the subject-matter approach we have, from the point of view of this 
chapter’s thesis, found ourselves in worse straits than we were before.  
As I have said, I think we have good political and methodological reasons to 
understand the street actions of the women of Paris as philosophy. We should therefore 
not accept too readily the apparent restrictions of the rational-method approach. And, 
happily, it does not stand up to much scrutiny.  
First, against Plato, it is not clear that the rational-method approach really does 
describe philosophy, even when philosophy is understood in narrow or traditional terms. 
This is a large claim, much larger than can be dealt with adequately here; but it is, I 
think, at least plausible that many arguments in canonical philosophy—especially in 
ethics and politics—rely more on emotional persuasion than they care to admit. Many 
intuition pumps, for instance, might use reason to convince us of the consequences of 
our responses to particular situations, but those responses themselves needn’t be arrived 
at by rational argument. This muddying of the rational waters mightn’t be a bad thing; 
and to the extent that, from the rational-method approach’s own perspective, it is a bad 
thing, we might ask whether it ought to be. One response we could give, then, is that if 
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the rational-method approach excludes polemics or excludes insurrection, then so much 
the worse for the approach.  
Second, and I think of more concrete use to us here, we might argue that the use 
of force is not as arational as it might seem. The intuition that the use of force is arational 
might derive from the intuition that, for instance, if I am held at gunpoint and made to 
concede that the Catholic God exists, I am not thereby rationally convinced that the 
Catholic God exists. But the problem with this illustration, as the old Spanish inquisitors 
themselves realised, is that it is not clear that I am convinced at all. I am just—perfectly 
rationally, unless I believe in a paradise for martyrs—saying that the Catholic God exists 
to avoid being shot; what I believe is a different matter. So this intuition pump doesn’t 
quite work: the problem isn’t that I’m convinced arationally, but that I’m not convinced.  
When we move to the political arena of groups and governments and power the 
problem becomes murkier still. The separation between force and reason becomes less 
clear. During the women’s march on Versailles, Marie-Rose Barré, a twenty-year-old 
Parisian lace-worker, was one of four women taken to meet the king to ask him for 
bread:  
 
His Majesty answered them that he was suffering at least as much as they were, 
to see them lacking it, and that so far as he was able he had taken care to prevent 
them from experiencing a dearth. Upon the king’s response they begged him to 
be so good as to arrange escorts for the flour transports intended for the 
provisioning of Paris, because according to what they had been told at the bridge 
in Sevres by the two young men of whom they spoke earlier, only two wagons out 
of seventy intended for Paris actually arrived there. The king promised them to 
have the flour escorted and said that if depended on him, they would have bread 
then and there.22 
 
With the previous example in mind, we might argue that, despite the apparent 
cordiality of this interaction, the presence of a thousands-strong crowd of armed women 
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immediately outside means that the king was not really convinced of the people’s need 
for bread—or, more strongly, of their moral claim to it. At the very least, we might say, he 
wasn’t rationally convinced of anything. He was just saying what needed to be said to 
avoid violence.  
Perhaps this interpretation would be true if what the king was forced to concede 
was a bare factual claim such as “the Catholic God exists” or “two plus two equals five.” 
But the demand of the women of Paris was a political one. And for such claims the 
bringing to bear of force to convince does not automatically make that convincing 
arational. This is because political claims are about power, and hence are partly about 
the use of force: about who gets access to it, who gets to use it, when, and to what end. By 
appearing in force, the women of Paris concretely illustrated the truth of their claims: 
not, it must be conceded, necessarily the truth that they needed bread, but the truths that 
they had power and that they had the right to use it when they saw fit regardless of the 
wishes of the nominal authorities. The insurrection hence expressed truths beyond its 
immediate goal, and, observing the insurrection, it would be rational to be convinced of 
those truths. And if one were to accept those truths, it would be rational to accept the 
truth of the insurrection’s goal after all: the people must have bread.  
Indeed, in settling questions of who gets to use force and when, one can think of 
fewer more convincing arguments for the oppressed classes of society than using force 
when they see fit. In general the rulers of a society reserve for themselves the right to use 
force to settle political contests and disputes.23 One can argue verbally against them that 
they are not the true arbiters of the proper application of force; or one can assert the 
falsity of their claim by using force oneself, by asserting one’s own right to bring force to 
bear on issues where that right is denied by one’s rulers. As we shall see in the following 
                                                        
23 The claim that “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory” is Max Weber’s: Weber 4, emphasis original.  
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section, the articulation of this natural right of insurrection beyond the bounds of 
existing powers, is, I think, an important part of the latent philosophy of the street 
actions of the Revolution. And this articulation is rationally convincing because it is 
made through force; much more so than if—as I do so here—it is merely expressed 
through words. In this case, it is the force of the insurrection, not the work of later 
interpreters like myself, that does the convincing. As Marx wrote, “the weapon of 
criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be 
overthrown by material force”24: to convince those more powerful takes power.  
I do not hereby claim to have settled the big question of what, in the end, 
philosophy is. And, as I said at the outset, I think the subject-matter approach works well 
enough for my purposes here: the women of Paris were, I think, in their insurrections 
engaged in the same kind of project as people that almost everyone would agree were 
doing philosophy. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the approach’s limitations, 
and especially important when in so doing we’re thereby able to see another sense in 
which the women’s street actions really can be understood to be philosophy: they aimed, 
rationally, to convince of the true existence of a natural right. It is to the excavation of 
this right that I turn next. In the process of that excavation, we can also see a dynamic 
interaction of philosophical texts and political action.  
 
4.4 Militant Women’s Republicanism 
 
Much changed between October 1789 and Germinal-Prairial Year III, not least 
the calendar itself, but when women then rioted against the most recent iteration of the 
First Republic—the more conservative National Directory—it was once again over bread, 
as had been the earlier riots of 1789 and 1792; and, like those earlier riots, it was not only 
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over bread. The insurrection of 1 Prairial (20 May 1795), again led by women, took as its 
slogan “Bread and the Constitution of 1793,” succinctly combining economic and 
political concerns into a single expression of the people’s demand for their rights.25 It is 
from this slogan that I will begin to work out the outlines of the militant republicanism of 
the women of the riots, using the tripartite characterisation of neo-republicanism given 
by Bergès as a source of inspiration and comparison—with particular emphasis, in this 
section, on the republican tenet of freedom as non-domination.26 In this way we can see, 
alongside Bergès’s explication of the women-centred republicanism of de Gouges, de 
Grouchy, and Roland, another attempt to work out a republicanism that worked for 
women and that was made and expressed by women. In this case, that republicanism 
focused on the rights of women to live free of domination by state institutions, and—
importantly—to participate in the creation of that non-dominative order.    
The values expressed in the slogans of the insurrection, as well as in the 
insurrection itself, can help us to understand this other republicanism that was formed 
and reformed by the working-class and militant women of Paris throughout the period of 
the Revolution, but it arguably reached its clearest manifestation in Prairial. At the same 
time, the insurrection can help us to see how political practice and philosophical writing 
interacted at a moment of particular foment: how texts and activism entered into a 
reciprocal relationship of mutual reinforcement. Philosophy, then, both drove and was 
driven by the direct actions of the street. With a little unpacking, “bread and the 
Constitution of 1793” can show us this vividly as well as showing us, or at least guiding us 
towards, the concrete values of the women that used it.  
The Constitution of 1793 is the Montagnard Constitution, the first republican 
constitution of France, written by the radical republican faction of the National 
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Convention and containing a spate of democratic reforms, including universal manhood 
suffrage and the abolition of slavery; it was never implemented.27 Its text was preceded 
by a Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, similar to the more famous such 
Declaration written by Lafayette, Jefferson, and Mirabeau at the very beginning of the 
Revolution in 1789. But while the 1789 Declaration aimed to limit the absolute power of 
the King and to do away with feudal privileges, the  Declaration 1793 is more stridently 
republican and egalitarian.28  
Massimiliano Tomba argues that the 1793 Declaration signals a reconfiguration 
of the relationship between the individual bearer of rights and the state: a shift from 
what he calls the “juridical universalism” of 1789 to the “insurgent universality” of 1793. 
“The tradition of the first declaration,” writes Tomba, “shows how individuals strip 
themselves of their social characteristics in order to become ‘simple individuals’ and 
therefore citizens of the state”: this is the tradition of the “abstract bearer of rights,” to 
quote Tomba again, that has been one of the troubling legacies of liberalism and 
republicanism for feminists and those in other radical liberatory movements, who have 
frequently seen this abstract bearer of rights as implicitly white, propertied, and male.29 
What’s more, the rights of the man and citizen of 1789 were seen as handed down 
benevolently by governmental institutions, and in the same breath as their declamation 
they were limited by strictures that the rights not be abused and not disturb public 
order.30  
Such a conception of rights, then, is doubly dominative, and thus doubly unfree: 
on the one hand, it constitutes a bearer of rights that is individualised and abstracted 
only insofar as they are not a woman, not a person of colour, not enslaved, and not poor; 
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on the other, even the rights of that heavily circumscribed group are dependent on the 
largesse of a government that can, at any point, invoke the expediency of public order to 
circumscribe the rights themselves. In the republican tradition non-domination entails 
not just non-interference but the absence of the possibility of arbitrary interference: not 
just the presence of a kind-hearted or lackadaisical master, but no master at all.31  The 
handful of abstract right-bearers of the 1789 Declaration, then, were not free in the 
republican sense (nor, indeed, were they yet living in a republic).  
The 1793 Declaration was written after three years of popular protest and 
insurrection of women, the poor, and the enslaved people of the colonies. It, by contrast 
to the more liberal 1789 Declaration, “announces” what Tomba calls “insurgent natural 
rights’ that ‘express the political agency of human beings beyond the state.” That is to say 
that, rather than emptying out individuals of their concrete features, making those whose 
social position makes this operation possible “abstract,” and then bestowing them with 
rights that are carefully limited by the state, the 1793 declaration—on Tomba’s reading, 
at least—acknowledges that individuals have rights by virtue of their concrete features 
and admits no possibility of their being limited by the state; rather, the state and 
governmental institutions exist at the sufferance of a people who have a permanent right 
to insurrection.32  
Tomba sees the provenance and expression of this understanding of insurgent 
natural rights in the insurrections, during the Revolution, of those people whose “non-
abstract” features had disqualified them from rights under the older declaration: the 
poor, the rebels of Saint-Domingue, and—of course—women33. By acting as citizens 
despite their exclusion, and expressing their rights despite their disqualification, these 
groups, Tomba argues, articulated the gap between the concrete human being and the 
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abstract citizen rights-bearer of the 1789 Declaration, putting a whole dominative 
political and social order into question; not with the end of admittance into that order 
but with the far greater one of expressing and demanding one’s human agency in the face 
of any order.34 In this, again, the insurrections of women, the poor, and the enlaved 
people of the colonies can be seen as making demands outside of, but here also 
alongside, philosophical texts.  
One such text, as Tomba notes, is de Gouges’s Declaration of the Rights of 
Woman and Female Citizen, written two years before the 1793 Declaration. It expresses 
its own understanding of insurgent universality, rewriting Article 6 of the 1789 
Declaration—“The law is the expression of the general will”—to “the law should be the 
expression of the general will,” hence making the law “subject[..] to the judgment of the 
people.”35 
Here, then, is a thoroughgoing demand for freedom as non-domination; for 
freedom as the non-possibility that one’s rights will be infringed, enshrined in a right of 
insurrection that can be acknowledged, but never granted or circumscribed, by the state. 
It is a demand made overwhelmingly by the participants in the popular politics of the 
Revolution, the riots and actions of the street carried out by all those that saw the gap 
being forged between human being and citizen: that is, by those human beings whose 
citizenship was denied. Where bread, or indeed coffee or sugar, was a part of their 
motivation, the demand is expressed only the more clearly, showing that gap in yet 
starker terms: those of a state that would grant rights to abstract subjects while ignoring 
the concrete needs of real human beings.  
In taking the Constitution of 1793 as their slogan and model, the women of the 
Prairial insurrection express their refusal of domination clearly. The insurrection is both 
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sanctioned and granted political meaning through the invocation of the Constitution; at 
the same time, the insurrection itself constitutes evidence for the the truth of the claims 
in the Declaration that the rights of expression and assembly “cannot be forbidden” and 
that “insurrection is for the people and for each of portion of the people the most sacred 
of rights and the most indispensable of duties.”36 In a sense, then, by allowing for the fait 
accompli of the people’s right to non-domination and by enshrining their right to 
resistance, the Declaration—even though it was never put into law—generated its own 
evidence. It philosophically justified political actions that themselves justified its 
principles. The content of the insurrectionary claim—the demand not to be dominated—
is expressed in text, in action, and in the interaction of the two.    
There is a further interesting wrinkle to this interplay, however. As noted, Tomba 
argues that the 1793 Constitution was itself written in response to earlier insurrections of 
the poor, of women, and of the enslaved (including the by then quasi-legendary march 
on Versailles that we discussed in the previous section). Here the direction of influence is 
reversed: rather than political action being justified by an earlier text, the pre-1793 
insurrections are retroactively justified by a text that is written partly in their light. In 
other words, political practice here generates its own philosophical justifications: 
“applied philosophical reflection” taken to the extreme. The Declaration of 1793 here 
acknowledges pre-existing facts on the ground: the women (and enslaved people, and 
poor) of the Revolution have rights, including the right to insurrection, and they will not 
be dominated. And in making that acknowledgement it creates the conditions for new 
political actions and new on-the-ground insurrections—ones that make it into their 
slogan.   
All of this helps us to grasp the expression of freedom as non-domination—
republican freedom—in the insurrections and riots of the revolutionary period.  The 
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storming of the Bastille, the march on Versaille, the last gasps of the Germinal and 
Prairial Days: all these can be said to express, instantiate, and demand a particular 
variant of militant or insurgent republicanism. The women of Prairial Year III that cried 
“bread and the Constitution of 1793” asserted their right not to be dominated, by hunger 
or by unscrupulous flour merchants or by the state itself, and they asserted it by refusing 
to be dominated and by taking their rights into their own hands. Their rights overspilled 
the bounds set them by the state, and they demanded the ratification of the Constitution 
that acknowledged this.  
 
4.5 Public Participation and Public Virtue 
 
Republicanism, however, is not just an understanding of freedom as non-
domination. Its other two features, as identified by Bergès in her discussion of the 
republican women writers, are its emphases on virtue-led politics and political 
participation.37 As we have already seen several times, a part of the underlying logic of 
the women-led insurrections and riots of the revolutionary era was the demand, and 
indeed understanding, on the part of the women that they should participate in the 
political process even as they were excluded from most governmental institutions. To be 
sure, rioting over bread is not the form of participation that most of the great republican 
men of the time are likely to have had in mind, but with no other options available 
insurrection becomes a tool of both participation and non-domination.  
There are, however, other ways that the militant republicanism of the women of 
Paris was expressed, and it is to these that I wish to turn in this final section—to the ways 
that the republican women of Paris emphasised their desire to participate and their 
instantiation of civic virtue. It is here, then, that we can finally return to the Society of 
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Revolutionary Republican Women, and, I think, to a vision of radical republicanism that 
is more explicitly focused on the rights of women. This vision was also, significantly, one 
that was expressed in public and made a demand for women’s inclusion in the public 
sphere: the species of participation and civic virtue desired by the militant women of 
Paris were ones that led beyond the domestic and private realm. Where they used texts, 
the context of their dissemination helped support the texts’ content, and the content 
helped support political action. 
Pauline Léon was already making herself known in March of 1791, two years 
before the official registration of the Society at the Commune, when she and three 
hundred other women petitioned the National Assembly for the right of women to bear 
arms:  
 
We wish only to defend ourselves the same as you; you cannot refuse us, and 
society cannot deny the right nature gives us, unless you pretend the Declaration 
of Rights does not apply to women, and that they should let their throats be cut 
like lambs, without the right to defend themselves. Can you believe the tyrants 
would spare us? No, no—they remember October 5 and 6, 1789 [that is, the 
march on Versailles] … But, you say, men are armed for your defense. Of course, 
but we reply, why deprive us of the right to join that defense, and of the pleasure 
of saving their days by using ours? [...] Why then not terrorize aristocracy and 
tyranny with all the resources of civic effort and the purest zeal, zeal which cold 
men can well call fanaticism and exaggeration, but which is only the natural 
result of a heart burning with love for the public weal?38  
 
In 1791, of course, France was still a monarchy of sorts. Nevertheless, Léon makes 
no mention of the King and frequent references to civic virtue and citizenship. Here then, 
in inchoate form, is the beginning of a specifically women’s form of resistance to 
domination, what would in time become essential to republicanism; in this case to 
domination by the enemies of the nation both interior and exterior. But Léon’s petition 
                                                        




also lies direct claim to the ability of women to participate in the defence of the polity 
and of the availability to them of the civic virtues of patriotism and sacrifice. Despite 
their limited citizenship and limited rights, Léon and the other women expected not just 
that they be granted their constitutional rights but that they could, and should, 
participate in their creation and safeguarding as equal members of both polity and 
ongoing project. “We are citoyennes,” Léon announced, “and we cannot be indifferent to 
the fate of the fatherland.”39 The very fact of their petitioning, of course, just like in the 
case of de Gouges, formed a part of their assertion of their right to participate. Their 
300-strong presence provided force to their argument. As ever, they demonstrated their 
willingness and desire to become citizens and to participate both in word and deed.  
Nevertheless, the women desired more than just the right to appear and to 
petition. In this it seems that their words, supported as they were by their presence and 
their activism, would be insufficient: the petitioners demanded the right to participate 
specifically in the armed defence of the new nation. The petition, by itself, is an act of 
participation and a demonstration of civic virtue. But the ability to petition—which was 
itself to be taken away from women in 1793—was not enough.  Léon and her fellow 
petitioners saw the right to bear arms as the route along which they could access all the 
rights and responsibilities of republican citizenship: to be independent, women had to 
participate in the armed defence and creation of the nation; to participate, they needed 
the independent right to bear arms, still given only to active citizens; to access and 
express their (soon to be) republican virtue they also needed the freedom to participate. 
And so they were compelled—again by civic virtue—to participate directly in the creation 
of a non-dominative state and to defend it from domination from abroad.  
Again, these considerations were not made in abstraction but in the immediate 
context of work then needing to be done. Léon here is beginning to form a republicanism 
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that responds immediately to its circumstances and whose principles are created in the 
process of political work.  
  The right of women to bear arms and form militias was a central preoccupation 
of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women, of which Léon was a central member 
and occasional president, during the short span between its official formation in May 
1793 and its proscription along with all other women’s clubs by the Jacobins at the end of 
October. The first article of the Society’s rules stated that “The Society’s purpose is to be 
armed to rush to the defense of the fatherland; citoyennes are nonetheless free to arm 
themselves or not.”40 They hence argued for their inclusion in public citizenship not 
primarily through the vote, or through political representation, but through the right to 
aid in the defence of the nation—to be a part of a civically virtuous, publicly visible corps 
of patriots.   
There were other means, however, by which the Society articulated—and worked 
to produce—its vision of a militant female republicanism. They expressed strong support 
for the implementation, and then vigorous enforcement of, the Terror and the repressive 
Law of Suspects against aristocrats, speculators, and hoarders of grain, in another 
petition made alongside the radical Cordeliers Club just after the Society’s formation in 
May 1793:  
 
Legislators, strike out at the speculators, the hoarders, and the egotistical 
merchants. A horrible plot exists to cause the people to die of hunger by setting 
an enormous price on goods. At the head of this plot is the mercantile aristocracy 
of an insolent caste, which wants to assimilate itself to royalty and to hoard all 
riches by forcing up the price of goods of prime necessity in order to satisfy its 
cupidity. Exterminate all these scoundrels; the Fatherland will be rich enough if it 
is left with the sans-culottes [that is, the urban poor] and their virtues.41 
 
                                                        
40 “The Regulations of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women,” in Levy et al 161 




And then again in another petition to the National Convention in August:  
 
No, it will not be said that the people, reduced to despair, were obliged to do 
justice themselves; you are going to give it to them by ruining all guilty 
administrators and by creating extraordinary tribunals in sufficient numbers so 
that patriots will say, as they leave for the front: “We are calm about the fates of 
our wives and children; we have seen all internal conspirators perish under the 
sword of the law.”42 
 
In these cases the women of the Society participated in the creation and 
dissemination of radical, polemical text and speech that aimed both to show that they 
could so participate and to steer the conditions of the Revolution in the direction they 
desired. Their bloodthirsty rhetoric found expression in action and their actions 
supported the seriousness of their rhetoric. 
Extraordinary tribunals and swords of the law, of course could—and did—
severely impact the non-dominative freedom of those unfortunates who found 
themselves on the wrong side of them. And the image of civic virtue here is a blood-
drenched one. Yet for all that this is still a species of republicanism: in this case, non-
domination, virtue, and participation are all brought together in the demand for 
extraordinary violence, in both senses of the term “extraordinary.” 
The Revolutionary Republican Women saw the formation of a republican ethic 
and a republican society as an ongoing project, and not one that could only be theorised 
about: to be undominated required a robust and terrifying participation in politics, a 
bellicose expression of their virtuous commitment to the ideals of the republic. Joan 
Landes describes how they “took to policing markets to root out hoarders’ and ‘engaged 
actively in surveillance”43—another expression of their desire to participate in the public 
sphere and shape what that sphere was like. These activities can be read philosophically 
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too: to be undominated, the women asserted in their petitions and through their actions, 
meant the forcible destruction of those that tried to dominate them. If we see a 
deplorable contradiction here, they surely saw a hard-nosed practical response to 
concrete circumstances.  
Landes describes how the women of the Society also worked to express a 
particular visible and public role for women, specifically, in the new republic. In 
September they successfully petitioned the Convention to pass a law requiring women to 
wear the republican tricolour cockade while in public.44 Here lies another tangle: the 
quasi-feminist demand that women be able to participate in the public life of the 
republic—that their citizenship and belonging be visibly represented—and that they be 
able to demonstrate their civic virtue and commitment runs roughshod over the demand 
for non-domination. Other women, especially market women at Les Halles, did not 
appreciate this domination, and fought back—literally—against the women of the Society 
that tried to enforce it.45 And so the expression of a women’s republicanism continues to 





 These alternate models of republicanism, then, are not universally positive or 
admirable. They can be dark and violent. But still they represent how women of the 
Revolution who could not frequently be heard by traditional or decorous means still, in 
the public realm and with the tools they had, worked to produce a republicanism for 
themselves, and in this I think there is much that can be learned. 
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Philosophically and politically, the understanding of freedom as non-domination 
that I have excavated here is one that takes freedom to be not a particular state of being, 
and certainly not one whose boundaries are codified in law, but an ongoing, collective 
project in which people must participate as full-fledged citizens. To be undominated on 
the terms of the Revolutionary Republican Women requires vigilance, practical action, 
and the means to defend oneself against threats: all these things can only be realised in 
the coming-together of people as collectives or communities where they can protect one 
another. The polity itself does not make people free: rather, the people’s capacity to 
shape the polity, to be actively involved in the progress and direction of the society in 
which they are part, is what grounds their freedom.  
As I noted in my discussion of Tomba and the Constitution of 1793, this capacity 
of the mass of the people to shape the state as they see fit is always there, latently, within 
them. To this extent freedom would appear to be a metaphysical fact: that the 
Declaration of 1789 pedantically circumscribed the cases in which political protest and 
assembly were permissible had no bearing on what actually happened, because the law 
had no relation to this capacity. A capacity, however, translates to nothing without 
political work, and it is in this insistence that political work must be done to secure the 
freedom of the people that the militant women of Paris are, I think, most instructive. 
Certainly, securing the writing of a Constitution that made itself subservient to the 
insurrectionary rights of the people was a victory—even if it was immediately suspended 
in a state of emergency—but one of the primary ways that it was a victory was that it 
could subsequently act as a locus and model for further political action. It was the action 
itself that, however briefly, seemed to be pushing things in the direction of liberation. 
Freedom, then, understood as the impossibility of one’s domination by another, is 
something that people make for themselves.  
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These political considerations can also inform the methodological turns that I 
have made here. Of course, the insistence on the importance of political action can lead 
us directly to the attempt to bring that action into the realm of philosophy—not to 
denature action but, hopefully, to radicalise philosophy. The importance of collectives in 
ensuring political change, I think, gives us a good reason to seek ways to understand how 
intellectual currents can be expressed in the forms of social movements that exist beyond 
texts, and especially beyond texts written by individuals. Understanding political thought 
requires understanding all the things that drove it, and in many instances it was driven 
by the forceful action of groups of ordinary people, who used texts as justifications and 
models, retroactively and proactively. In finding a methodology that can adapt to this, I 
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In my introduction, I said that one of my aims in this dissertation was to 
contribute to an ongoing attempt at destabilising the so-called “standard narrative” of 
early modern philosophy: that narrative, familiar to every philosophy undergraduate, of 
the development from rationalism, through empiricism, to Kantianism. To do this means 
not just that we ought search for the overlooked philosophers of the past—though this is 
a valuable aspect of the trend, and especially when those new figures frustrate previous 
assumptions about who can be philosophers. It also means that we critically interrogate 
the questions and methods that have contributed to the narrative’s longevity and—until 
recently—seeming unassailability, not with the goal of declaring those questions and 
methods illegitimate but, more modestly, with the goal of finding alternate routes that 
were previously hidden. To understand the methodological and political architecture of 
the standard narrative is to understand what could now be otherwise.  
In the preceding chapters I have presented several ways of engaging with the 
philosophy of the early modern period outside of this Kantian narrative. In my 
introduction I noted that I would do this in part by constructing a “separate, newer 
narrative” about the relations between people and societies from the perspective of those 
that were marginalised. Here at the end, we can see that narrative with more clarity. 
By focusing on women, and in particular on their responses to their subjugation 
throughout the period, I have crafted a narrative that shows the relation of individuals to 
wider groups, as it is considered philosophically, becoming increasingly a political 
question: that is to say, the philosophers on which I have focused increasingly turned to 
the matters of social organisation and the distribution of power to find solutions to the 
ethical, aesthetic, and more broadly philosophical problems that they faced. Each 
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chapter gives a political response to its individual concerns, but over the arc of all of 
them politics as a practice grows to swallow metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and then 
philosophy itself. This, I hope, gives us a new way to think through early modern 
philosophy outside of the standard story—and as such thinking is itself a political project, 
the work of the philosophers I discuss can also provide a model for us in bringing 
political commitments into the history of philosophy.  
This new narrative of the growth of the political has been a convenient way for 
the structure of the dissertation to mirror its methodological and philosophical 
preoccupations regarding the primacy of the political in reconstructing past thought in 
forms that are helpful to contemporary concerns. And this growing primacy of the 
political might even be persuasive as one way that the period can be read: a period that 
began with witch-trials and weapon-salves and that ended in secular revolution, with the 
materialism of Marx and realpolitik on the horizon. But I have not presented this 
narrative with the aim of encapsulating, representing, or even describing the contours of 
the political thought of the women of early modern Europe. I do not think, ultimately, 
that destabilising the standard narrative means setting up something new to take its 
place—though perhaps if we were to say many things should take its place we would be 
on firmer ground.   
Rather, I have presented four chapters that each seek to understand the 
philosophy of the early modern period beyond the standard narrative—that is, that take 
steps on a number of routes forward. Here at the close I will draw out those routes more 
explicitly and then suggest further research to be undertaken in the same vein in future.  
 




Firstly, then, and most obviously, by focusing on the work of women 
philosophers, writers, and activists of the early modern period we can immediately effect 
a radical break from the exclusively male canon handed to us by tradition. New faces 
with new perspectives can be added to the canon even without significantly altering the 
canon’s biases in terms of content and genre. Cavendish, as we saw, was as concerned to 
describe the deep structure of the universe—what is in it and how it works—as any male 
metaphysician, and in her Philosophical letters she sets herself up as responding directly 
on such matters to Hobbes, Descartes, More, and Van Helmont.1 We might also include 
Anne Conway, whose Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy developed 
a monist metaphysics against Descartes that seems to have strongly influenced Leibniz.2 
And though the standard narrative has traditionally overlooked ethics, aesthetics, and 
politics in its reconstruction of the early modern period, this dissertation has presented 
women working on those issues too, which are after all now very much in the 
mainstream of philosophy: Suchon on freedom, de Grouchy on moral sentiments and 
political rights, Reynolds on aesthetics, Wollstonecraft on aesthetics and republicanism, 
de Gouges and the Revolutionary Republican Women on republicanism, political rights, 
and economic rights.  
Though matters have been changing in recent decades, these writers and activists 
were for a long time stranded on the outside of the institutionalised history of 
philosophy. Even if we hold fairly conservative views of what constitutes or ought to 
constitute philosophy, these women—and many more—can help us to construct a 
narrative or picture of early modern philosophy that is far closer to the true intellectual 
complexion of the era than that of seven men stretched over two hundred years. 
Uncovering and engaging with the work of early modern women is hence one way of 
                                                        
1 Cavendish PL 234 
2 Coudert and Corse xxx  
198 
 
progressing beyond the standard narrative.3 That project is very much ongoing, and I 
hope this dissertation can serve as one small part of it. 
There are other ways that I have sought to progress beyond the traditional 
Kantian narrative, however. As I previously noted, throughout the dissertation I have 
tried to show how close political concerns are to each philosopher’s treatment of their 
particular issues. The way that politics emerges as a primary concern differs in each 
chapter: for Cavendish the primacy of politics is an artefact of her belief that all things 
are living individuals who must therefore be socially organised in some way, while for the 
republican women of Chapter Four politics is front and centre as the method by which 
they will take control of their lives. In all cases, however, politics is inextricable from 
each woman’s writing. In the process of thinking through the answers to questions in 
metaphysics, aesthetics, or ethics, we find ourselves thinking along the lines of social 
organisation: how societies can be organised; how different forms of organisation affect 
the individuals within them; how power can be distributed across them; how individuals 
can relate to that power; and, importantly, how the contestation of that power can 
generate new ways of thinking and relating.  
Such thinking is alien to the early modern period of the standard narrative, which 
has tended to view its canonical figures as grappling alone with stable and permanent 
universal questions—what kinds of things exist? how do we know?—that are not sensitive 
to social circumstances. This might be a consequence of the homogeneity of the 
narrative’s canon: as men, mostly of independent means, the seven great sages are less 
likely to have been subject to, or cognisant of, the psychic turbulences or material 
restrictions of patriarchal social structures than the likes of Suchon or Wollstonecraft, 
both of whom demonstrate a clear sensitivity to how thought can be bound up by 
                                                        
3 For a useful discussion of strategies for bringing women philosophers into the canons of early modern 
philosophy, and of the extent to which women were part of the intellectual networks of the time, see 
Bergès 381-97.  
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politics. And so another way that I have sought to move beyond the canonical narrative is 
by bringing such concerns, and the people that wrote about them, to the forefront of my 
engagement with early modern philosophy.  
Finally, I have also tried to give political readings of the texts that I discuss 
throughout the dissertation. “Reading politically” can mean many things, and I briefly 
covered what I meant by it in the introduction: situating texts in the power structures 
they assume, and excavating those that they attack; understanding both the narratives 
that they place themselves in and those narratives in which they have come, 
subsequently, to be placed; testing out how texts might be placed in newer narratives, 
including contemporary ones for our own use. It is clear, I think, how such methodology 
seeks to move beyond the standard narrative—for one thing, it assumes that there are 
other narratives to be had, and actively searches for them. It also seeks to keep ideas 
closely in their immediate contexts, and in the contexts that they have accrued over the 
years, rather than treating them as abstract or timeless. It tries to understand how the 
answers to philosophical questions—and the questions themselves—are formed not just 
in the minds of individuals, or even of individuals in dialogue with one another, but in 
the structural conditions in which those individuals involuntarily find themselves. In this 
again I have tried to work in opposition to the image of the hermetic and heroic “great 
man” philosopher of the standard narrative.  
 
5.2 Future Routes 
 
To bring the dissertation to an end, then, I will here briefly identify a few avenues 
for research to be undertaken in future, following some of the routes I have mentioned 
above or forging new ones. I will begin with content questions that have emerged during 
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the process of writing the dissertation, and then turn to new possibilities in 
methodology.  
First, an underlying concern of many of the writers and activists of the 
dissertation that could fruitfully be the object of further study is that of the distinction 
between the masculinised public realm of political reason, abstract right, and civil 
participation, and the feminised private realm of domestic duty, personal ethics, and 
maternal care. The relation of these two realms to one another, and the relation of 
women to them, was complicated throughout the early modern period. Some of this 
complexity can be seen in Chapter Three, where I noted a distinction between two 
understandings of good aesthetic taste in the work of the Earl of Shaftesbury and Frances 
Reynolds: Shaftesbury argued for a masculinised, aristocratic taste that translated to 
virtue in the public realm, while Reynolds described taste as a matter of private feelings 
incubated by women in the private realm. Between and beyond these two opposed views 
was that of Wollstonecraft herself, who in rejecting the association—positive or 
negative—between women and taste also sought to move beyond that association that 
kept women tied to domestic life. To complicate matters further, Wollstonecraft 
associated the aristocracy—the constituents of “the public” for Shaftesbury, and the 
bearers of public virtue—with the same indolent and feminised aesthetic forms that 
Shaftesbury decried. For Wollstonecraft, perhaps, the public and private realms are best 
muddled together, their distinctions abandoned, with both men and women able to 
participate in public and to have rational domestic lives.  
In Chapter Four the gendered contestation of the public realm is seen more 
explicitly. The women’s requests to form armed militias, de Gouges’ demand for political 
rights, and the direct actions of insurrection or revolt themselves were all attempts to 
seize control of the public and to make a presence there known. The men of the Parisian 
and French legislatures responded aggressively to ban women from public political 
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participation—from petitioning the assemblies and from forming their own political 
clubs.4 In this case, then, the public realm is something that has to be created and 
defended, its boundaries policed. For women to act in public was to overrun these 
boundaries, to declare their full citizenship, and to reject the gender binaries that were 
just then being coded into the new republic.  
In the seventeenth century the distinction is more inchoate. But there are 
promising avenues in the work of—for instance—the Venetian nun Arcangela Tarabotti, 
who wrote fervently against the practice of imprisoning unwanted daughters in convents 
but whose solution to the practice, rather than a more thoroughgoing liberation of 
women, was to allow daughters to “enjoy a true Christian education at home 
accompanied by modest retirement from the world.”5 The idea that women should or 
could be of the world seems remote. More complicated still are Suchon’s arguments for 
the “Neutralist” life in The Celibate Life Freely Chosen, which arguably blend together 
elements of public and private life.6 Drawing together these disparate threads from the 
seventeenth century, and following them to the great contests over the public realm at 
the end of the eighteenth, requires a great deal more study.  
A related avenue for further research concerns the role that social class plays in 
the work of the women writers of the early modern period. As we already saw, 
Shaftesbury linked the public realm directly to the aristocracy; Wollstonecraft, by 
contrast, attacked the aristocracy and instead defended a robust, austere rationalism that 
                                                        
4 “Does the honesty of woman allow her to display herself in public and to struggle against men? to argue 
in full view of a public about questions on which the salvation of the republic depends? In general, women 
are ill suited for elevated thoughts and serious meditations…” “The National Convention Outlaws Clubs 
and Popular Societies of Women” in Levy et al 216 
5 Tarabotti 42 
6 For Suchon, the celibate life is one that is neither a married nor religious life, but one “without 
commitments.” There is however a great deal of variance in how much those living the celibate life might 
involve themselves in the outside world. See, for instance, “On Different Kinds of Lives without 
Commitments,” Suchon 248-55. She also argues that institutionalising the celibate life is good for society 
in general: “We must serve the public good, and no one can do that with greater ease than those without 
commitments,” Suchon 256.  
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she associated with the middle classes. Her innovation in both her anti-aristocracy and 
anti-patriarchal polemics was to break apart the naturalised association of women and 
the middle class, defended with different moral valences by both Shaftesbury and 
Reynolds: this allowed her to claim that the middle classes were the true bearers of 
“masculine” Enlightenment values and that such values were in principle open to women 
as well. As I noted in Chapter Three, the revolutionary change she foresaw for society 
was one in which the rational virtue of middle class men was open to everyone, and the 
irrational sentiment of the aristocracy—which had the effect, Wollstonecraft thought, of 
bewitching the working class, making them impotent to affect change7—was done away 
with.  
Middle class virtue was hence the route to women’s liberation for Wollstonecraft. 
For the working class Revolutionary Republican Women, however, this proved 
insufficient. As we saw in Chapter Four, their coupling together of economic and political 
concerns—in the bread riots, for instance, but also in their demand that the Terror be 
enforced against “speculators, hoarders, and [...] egotistical merchants”8—was decried as 
counter-revolutionary in the Jacobin Club.9 But for the radical women of the Revolution 
the institution of a liberal capitalist democracy did not go far enough: they saw, from the 
position of people that had to work for the food of themselves and their families, that to 
really ensure their new rights meant a reorganisation of the class structure of society as 
much as of the government. And this classed element of their resistance was part of their 
downfall.  
These are just the beginnings of an attempt to tease out the intricacies of the 
relation between class politics and pro-women politics in the early modern period. Such 
                                                        
7 See, for example, Wollstonecraft 59-60 
8 “The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women Joins the Cordeliers to Denounce Traitors,” in Levy et 
al 151 
9 Journal historique et politique, no. 69, 18 September 1793. Cited in Rose 60 note 28 
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a project would also have to look back to the seventeenth century, to see how class 
conflict and women’s liberation interacted in thought then too. Much work could yet be 
done.  
Finally, a quick look toward future methodologies. In Chapter Four, I argued for a 
methodology in the history of philosophy away from the “great man” view of the 
standard narrative. There are, I think, good political and moral reasons for abandoning, 
or at least looking beyond, this way of structuring our history: as I said in Chapter Two, 
the construction of the individual as an asocial singularity is often criticised as implicitly 
masculine, and even if this image is a little caricatured we might do well to use such 
critiques as a route toward thinking differently. This desire to move beyond the “great 
man” helped motivate the move toward a philosophy of crowds and revolt in Chapter 
Four, but it also affords us new opportunities in how we engage with the named 
philosophers of the past.  
Rather than treat such philosophers as hermetic, sui generis figures, whose 
thought was shaped only by their engagement with the deep structures of the universe, 
the view—expressed throughout the dissertation—that individuals and their work are 
complicated assemblages, sensitive to social and political circumstance, could lead us in 
new directions. We might, where possible, want to move yet deeper into the archives to 
find the ways that the seemingly abstracted thoughts in philosophical texts might have 
been influenced by more practical day-to-day concerns and relationships. There are 
multiple good examples of such work in recent scholarship on Emilie du Châtelet, among 
others.10   
                                                        
10 For contextual studies of du Châtelet see, for example, Nagel 97-112, Hutton 515-31, and Winter 173-
206, especially 186-90; Larsen 105-26 for an analysis of the epistolary relationship between Marie de 
Gournay and Anna Maria van Schurman; and Bergès 386-9 on the exigencies of women’s publication and 
intellectual activity in the early modern period.  
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Alongside this opportunity, however, we are afforded another chance for 
pluralism. Abandoning the hermetic “great man” philosopher also allows us to be less 
beholden to authorial intention in our interpretations of the works of the past. In 
Chapter Three, for instance, I sought not to give a fulsome account of Wollstonecraft’s 
views on aesthetics but to situate the views I found in the Vindications in their 
intellectual and political contexts. Though Wollstonecraft surely would deserve a place in 
a true monumentalist survey of the intellectual history of the period, my intention in the 
chapter was not to treat her as an honorary female “great man” but as a political actor 
and a producer of political texts: texts that can even, perhaps, have meanings in their 
contexts or ours that are beyond their authorship. Remaining open to this possibility 
might radically change how we read the texts of the past. The interpretations I presented 
throughout this dissertation only tentatively begin down this path.  
Of course, as I already noted, the move away from “great man” history of 
philosophy is most radically made in Chapter Four, which not only does away with the 
“man” side of the formula but also searches for philosophical ideas beyond 
individualised greatness. In part this is because of necessity: one cannot easily get a fix 
on the intentions or beliefs of the great majority of the radical women of the French 
Revolution. But it is also reflective of an attempt on my part to do philosophy, or the 
history of philosophy, at a remove from not just the content of the standard narrative—
its preoccupation with particular figures and particular questions—but also its form. Due 
to the work of recent decades to move away from the standard narrative, we need no 
longer feel bound to interpret only individuals, or only scholars in particular lines of 
lineage, or only texts.  
This has the advantage of not just replacing the standard narrative with another 
that changes its faces but keeps its methods and commitments. But though I think such a 
radical break is necessary I do not think it needs to be destructive. We have all learned 
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and will continue to learn much from the standard narrative; and though I have been 
guided by a new methodology I think that my interpretations are plausible enough on 
their own or by conventional lights. Moving forward, however, we are afforded an 
opportunity to approach the history of the early modern period with more pluralism, 
more collectivity, and more politics. I think this will help us to produce more interesting 
and even more accurate narratives of the history of thought. And it shows us that like the 
societies and governments I have discussed, the history of our discipline is the product of 
collective, politically-engaged, and practical action. Shifting the standard narrative 
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